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 This thesis concerns institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania and seeks to test 
several variables’ importance in determining individuals’ trust. African countries have 
historically been somewhat neglected in trust research and these two countries have therefore 
been chosen as the cases of my study. Based on the cultural theories and institutional theories 
of trust I have selected socio-demographic factors, social capital, transparency, democratic 
satisfaction and policy performance as my independent variables. The analysis is based on 
survey data from Afrobarometer conducted in 2012. The findings in this thesis suggest that the 
cultural theories do little in explaining institutional trust as the socio-demographic and social 
capital variables do rather poorly. Institutional theories on the other hand do very well in 
explaining variations in trust in public institutions. The most determining variable in terms of 
individuals trust in public institutions seems to be the general policy performance of the 
government and individuals’ approval of the President’s performance.         
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
What is trust? What defines trust? Why do we decide to trust and how do we measure 
it? Do we need trust? Trust can be seen as the glue that holds our society together, a foundation 
and a lubricant (Grimen, 2009). It is a control factor that evaluates the job of the trustee and in 
this sense we also need distrust as a morally correct reaction to actions we find critique worthy 
(ibid.). Blind and naïve trust can have fatal consequences and some hesitation is therefore good 
before deciding to trust someone. We need to minimize the risk of entering a relation with 
someone. How do we do this? How do we know if we can trust someone? General trust can be 
learned and it is crucial that we do as we in many situations in life need to rely on others and 
their skills and expertise to handle unforeseen issues, like for instance with medical treatment. 
General trust or distrust will in many ways stem from experience and the culture of trust in 
society. Negative experience will naturally lead to a more precautious attitude in the future. It 
is believed that those who trust are more tolerant, cooperate better, are more creative and willing 
to take risks as well as generally being more satisfied. With that said, we do find cooperation 
between people who do not trust each other and this is also to some degree necessary. Yes, we 
do need trust, both between individuals as well as between individuals and institutions and 
professionals. We need to cooperate with one another and trust is a natural part of this. 
Institutional trust is also a necessary component for individuals to trust each other. If the 
members and actors in the institutions adopt the accepted and expected values and norms the 
institutions will become trustworthy and in turn this will have positive repercussions for society 
as a whole. Confucius (551-479 B.C.) once said that there were three elements necessary in 
order to rule a state: weapons, food and trust. In trying times the last factor to be given up should 
be trust because without trust the system will collapse (Grimen, 2009) and participation and 
cooperation will decline.  
In this thesis the weight will be on institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania. The 
field of trust is without a doubt extensive and it can be studied within various contexts, 
disciplines and subgenres. Within political science and public administration however, it seems 
only right to study citizens trust in public institutions and how and why this trust occurs. 
Numerous contributions have been made in order to find some answers to these questions 
concerning why individuals choose to trust institutions. However, rather few of them on the 
African continent and this is where I wish to contribute. Hopefully, by the end of this thesis, I 
will be able to give some answers as to which factors lead to individuals’ trust in the public 
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institutions, and if any of the theories that have commonly been used to explain trust in Western 
and Asian countries can be applied to an African context as well.     
 
The quality and moral trustworthiness of an institution should be evaluated through four 
key values: fairness, solidarity, keeping promises and veracity (Grimen, 2009). When actors do 
not embrace these values we do not know what motivates them in their work and it will 
consequently be harder, if not impossible to trust both them and the institutions (ibid.). 
Institutional trust indicates the public’s support for the political system and we can identify 
several levels of support. The most general level refers to the feeling of national identity and 
citizenship. The second level is concerned around the support for, and agreement about the 
main principles in the political regime. The third level focuses on the evaluation of and support 
for governmental performance while the fourth level is concerned about the actual institutions 
of the system, like courts of law, the parliament and the police force. A final level can be 
accounted to support in the actors of the institutions (Askvik, 2007). I will include these levels 
of support in different ways throughout the thesis. As my dependent variable is trust in public 
institutions the latter two levels will be visible in relation to this. The second and third level of 
support becomes clearer when studying policy performance and satisfaction with democracy 
which are two of my independent variables, which I hope can help explain why individuals 
trust institutions. In addition, I have chosen socio-demographic factors, transparency and social 
capital as independent variables. I find that these variables cover a wide specter of areas in 
society and I hope that they therefore will explain large parts of the variations in institutional 
trust. These are also variables that have been included in previous research on the field and have 
been found to be rather explanatory for institutional trust.         
 
Trust can seem somewhat abstract and broad, at the same time it is a very common and 
familiar concept. But do we ever reflect over why we trust others or why we do not?  Studying 
trust requires us to consider these questions carefully. A good theory of trust should include 
components of how, when and why trust occurs, develops and crumbles (Grimen, 2009). As of 
today no theory is successful in doing this, combining several theories is therefore necessary. 
In my attempt to explain how and why individuals in Botswana and Tanzania choose to trust 
or not trust the public institutions in their country, I will rely on institutional theories as well as 
cultural theories. These two theories have vastly different approaches to explaining why trust 
occurs. While the former bases itself on individuals’ evaluation of the performance of 
institutions, the latter is based on individual and social factors such as upbringing, personality 
and societal conditions unrelated to the public institutions. In newer regimes it is believed to be 
Marianne Landmark, Spring 2016: Trust in Public Institutions 
	
3 
common that popular support from the public will consist of a combination of these two as 
presented in William Mishler and Richard Rose’s (2001) lifetime learning model. After a 
regime has undergone change people may still rely on the fundamental political attitudes they 
acquired under the old regime as well as pre-adult socialization. Influence from the performance 
of the new government will cause their original beliefs and values to be questioned and updated 
(Askvik, 2010). The longer the new regime has been in place the more important institutional 
performance seems to become (ibid.). Botswana and Tanzania both have relatively new 
regimes, though Botswana has had a stable multi-party democracy since independence 
(Kryzanek, 2009, Worldbank, 2016), while Tanzania just recently converted from Nyerere’s 
socialist one-party regime to a multi-party democracy (Morrissey, 1995). We might therefore 
be able to see signs of these transformations in people’s trust patterns. As both countries are 
still in the phase of establishing full-functioning liberal democracies it is likely that we will see 
traces of both early-life and later-life experiences in the determination of trust as these are likely 
to coincide in newer democracies. If any of the two theories will gain more support and be of 
greater importance in determining trust will therefore be interesting to see. The fact that these 
two countries do not have full liberal-democracies yet and have a history of autocracy, lack of 
freedom and reduced civil rights might also cause levels of institutional trust to be unnaturally 
high due to loyalty and political fear. Determinant factors of trust may in this case be hard to 
discover and we might find some paradoxes in the correlations between institutional trust and 
the independent variables. I will therefore have a critical view of the results I get, and try to 
give logical explanations for the occurrences. In some cases I must acknowledge that there can 
be multiple reasons for why respondents answer the way they do, which in turn will cause the 
paradoxical correlations.         
 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
The wide-ranging field of trust can be studied in numerous ways and contexts and as 
outlined above I have chosen to study the determinant factors for institutional trust in two 
African countries. Based on this I have developed the following research problem: 
 
What determines how and why people trust public institutions in Botswana and Tanzania? 
 Are levels of institutional trust higher in Botswana, a relatively successful (in socio-economic 
development terms) country, than in Tanzania, a less successful country? 
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1.3 Relevance of the study 
“Trust is the core of social capital and one of the key resources for the development of 
modern societies” (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009:1537). Why then is this vital factor in society 
not studied further in developing countries in general and African countries in particular? 
Afrobarometer1 is a database that provides quantitative data on several social, political and 
financial issues in Africa, but there are only a limited number of studies where these findings 
have been used in relation to trust studies. Afrobarometer too, produces a large number of 
papers and articles based on the findings in their surveys, but as far as I am concerned only a 
few of them are focused on trust and what factors lead to institutional trust. I think it is 
astonishing that there has not been conducted more research on trust in the African countries, I 
therefore find it both interesting and relevant to study this further and that is why I have chosen 
institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania as the topic for my research. The reason for 
choosing these two countries is their differences in economic performance and cultural 
compositions, but also similarities in their geographical placement and historical factors.  
Studying trust as a vital part of social capital first became common in the 1980’s and 
1990’s and is therefore a relatively new research field in social science (Freitag and Bühlmann, 
2009). Trust is an absolute necessary factor in order to cooperate with other members of society, 
both the ones we know personally and strangers, in financial, political or social situations 
(Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). These connections and networks are crucial in order to achieve 
personal and societal goals, which will again be crucial in order to achieve development. In 
order for public institutions and the government to gain legitimacy and successfully implement 
public policies they are dependent on a trusting and supporting population (Jamil and Askvik, 
2015). Previous research finds that political institutions, civic engagement and income equality 
are necessary conditions for developing trust (Gleave et al., 2012). But where do these relations 
of trust occur and why? The theories are many and the findings point in many directions and it 
is necessary to explore these questions within this field further (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). 
It is for this reason exactly I believe it is important to contribute, at least to some degree, to this 
research field by studying the occurrence of trust in the context of two developing countries. 
As trust has been so widely acknowledged as an important factor in developing a modern 
democracy, achieving good governance and building social capital there have been a large 
number of studies on this field, but these studies have to a large extent focused on countries that 
are included in the World Values Surveys or European Values Surveys. These mostly cover 
																																																						
1	Afrobarometer: A Pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys 
on democracy, governance, economic conditions and related issues in 36 African countries 
(www.afrobarometer.org). 
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developed countries in Europe and North America, whilst only a few number of African, Asian 
and South American countries are represented. Nevertheless, Steinar Askvik’s (2007, 2008, 
2010), Ann Kryzanek (2009) and Dag Ingvar Jacobsen’s (1999) have studied trust within 
institutions in South Africa, Botswana and Tanzania respectively. They have however had a 
slight different approach than I have chosen. I will review the findings from these in the 
following. In addition to this many of the theories developed around the concept of trust have 
been developed from studies in Western countries with a higher development status and far 
more established and stable democracies. These theories may therefore not be applicable to less 
developed countries which are still struggling to establish strong institutions and a functioning 
government. Findings from post-communist countries or newly established democracies show 
somewhat different patterns of trust than in more established, western democracies. A further 
testing of the most common theories of trust might therefore be necessary.  
 
 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
 The overall objective of this thesis is to study institutional trust in Botswana and 
Tanzania and what factors influence this form of trust. Some specific objectives can be included 
in this: 
- Compare levels of institutional trust in the two countries 
- Examine which of my independent variables explains the variations in institutional trust 
the best 
- Test the main theories of trust in an African context 
- Analyze the findings in regard to development levels in the two countries 
 
 
1.5 Significance of the study  
 Trust in public institutions is a vital factor for a functioning democracy and a stable 
society and is therefore needed in order to achieve development. It is also interesting to see 
which factors determines trust, and only by knowing this will we have a chance to increase 
levels of institutional trust. Causality however, is a big issue when studying trust and we 
therefore need to be aware of whether different societal factors like social capital or satisfaction 
with the democracy leads to trust or the other way around. The importance of trust has been 
studied to great lengths in Western and some Asian countries over the last few decades, while 
most African countries have been neglected from this research. This is the main reason for the 
case-selection in this study. As institutional trust has not been extensively studied in an African 
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context, it is both interesting and much needed to test the theories of trust also here. Are there 
any significantly different factors determining trust here than in developed countries? Are there 
any cultural differences between the two countries that determine trust? The hope is that this 
master thesis can be a small contribution to the study of institutional trust in Africa.          
 
 
1.6 Organization of the thesis  
 This thesis will be divided into six chapters; this introduction chapter has included an 
introduction to the field of trust and my motivation for doing this research and the relevance of 
the topic as well as objectives for and significance of the study and naturally the research 
problem. I will in the following section move on to a theoretical discussion of institutional trust, 
explaining my dependent variable and a theoretical discussion of various factors explaining 
institutional trust, leading to my independent variables. This chapter will naturally also include 
the main theories I will use when discussing my findings, and last the analytical framework 
displaying my variables. The third chapter of this thesis is the methodological framework I have 
used for completing my research, including a review of the quantitative comparative method, 
the reasoning for my case selection and an evaluation of the reliability and validity of the study. 
The remaining chapters will be devoted to the presentation of my findings and analyzing and 
discussing these. Lastly, I will round of with some concluding remarks where I will try to give 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical and Analytical Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This second chapter consists mainly of two parts; first, a theoretical discussion of 
institutional trust which is my dependent variable and second, a theoretical discussion of the 
various factors explaining institutional trust. On the basis of this discussion I have chosen socio-
demographic factors, social capital, transparency, satisfaction with democracy and policy 
performance as my independent variables. As we will see in the discussion all these variables 
can help explain institutional trust and they have also been grounded in different theories of 
trust. The theories that I have chosen to rely on are institutional or performance-based theory 
and cultural theories including both individual traits and societal conditions. I will round of the 
chapter by talking briefly about Afrobarometer and the datasets I am using, and last I will 
present the analytical model of the variables for my study.  
 
 
2.2 The field of Trust 
Ever since the times of philosophers John Locke and Thomas Hobbes the field of trust 
has been a present feature in discussions surrounding the society we live in (Freitag and 
Traunmüller, 2009). Georg Simmel (1992:393-394) later stated that trust was “one of the most 
important synthetic forces within society”. The current debate on trust stems from the increased 
research on social capital and is a rather recent development within social science (Freitag and 
Traunmüller, 2009). Over the last few decades we have seen an extensive growth in the 
literature concerning trust and it has become an important part of studying economic growth, 
development, good governance and civic engagement as well as social capital (Jamil and 
Askvik, 2015). Social capital in particular is directly connected to and impossible to achieve 
without trust. Social capital can refer to social organization and can generate coordinate actions 
(Putnam et al., 1993). This social cooperation is largely built on trust and reciprocity as this is 
the basis for collective group action (Rotberg, 1999). In order to take part in voluntary activities 
one needs to know that the efforts put in will be reciprocated in terms of certain benefits to 
taking part in these activities. These benefits will usually come in the form of societal goods 
and security in the fact that one is part of a larger whole.  
The complexity and discussions surrounding the concept of trust naturally make the 
definitions many, but one way of defining it is as: “a belief that others, at worst, will not 
knowingly or willingly do you harm, and at best, will act in your interests” (Newton, 2001:3). 
Trust can be seen as a coping mechanism for individuals to handle the complex and uncertain 
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social organization (Gleave et al., 2012). This way they can either trust others to perform a 
certain job and be responsible for the outcome or they will cooperate with those with mutual 
interests in order to reach a common goal. Others again relate trust to social intelligence, 
morality or shared expectations, meaning that people who share an understanding of the world 
are more likely to trust each other (Gleave et al., 2012).  
Despite the disagreements on how to define the concept of trust it is widely agreed upon 
its importance for a civilized social and political society as well as high levels of trust is a 
prerequisite for a functioning democracy (Newton, 2001). The civil society and social capital 
that is needed in order to sustain democracy is only achieved through a large number of social 
networks which have to be based on trust in order to function. Trust is a good indicator of social 
capital, but is not necessarily sufficient. In addition to this there also needs to be a degree of 
trust between the civil society and politicians and government officials for civic engagement to 
occur (ibid.).  
 
 
2.2.1 Dimensions of Trust 
We can divide trust into four types within two dimensions: strategic versus moralistic 
trust, and particularized versus generalized trust (Gleave et al., 2012). The first dimension 
explains how we trust. For instance, that we trust someone with a specific profession to do the 
job they are trained to do, we trust X to do Y. This is called strategic trust. Moralistic trust, on 
the other hand, is not context-specific. This means that we simply trust another person (ibid.). 
The second dimension refers to whom we trust. Simply put, particularized trust means trust in 
the people you have a personal relation with, such as family and friends. The social trust that 
occurs in a local community, neighborhoods, amongst friends and family will be referred to as 
particularized trust. This is based on trust in people, not because what they say they will do, but 
because their previous actions give you a reason to believe that they will act in a way that will 
benefit you in the future and it will in turn also benefit them to help you or act in your interest. 
For both parties the options and consequences of not entering this relationship are unwanted 
(Putnam et al., 1993). Often, these are people you have a personal relation with (Gleave et al., 
2012). “I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you” (Putnam et al., 
1993:169). Particularized trust has, by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994), been referred to as 
knowledge-based trust. When this trust is transferred to the larger community, like 
governments, public institutions, the health care system and education system we have no 
personal relation to the people in charge and this is what we call a generalized type of trust 
(Gleave et al., 2012). This is trust in strangers or anonymous others we know nothing about 
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(Gleave et al., 2012). “Generalized trust is the belief that most people can be trusted. 
Particularized trust is faith only in your own kind” (Uslaner, 2000:573). The generation of 
generalized trust from particularized trust is where it gets difficult and this is especially a 
problem in developing countries. As noted above this is mainly because people tend not to trust 
people outside their own ethnic group or local community which again will cause levels of 
social trust to be low as people in general do not trust each other. Robert Putnam (2000) 
introduces the concepts of bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital refers to networks 
within homogenous groups. This would be relations with family, friends and neighbors. These 
types of networks are valuable when it comes to working for collective needs, as people in these 
groups are likely to have the same interests. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, means 
networks between heterogeneous groups. Meaning ties that are slightly more distant, like those 
with workmates and acquaintances. These networks can benefit from linking social capital by 
establishing ties with those outside one’s immediate group of contacts. These concepts can also 
be referred to as thick and thin trust (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009).  
Another reason that generalized trust may be low in certain developing countries is that 
the government and public institutions have not delivered the way it should and have not 
provided for its citizens. High levels of corruption is also likely to lead to distrust as this proves 
that government officials are more concerned with their private good, rather than the one of the 
public. This may cause a distrusting environment so that people will not just develop low trust 
or even distrust towards the government, public officials or others within their vertical trust 
relation, but also other people with whom they have a horizontal relation. Horizontal relations 
in the networks of trust mean that the members of the group are of equal status, race, class, 
ethnicity etc. Vertical trust networks will then consist of asymmetrical relations in a hierarchical 
system where some might be more dependent on the network than others (Putnam et al., 1993). 
Political and internal violence causing instability in a state, is another factor that contribute to 
low trust. The causation here is however, a little unclear as it can just as well be low levels of 
trust causing the conflict (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). This is a rather complex relation. 
Hutchison and Johnson (2011) provides two state-level factors, political capacity and internal 




2.2.2 Political Trust 
While social trust refers to the general trust in society, political trust is related to the 
political world and whether or not individuals trust politicians as well as political and public 
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institutions (Newton, 2001). Individual trust is a very common concept in society and in social 
science. Institutional trust however is slightly more abstract and debated. How does this trust 
in institutions differ from trust in other people? The rules, norms and procedures in society are 
in large part implemented and structured by institutions. Therefore, it is expected that officials 
like policemen, doctors, lawyers and civil servants will put into practice the rules and norms 
and official roles they are given (Jamil and Askvik, 2015). Individuals evaluate their trust in 
public institutions based on actions from and interactions with these members (ibid.). 
Institutional trust is achieved when the rules, norms and procedures are followed by the 
officials. The opposite actions will lead to the absence of trust as well as stating that the 
institutions are not functioning. This will in turn cause a decrease in legitimacy and a weak 
relationship between the state and the society (ibid.).    
 Political trust is strongly related to political capital, and just like social trust and social 
capital it is essential for a functioning democracy (Newton, 2001). While social and cultural 
trust refers to a more generalized form of trust in the social spheres, political trust can be seen 
as an evaluation of the political world (ibid.). According to the performance-based theory it is 
a measure of how well the public thinks political and public institutions are performing. Kadri 
Lühiste (2006:478) defines it as: “confidence that political institutions will not misuse their 
power.” Low trust tells us that something is wrong, either the institutions are performing poorly 
or the expectations are too high (ibid.). Distrust from the public, on the other hand, will require 
the government to actively do something that violates with the general opinion of what is right 
and wrong, for instance corruption. Too high trust though is also not ideal as this can cause 
naivety and an uncritical attitude amongst the citizens. Trust can also be a consequence of 
naivety and an uncritical attitude. If political trust is based on factors in the cultural theories, 
trust might be unnaturally high as individuals will trust public institutions for no other reason 
than that they are trusting people.  
Levels of political trust and legitimacy can be measured by looking at political interest, 
civic engagement, voter turn-out, tax payment, participation, political tolerance and confidence 
in the President, Parliament and other public institutions (Newton, 2001). How responsive the 
government is to the citizens and to what degree they act according to preferences is another 
way of measuring trust and legitimacy (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). An individual’s idea or 
experience of how the government is performing is often shaped through media and other 
information channels. It is therefore important that the perception individuals have is as close 
to correct as possible. A transparent political system is therefore vital so that any unlawful and 
unfaithful public officials or politicians will be uncovered. Political trust is essential for stable 
and functioning political institutions as well as for the democracy in whole. Public institutions 
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as well as the officials, both elected politicians and administrators, working there are dependent 
on trust, legitimacy and support from the public in order to complete their tasks. A democracy 
is also dependent on active citizens who want to take part in the political world. However, if 
they do not regard the institutions as trustworthy this will likely not happen (Jamil and Askvik, 
2016). In addition, it will also make more sense to individuals to follow rules and regulations 
if they trust the institutions (ibid.).  
 
In spite of the importance of trust in a democracy there is a belief that a certain level of 
distrust is needed in order to guarantee control (Van De Walle and Six, 2014). Too much trust 
will lead to naivety amongst citizens (ibid.). The value of low trust and distrust in a society is 
important to consider in a study of trust (ibid.). Many see trust and distrust as opposite ends of 
the same axis. Steven Van de Walle and Frederique Six (2014) along with Lewicki et al. (1998) 
however, treat them as two separate ideas which can both be present simultaneously. The 
absence of trust is rather low trust than distrust, and the absence of distrust does not necessarily 
generate trust, but gives us low levels of distrust. According to Möllering’s definition of trust 
it is based on routine, reflexivity and reason (Van De Walle and Six, 2014). If individual’s trust 
in government and public institutions is based on routine, it will cause them to be passive. 
Individuals are the ones who should keep the government in check and some degree of criticism 
is therefore productive. Van de Walle and Six (2014) also see distrust as not purely negative, 
but rather a factor that can be constructive and rational and lead to control, whilst too much 
trust can be seen as naïve and uncritical and lead to the absence of control (ibid.).  
Democratic progress can often develop from distrust (ibid.). Both trust and distrust 
requires an active opinion from the individual, while low trust or low distrust is more or less 
based on ignorance and indifference. Trust is based on the expectation that a government 
official or public institution will perform the task they are assigned to do. Distrust, on the other 
hand, relies on an expectation that the official or institution will fail to complete its tasks and 
act contrary to shared values and norms (ibid.). When treated as two separate concepts the two 
can, as mentioned, coexist, meaning that one can trust certain aspects within a relationship, but 
distrust others (ibid.). The presence of control does not necessarily imply active distrust, but it 
can help produce and build trust (ibid.). When studying trust in a society it is therefore important 
to study both trust and distrust as well as control as separate concepts. We must avoid drawing 
conclusions stating that low trust in a society means distrust (ibid.). If trust and distrust in public 
institutions are based on performance, change in trust patterns and regaining trust is a relatively 
easy matter, at least on paper. Institutions can turn to one of two methods, they can either 
improve their performance or they can lower the public’s expectations. These approaches will 
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lead to fast change in the institutions and trust can be regained in only a few years. If trust and 
distrust are culturally bound however, change is somewhat harder to achieve and may take 
decades. To explore this further, we need to dig deeper into institutionalism.   
 
 
2.2.3 Empirical examples 
Dag Ingvar Jacobsen’s (1999) article: “Trust in Political-Administrative Relations: The 
Case of Local Authorities in Norway and Tanzania” examines the differences in trust in a well-
developed, functioning democracy and a newly established democracy. The study was 
conducted in the context that administrative development is equally important as the political 
development in achieving and sustaining a developed and modern society (Jacobsen, 1999). 
Both these aspects are included in the concept of good governance, though the labor division 
between these two is a bit unclear. In a functioning democratic system politicians come and go 
as they are elected only for a certain period of time, but the administration stays. It is vital that 
there is a trusting relation between these two. If politicians exploit their positions to their own 
benefit (corruption), administrators may distrust the political system. In addition, if the 
politicians act incompetent, due to how the system is designed, administrators may distrust the 
politicians (Jacobsen, 1999). The findings in this study indicates that there is indeed a difference 
in trust between the countries with Norwegian administrators expressing greater trust in their 
politicians and political institutions than the Tanzanian administrators do (ibid.). One variable 
that seems to influence the trust-levels positively is education and degree of professionalism. 
This is probably the most interesting finding in relation to my own study. I however, will study 
the general public’s trust in the public institutions which means both administrators and 
politicians. Nevertheless, the indication that the more education one has the more faith one has 
in the political system can possibly be applied to the general public. This shows that an 
education contributes to a better understanding and more knowledge about the system of 
politics and administration (ibid.). The paper concludes that national factors, such as culture, 
political traditions, economic prosperity and social capital, are more important for a functioning 
administration than trust (ibid.).  
 
In a working paper from Afrobarometer Mattes et al. (2002) review the results from an 
Afrobarometer survey from 2001 on national public opinion in Tanzania. This paper considers 
how citizens feel about the transition from a socialist one-party state with command economy 
to a multi-party democracy with market-based economy. In order for this to be successful 
individuals need to first of all understand what this type of regime contains as well as approve 
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of the policies that are being implemented. Secondly, they must take an active part in the 
democracy which includes being critical towards the government. The survey shows definite 
support for economic and political reform, but there are also clear signs of the legacies from 
the previous regime. In addition, we also see that Tanzanians are rather uncritical in regard to 
their political system which can work as a hindrance for democracy to function ideally. In 
general, the public opinion in Tanzania differentiates itself from several other African countries 
(Mattes et al., 2002). The authors of this paper present three paradoxes as a result of this. First, 
they are very dissatisfied with the national economy, but at the same time they are very 
supportive of an economic reform. Secondly, they express great interest in politics and are 
active in various political events like campaigns and rallies. Individual and spontaneous 
participation however is not so common. Third, Tanzanians perceive corruption levels to be 
high at the same time as they show great trust in government (ibid.). One reason for this 
inconsistency in opinions could be that individuals are simply not critical enough and they 
employ a certain habit when it comes to how they feel about the government and the political 
system. These habits stem partly from the old, socialist regime, but also from the new political 
and economic regime. The distance between “normal” people and politicians in government is 
also quite big which may cause individuals to have more respect and loyalty towards them 
instead of the critical attitude they should have. Another reason for the paradoxes may be that 
the top-down rule in the country has been rather kind and well-meaning so even if the 
institutions do not succeed in all their work they still receive some support from the public 
(Mattes et al., 2002). This can indicate that trust in Tanzania is determined by both cultural and 
institutional factors from the life-time learning model that Mishler and Rose (2001) present us 
to.    
Judged by this we can expect levels of institutional trust in Tanzania to be rather high 
even though there is not necessarily an objective reason for this. An uncritical attitude and a 
belief that they, as citizens, must obey and support any government and President will give high 
levels of trust. In addition, this uncritical attitude may also work as a hindrance for an objective 
evaluation of the government’s performance. This may cause results for both my dependent 
variable as well as some of the independent variables to be unnaturally high, giving me a 
somewhat wrong picture of reality.       
 
Marc Hutchison and Kristin Johnson (2011) have studied the relation between political 
capacity and institutional trust in 16 different African countries. They rely on the relative 
political capacity (RPC) model, which refers to whether governments are able to obtain the 
needed levels of resources given their economic capabilities. It accounts for variations in 
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income due to economic development as well as it reflects how effective a government’s 
resource extraction is considering its natural resources and economic endowment (Hutchison 
and Johnson, 2011). RPC is regarded as a valid measurement of how well public institutions 
perform in a number of important areas and could therefore also be seen in relation to 
institutional trust, hence the institutional theory discussed below. Hutchison and Johnson 
(2011) hypothesize that countries with high political capacity will also have high trust in the 
public institutions. If the government is efficient it must mean that the institutions are 
performing as they should and if individuals base their trust on performance, high efficiency 
will increase trust (ibid.). In their analysis they find that a state’s political capacity does have a 
positive effect on institutional trust across all the countries in the study. Increasing the 
government’s efficiency will therefore help in generating more trust (ibid.). The RPC in 
Botswana was 0.63 in 2005 while it was 1.77 in Tanzania the same year. Given that a higher 
number indicates better political capacity we might expect that individuals have more faith in 
institutions in Tanzania than in Botswana. As opposed to in the previous example, this indicates 
that trust in Tanzania would be high based on valid and legitimate reasons.            
 
 
2.2.4 Institutionalism  
Douglass North (1981) defines institutions as “mechanisms or structures designed to 
govern the behavior of individuals” and their performance should be reflected when measuring 
political trust. Rosemary C. R. Taylor and Peter A. Hall (1996) simply states institutions as: 
“the rules of the game”. Institutions form individual’s behavior providing the strategic 
information as well as the routines and systems that shape their preferences in more cultural 
terms. These aspects are so deeply embedded in individuals and in society that the resistance to 
change is large. An institution will gain support from the people by contributing to solving 
collective action problems (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This way they will likely also gain more 
trust. Individuals’ behavior is influenced mainly through two approaches, the calculus approach 
or the cultural approach. The calculus approach relies on strategic and instrumental thinking 
and behavior from individuals (ibid.). The cultural approach on the other hand, focuses less on 
individuals as utility maximizers and more on the satisfactory outcome. Although individuals 
will always have some sense of rationality and purpose, they use known patterns and routines 
to reach their decision (ibid.). Historical institutionalism includes aspects of both these theories, 
while rational choice institutionalism naturally focuses on the calculus approach and 
sociological institutionalism is centered around the cultural approach (ibid).    
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These two approaches can be related to the different theories of institutional trust; 
cultural theory and institutional theory. Cultural theory states that trust in public institutions is 
based on personality characteristics and socialization. Institutional theory claims that 
institutional trust is generated when institutions perform in the preferred way according to the 
individual’s preferences. Change in the institutions in order to gain more support is naturally 
also related to these factors. If institutional trust is based on cultural factors, aspects of national 
and societal culture as well as up-bringing and socialization needs to be changed. This will be 
a long and complex process and can take decades or generations. If institutional trust is 
performance-based however increasing trust is a much simpler process, or at least in theory. In 
this case the variable that needs change is performance. In order for levels of institutional trust 
to increase institutional performance needs to change so that it fits better with people’s 
preferences (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The strength of the rational choice view is its explanation 
of why institutions continue to exist. It is claimed that this is because the institution succeeds 
in delivering the benefits individuals want (ibid.) and will therefor also gain more trust. Both 
historical and sociological institutionalism rely on an inductive approach to the question of how 
institutions emerge, but this theory comes to short when explaining change and persistence 
(ibid.). 
 
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1989) offer a valid contribution to institutional 
change in their book “Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics”. They 
view institutions as a source of order and stability, but state that even though institutions encode 
experiences into standard procedures of action, professional and practical rules and identities 
they do not necessarily reflect intelligence (March and Olsen, 1989). Nor does it automatically 
mean that institutions that do not adapt precisely and immediately will fail (ibid.). Their main 
point is that most attempts to reform political institutions are unsuccessful in terms of achieving 
what was intended. However, these processes do make change possible and it makes talking 
about the justifications and mechanisms of change useful (ibid.). It is quite obvious that 
institutions and the rules and norms within them cannot last forever; they will not always be 
applicable to society. Through time it will become necessary to diverge from the rules and 
slowly adjust to the changes in the surrounding society. These much needed adjustment periods 
can be long and exhausting and often the conflicting and inefficient solutions survive. In some 
cases, the institutions will rather try to change the society they are a part of than adapt to it 
(ibid.). The historical approach to institutions claim that this theory is particularly efficient 
based on that history changes quickly and inevitably towards an outcome greatly influenced by 
the environment. This assumes that regardless of the process or the time path of history the 
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outcomes will result in an equilibrium between institutions and the society they are a part of 
(March and Olsen, 1989). This, of course, will not always be the case as this would require a 
perfectly stable environment and instant adaption from institutions. There is likely to always be 
a certain degree of mismatch between the rate at which the environment changes and the 
institutions adapt (ibid.).  
 
 
2.2.5 Dependent Variable – Institutional Trust 
 The former discussion has proved the importance of trust in a society as well as it is a 
crucial part of studying institutions, democracy, social capital and civil society. In addition, 
studying trust and its origins is vital for the generation of these factors in society. We must 
know what variables generates trust so that increased trust can be achieved. Trust is without a 
doubt an essentially contested concept and there are a number of definitions as well as several 
synonyms. I chose to rely on Newton’s (2001) definition: “a belief that others, at worst, will 
not knowingly or willingly do you harm, and at best, will act in your interest”, which I believe 
can be transferred to institutional trust. There are many schools of thought regarding what leads 
to trust both among individuals and towards the government. It is natural to believe that our 
trust in government will rely on records of how they have performed in the past. High political 
trust will usually be a sign of an efficient, effective and democratic government, while low trust 
can be a result of government’s failure to deliver public services (Van De Walle and Six, 2014). 
There is also reason to believe that social and cultural factors will play in on how individuals 
trust government and also amongst each other. The specific theories of trust will be reviewed 
below. The belief that a certain level of distrust is needed in order to guarantee control and that 
too much trust will lead to naivety amongst citizens can be interesting in African terms as 
political fear, loyalty and little experience with a full liberal democracy can result in high levels 
of trust. The control factor will in this case be absent.  
This is the main reason that institutional trust was chosen as my dependent variable as 
this is a factor in society that needs to be explained further. Although there have been a number 
of studies within the field of trust they lack focus on the African countries. This is something 
that needs attention and I have therefore chosen Botswana and Tanzania as the cases for 
comparison in my study. I want to find out how trust in public institutions differs in these two 
countries and what factors influences trust in either negative or positive ways.  
 
In my study I will focus on institutional trust as I want to study citizen’s trust towards 
the public institutions. This will be operationalized through the question in the Afrobarometer 
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survey concerning the respondent’s trust in a number of public institutions. I could have chosen 
to combine this with other ways of measuring individuals’ trust in the government. For instance, 
by looking at in what degree people are willing to pay taxes as this would show to what degree 
people are willing to transfer their own earnings to the state. We can also look at the willingness 
to report crimes to the police as this could indicate to what extent people have faith in the police 
and investigation system. I have however, chosen to only focus on the institutional trust 
question. This has been converted into a trust index in my analysis and is merged together of 
the respondents’ answers to the question: How much trust do you have in the following? the 
President, the parliament, the national/independent electoral commission, the Botswana or 
Tanzania revenue authority, the local government council, the ruling party, the opposition 
political parties, the police, the army, courts of law and in Tanzania also the prevention and 
combating of corruption bureau. The reason for merging these into one variable is that it will 
be easier to operate within the analyses and simpler to read, but I have included the descriptive 
statistics for each individual institution.  
One problem that follows the merging of trust levels in regard to these various 
institutions is that there will be no division between the representational institutions, like the 
President and the Parliament, and the implementation institutions, like the police and court of 
law. According to Rothstein and Stolle (2008) the theoretical difference between this is that for 
the representational institutions the main task is to be partisan. The political parties and the 
President in power are supposed to implement the political ideologies of their party, individuals 
who support these ideologies will therefore likely have more trust in these institutions than 
individuals with opposing meanings (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Trust in the legal and 
administrative branches of the government however are believed to be more equally spread 
amongst the population. This is because civil servants, judges and police treat people evenly 
and impartially, or at least they should. Another reason is that these institutions identify and 
punish those who live outside the law, generally those who cannot be trusted (ibid.). The latter 
category is consequently thought to have a stronger correlation with general trust levels than 
the former category. As all the institutions will be merged in this case we might therefore not 
see a particularly strong correlation between generalized trust and institutional trust.      
 
In terms of how and whom respondents trust we need to see how the independent 
variables effect trust levels. Strategic trust can be defined from looking at policy performance 
and how the government’s performance will affect people’s trust. Moralistic trust can be related 
to the general trust in public institutions, which in turn is connected to generalized trust and if 
individuals feel that people in general can be trusted. Particularized trust on the other hand, will 
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be of greater interest in regard to the independent variable concerning social capital. As this is 
trust only in people that you know it might be interesting to see if respondents who are part of 
a trusting social environment will have greater trust in the public institutions.  
 
H1: In general, institutional trust may be higher in Botswana than in Tanzania 
Botswana is one of the most successful countries in Africa and has had great economic 
progress over the last few decades. Their annual growth rate is of over 7 percent (if we exclude 
the negative growth in 2009 (-7.7 percent)) (Worldbank, 2016) and the national poverty rates 
have dropped from 47 percent in 1993 to 19 percent in 2015 (UNDP, 2015). This is in part due 
to functioning institutions and political programs as well as low corruption rates. According to 
the performance-based theory of trust we have reason to believe that this will generate a trusting 
population as the theory states that the respondents who report that they are happy with the 
performance of the government will also show more trust. The societal theory, which states that 
the success of a country will have a positive effect on trust, also gives ground for this 
hypothesis. On the other hand, Botswana is still battling high poverty rates which can be a sign 
that the economic progress has not benefited the general population. As the theory of success 
and well-being is positively related to trust this may cause institutional trust to not be that high 
after all. Tanzania however, has not achieved the same levels of development as Botswana, in 
spite of their average annual economic growth of around 6 percent between 2006 and 2012 
(Worldbank, 2016). The government is still struggling in many areas, like with high corruption 
levels and high poverty rates. As 43 percent of the population is living in extreme poverty2 
(Millenium Development Goals Indicators, 2015) and 28 percent below the national poverty 
lines (Worldbank, 2016), it is likely that we will see lower levels of trust here. Since neither the 
economic success of the country nor of the individuals is particularly high, institutional trust 
may be lower in Tanzania than in Botswana. However, previous findings show that Tanzania 
has rather high levels of institutional trust, which could be due to loyalty, political fear and 
unawareness of ones rights and how a liberal-democracy is supposed to function. In addition, 
the relative political capacity seems to be better in Tanzania than in Botswana, which could 
lead to higher levels of trust (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011).    
It is also believed that trust is easier achieved in homogenous countries than in 
heterogeneous countries, I therefore have yet another reason to expect that levels of trust is 
likely to be higher in Botswana. The findings and theories point in somewhat opposite 
																																																						
2 extreme poverty is defined as living for under $ 1.25 (PPP) per day 
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directions, but I chose to rely on the theories and I therefore expect levels of institutional trust 
to be higher in Botswana than in Tanzania.   
 
 
2.3 Theories of Institutional Trust 
Where, how and why trust occurs are questions that have triggered a debate amongst 
scholars in the field of trust in the recent decades (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009). Generally 
speaking, we can say that trust stems from either personal predispositions and concrete 
experiences of trustworthiness in social interaction or on the other side, experience and 
evaluation of a situation and performance (ibid.). This can be divided into two main theories; 
institutional or performance-based theory and cultural theories (Lühiste, 2006). The common 
factor for these theories is that trust is something that is grounded in some form of experience 
(Mishler and Rose, 2001). When this experience is acquired, which experiences are most 
relevant and how long the lessons of trust are likely to last, however, are points where the two 
theories differ (ibid.). In terms of trust in developing countries it is important to acknowledge 
what effect culture and traditional norms and values will have on peoples trust in public 
institutions, public office holders and civil servants (Jamil and Askvik, 2016). These two 
theories and their determinant factors are displayed in figure 2.1 below.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Mishler and Rose’s (2001:34) competing theories of the origins of institutional trust 
combined with Newton and Delhey’s (2003) theories of cultural trust 
 
 Cultural and/or  
Exogenous Theories 
Institutional and/or  
Endogenous Theories 
Micro-Level Individual socialization 
- personality theory 
- theory of success and well-being 
Individual evaluations of 
performance 
Macro-Level National culture 
- voluntary organization 
- social networks theory 
- community theory 








 Personal predispositions mean qualities that are either innate or acquired early in life 
and this can result in generalized trust. Experience of trustworthiness builds on an evaluation 
of the social environment one is a part of and results in particularized trust. The particularized 
form of trust has strong ties to rational choice theory as individuals in this case would need 
information on the trustee in order to make a decision on whether or not to trust him or her. 
Getting this information implies that there is already a relationship and an interaction with past 
experiences to draw from (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The relationship will in most cases be 
mutual and in both party’s interest to maintain, meaning that trustworthy behavior is 
encouraged. As most people are part of bigger social networks this trustworthy behavior and 
trusting relationship can have repercussions to other members of the network. This 
particularized form of trust naturally only applies to people you know. The rational choice 
theory approach cannot be used in trusting strangers as we know nothing about them. In these 
cases Eric Uslaner (1999) amongst others turn to the personal predispositions one has for 
trusting people in general. Trust in this case will be based on optimism, worldview and outlook 
on life and not so much on experiences. Negative experiences will therefore not change one’s 
trust-patterns (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009). But if you are a constant victim of betrayed trust 
would not your outlook on life and optimism change? How can you continue to trust people if 
no one ever reciprocates the trust? Robert Putnam (Putnam, 2000) states that also trust in 
strangers is based on experience. If you are a part of a trusting social network and in general 
have positive experiences surrounding trust you will likely also trust strangers, but negative 
experiences will result in the opposite. Others again rely on a top-down, state-centered approach 
in explaining trust. In this view, trust is seen as something that is derived from institutions and 
organizations that encourage trustworthy behavior. It is related to generalized trust as it is based 
on whether there is a general degree of trust amongst individuals in a society (Delhey and 
Newton, 2003).  
How then does trust in public institutions fit into this explanation of trust? On the one 
side, individuals do not have any personal relation to any of the public institutions and the two 
do not interact as closely as two individuals would, but on the other side, they are not strangers 
either. The individual has past experience and the institution’s performance to draw from so it 
is natural that this is the basis of the trust, but yet it is not particularized trust. Some however, 
argue that a positive attitude will result in trust in government even though we do have the 
information we need to make an informed decision unlike when we choose to trust a stranger. 
The trust relationship between an individual and a public institution is largely asymmetric. The 
trustier knows the trustee, but not the other way around. Both parties are also dependent of the 
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trusting relation, but in different ways; the trusties in order to get the wanted and needed good 
and services, and the trustee in order to stay in power.    
 
In relation to how and why trust occurs comes the question of causality between social 
and political trust. This is a constant debate in the field. Does a strong social capital and trust 
amongst citizens generate trust to public institutions or do reliable and trustworthy institutions 
generate trust to the public? And do people take part in their local community and voluntary 
groups because they are naturally trusting or do they become more trusting because of this 
membership? Do people have more success in life because they are trusting or do they trust 
because of their success? Two important implications about cause and effect can be made here 
(Delhey and Newton, 2003). First, we need to look at the correlations between trust as a 
dependent variable and several independent variables. Only if there is a correlation between 
two of the variables we need to try to find the cause and effect. Secondly, there is no one way 
to determine the direction of the effect. We need to study each correlation separately in regard 
to what variables we are looking at (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Common sense is a good tool 
here. If there is a correlation, what cause-effect direction makes the most sense? Developing 
countries will often display low levels of trust in public institutions due to poor performance 
and bad governance. The correlation between governance factors and trust gives support to the 
performance-based theory stating that people will trust public institutions based on how they 
perform. If low institutional performance however, generates low trust this will also affect the 
factors in the cultural theory of trust, which states that trust is something that we obtain from 
several societal factors like socialization, upbringing and social networks.  
The cultural approach states that people will be naturally trusting (or distrusting) and if 
this is the case it can lead to more efficiency in market transactions. This will in turn generate 
more efficient economic outcomes and better functioning institutions as trust might provide 
some sort of lubricant for interaction between parties (Lee, 2013). On the other hand, if public 
institutions are free and fair and well-functioning and they perform according to people’s needs 
and expectations this will lead to trust from the citizens. The fact that people will have greater 
trust towards the government might also lead to more trust between people. Trust is in this case 
a consequence, not a cause of good performance (ibid.). We still lack further knowledge on 
what variables determines trust and this continues to be of great interest to scientists.  
 
William Mishler and Richard Rose (2001) present a lifetime learning model to trust 
where institutional and cultural theories can be seen in relation to one another when looking at 
both early-life socialization and adult learning. The model states that the cultural theory expects 
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that social trust acquired when young through youthful and pre-political experiences will later 
be transferred to trust in institutions. Adult experiences will either support or challenge the 
opinions developed as young causing trust preferences to change or stay the same. In 
established democracies with well-functioning and stable institutions the initial opinions are 
likely to be confirmed causing the trust relationship between individuals and public institutions 
to stay the same over time (Mishler and Rose, 2001). A situation like this will cause cultural 
and institutional expectation for trust to coincide. This however is not likely to happen in newer 
democracies where the political and economic institutions have undergone major changes in 
recent times, like for instance in Botswana and Tanzania. In cases where political trust is likely 
to be unstable over time we might find that cultural and institutional theories clash in their 
predictions. From this perspective the discussion between the cultural and institutional theories 
boils down to an empirical debate over what is most important of early-life or later-life 
experiences (ibid.). If we assume that individuals will distinguish clearly between past regimes 
and institutional practices and those of today, we have reason to believe that the later-life 
experiences and present institutional performance will explain more of political trust than 
cultural factors will. However, in a transitioning phase traces of both early-life and later-life 
experiences can be found, which may cause some paradoxes in the results. According to Askvik 
(2010) it will take time before people abandon their previous beliefs and perceptions, hence the 
cultural theories of change. Stronger signs of performance-based trust and weaker support for 
culturally based trust will become more apparent the longer the new regime has been in place 
(Askvik, 2010).  
 
    
2.3.1 Independent Variables 
 In sociological theory determinants of trust can be divided into four categories; civil 
society, institutional quality, culture and values, and demographic homogeneity (Gleave et al., 
2012:212). Active participation in civil society will teach individuals the signs and rules used 
to judge the trustworthiness of others. They will learn from past experiences and develop 
expectations for how others will behave and act (ibid.). Institutional quality refers to in which 
degree the government succeeds in providing for its citizens and express trustworthy behavior. 
Low levels of trust on the other hand is generated from the opposite conditions (corruption and 
unfair or partial regimes). The culture and values determinant claim that high trust can be a 
result of an optimistic outlook, strong moral attitudes, and egalitarian values. Demographic 
homogeneity’s relation with trust means that it is more likely that people who share some basic 
characteristics are more likely to trust each other. Hence, trust will be harder to achieve amongst 
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people across different ethnic groups, religions, and classes (ibid.). Culture and values and 
demographic homogeneity naturally fall under the cultural theories. Civil society is also in large 
part within cultural theories, though could also be linked to institutional theory as it relies on 
the trustworthiness of others. Institutional quality is of course part of institutional theory. Based 
on the two main theories of institutional trust I have developed the following categories of 
independent variables. Socio-demographic factors and social capital are linked to cultural 
theories of trust, while transparency, democratic satisfaction and policy performance are linked 
to institutional theories. The specific theories and the independent variables will be outlined 
further in below.  
 
 
2.4 Cultural Theories 
The cultural theories of trust differ from the institutional theories mainly because they 
discard all political factors in the trust relationship between individuals and public institutions. 
It is in many ways closely related to generalized trust. It is exogenous in nature as trust in public 
institutions is caused by factors unrelated to the institutions (Mishler and Rose, 2001). We can 
divide this into trust that stems from individual factors like experience and upbringing and trust 
from societal and national factors (Lühiste, 2006). If people generally trust others they are 
believed to also trust the government and public institutions. Cultural theories of trust can be 
divided into macro and micro distinctions. The macro distinction emphasizes the standardizing 
trends of national traditions and makes little room for variations in trust among individuals 
within societies. The micro distinction on the other hand, focuses on the differences in 
socialization experiences as a reason for variation in political trust both within and between 
societies (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Some might even argue that institutional trust in this 
perspective is just another aspect of social trust (Lühiste, 2006). If political trust is a result of 
social norms and patterns, change in institutional trust in order to generate increased trust will, 
as mentioned above, be a long process. When political trust is path dependent it can take 
decades or generations before a trusting relationship between citizens and institutions can be 
developed (Mishler and Rose, 2001).  
Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton (2003) defines six culturally based theories of trust in 
their article “Who trusts? The origins of social trust in seven societies”. Two of these theories 
are within the individual approach at the micro level of trust, whilst the other four are within 
the societal approach at the macro level. The individual approach can be divided into 
personality theory and the theory of success and well-being. The societal approach consists of 
voluntary organization theory, social networks theory, community theory and societal theory 
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(Delhey and Newton, 2003). Even though these theories have not gained the most support in 
previous studies, I have decided to include them as a contrast to the institutional theory, in an 
attempt to explain the variables that are not directly connected to the institutions. 
 
 
2.4.1 The Individual Approach  
Personality theory argues that social trust is something that we learn as children and is 
a part of our upbringing. This trust is also influenced by personality characteristics such as 
optimism and a belief that people can live peacefully together by co-operating for the benefit 
of all (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Even though acquired early in life the trusting or distrusting 
relationship can change to some degree throughout life due to more experience. The lessons 
you learn early on are either confirmed or confronted as you get older, in addition it is likely 
that you develop a more critical and nuanced evaluation of the political system and its 
performance which can change your trusting preferences (Mishler and Rose, 2001). In 
authoritarian cultures these values will likely impact one’s socialization. The authoritarian 
values in society will be transferred to relations in homes, at school and in religious settings 
and become visible in the parent-children relationships as well as in the teacher-student 
relationships (Ma and Yang, 2014, Jamil and Askvik, 2016). This will result in a great power 
distance between authorities and “normal” people causing them to be less critical and accept, 
respect and support all kinds of rule. High degrees of loyalty towards the government will likely 
lead to more trust.  
 
The second theory within the individual approach is associated with success and well-
being and states that the less you have the less likely you will be to take risks because you 
cannot afford to lose the little that you have. Richer people will lose comparatively less if their 
trust is betrayed and is therefore much more willing to take risks (Delhey and Newton, 2003). 
This again leads to the fact that the rich become richer and the poor will stay poor. In studies 
mostly conducted in Western countries using the World Value Surveys and the American 
General Social Surveys these theories have often been supported. Those who have mostly 
positive experiences throughout life come off as more trusting than the ones having to battle 
crime, violence, divorce, discrimination, unemployment and social excursion (ibid.). Roger 
Mayer’s (1995) specific and critical definition of trust can be related to this: “the willingness 
of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the 
other will perform a particular action important to the trustier, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party”. Vulnerability indicates that there is something of 
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importance that can be lost, which again means taking risks. Trust is the willingness to take 
risks, not taking risks itself (Mayer et al., 1995). The willingness to take this risk can be linked 
to people’s success in life.  
 
 
2.4.1.1 Socio-demographic factors 
Personality theory and the theory of success and well-being leads to the socio-
demographic category of independent variables. This includes age, gender, economic 
prosperity, education and tribe. There is a slight disagreement amongst scholars about whether 
socio-demographic factors have anything to say in terms of who and how people trust, I do 
however choose to include them as I see them as rather relevant. As mentioned above ethnicity 
may be a factor in determining particularized trust at the cost of generalized trust. This can be 
seen in regard to social capital discussed further down, but I chose to study if there is any 
difference in trust between ethnic groups and if this has a positive or negative effect on 
institutional trust. We might for instance find that groups that have been discriminated or 
suppressed by the government in the past is likely to show lower levels of political trust (Gleave 
et al., 2012). It is natural to believe that experience will affect how and who people trust, which 
makes education and age to be relevant factors. Studies conducted in Europe show that the more 
education people have the more trusting they will be (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005, 
Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). This can imply that knowledge and experience about society, 
government and political system leads to more trust. However, it is important to note that this 
experience can also lead to less trust due to negative experiences or knowledge, like corruption 
and failures in government. This is for instance the finding in Lühiste’s (2006) study. According 
to the theory of success and well-being the more success you have financially and 
professionally the more you trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003). There is a natural connection 
between education, occupation and your economic prosperity as one is likely to lead to the 
other. We have also seen that there can be certain differences in institutional trust between 
genders, therefore this can be interesting to study further (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005, 
Lühiste, 2006). Societal theory (explained further down) also states that low ethnic diversity 
and economic prosperity as well as equal rights are important in order to generate trust. This 
theory might border to both social capital variables and performance-based theory, but as these 
are individual factors I choose to include it here.   
Success in society in general can lead to success and well-being for individuals and we 
can see that both these theories also gain support. Societal conditions are strongest related to 
trust and we can see a correlation between the development of the countries in the study and 
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their levels of trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003). This is a natural and expected connection as 
higher levels of development is most likely a proof that the government and public institutions 
are performing their tasks as expected and providing for its citizens which will lead to a more 
trusting population. However, a recurring problem in developing countries, and also in 
Botswana and Tanzania, is that the government does not manage to have the economic growth 
benefit the population. Therefore, large parts of the population will stay poor, even though there 
is great progress for the country as a whole.     
 Subjective measures of success and well-being (satisfaction with life and living 
standards) are more important than objective ones (income, occupation, living standard). One 
explanation for this can be that the subjective measures will most likely be in comparison to 
what one used to have and what others have, whilst the objective measures will compare to 
general standards of living and income etc. in the country. Steinar Askvik (2008) studies this in 
the context of South Africa post-apartheid and seeks to see if living standards has any effect on 
institutional trust. He does indeed find a strong correlation between how standards of living 
have changed over the past 12 months and trust in public institutions (Askvik, 2008).    
 
The personality theory is hard to test and the best way to test it using my variables is to 
see if there is any effect from the variables that change over time, like age, education and living 
standards. It does however not receive a lot of support in Delhey’s and Newton’s (2003) study 
which agrees with Mishler and Rose’s opinion that adult experiences are more important for 
trust than early-life socialization. It is also hard to believe that a positive outlook on life and 
belief that people will cooperate peacefully for the benefit of all is solely based on personality. 
One will likely only employ this view after positive experiences. Hutchison and Johnson (2011) 
note that demographic characteristics have little influence on political trust which may suggest 
that citizens trust in government is largely based on its performance and less on individual 
factors. Many studies on the field of trust however have been conducted with data from the 
World Value Surveys where most African countries are not represented, with the consequence 
being few studies on trust in an African context. The results from many previous studies might 
therefore differ from European or Western countries to African countries. Nevertheless, other 
studies (Herreros and Criado, 2008, Paxton, 2007) show that there is a positive link between 
socio-demographic factors, such as age and education, and trust whilst social networks and 
discrimination may be seen as a hindering for trust to develop (Gleave et al., 2012). Other 
studies however, show the exact opposite results. Socio-demographic factors have little or 
nothing to say, while social networks seem to be of significant importance (Delhey and Newton, 
2003). This is also the finding in Ishtiaq Jamil and Steinar Askvik’s (2015) study on citizens 
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trust in political and public institutions in Nepal and Bangladesh were membership in different 
societal groups has a positive effect on institutional trust.       
Kadri Lühiste (2006) includes a few control variables in his study, these being partisan 
support and ethnicity as well as some socio-demographic factors. Individuals supporting the 
party in power show greater signs of trust than ones that support opposing parties (ibid.). The 
study also shows that ethnic minorities have less trust in government and education is 
negatively correlated to trust, while men show less trust than women (Lühiste, 2006).  
 
The values for survey questions3 regarding age and gender are self-explanatory, while 
the one for education will consist of the question regarding respondent’s education level ranging 
from 0 to 9. In the analysis these levels will be combined into fewer groups: those with no 
formal schooling, those who have attended or completed primary school, attended or completed 
secondary school and attended or completed a university degree. Economic prosperity will 
consist of the question regarding the respondent’s living conditions as I see this as a valid 
measure for their financial stand. The answers here ranges from very bad (1) to very good (5). 
In the analysis these will be combined into either good or bad. I must note that the answer 
respondents give to this question is a subjective measure. The values for the question on tribe 
are given only in order to separate them. As there is a large number of ethnic groups I will focus 
mainly on the three largest ones. In the regression analysis I have created dummy variables 
from these three and therefore not included tribe as a whole as this would be too extensive.  
 
H2.1: Age may only have a little effect on institutional trust   
 According to the personality theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) trust is something that 
you take with you from your up-bringing and early socialization therefore how you trust will 
not change much as you get older and the effect of this variable will therefore be small if not 
insignificant. In addition, it is believed that the performance and functioning of public 
institutions will affect people randomly, independent of age for instance.     
 
H2.2: I do not expect gender to have any significant effect on institutional trust  
 Lühiste (2006) have found that men are less trusting than women, but other studies have 
not found any evidence for any effect from gender on institutional trust. The various cultural 
theories also suggest that trust would appear randomly amongst men and women. Therefore, I 
expect no effect from gender on institutional trust.   
																																																						
3	All the survey questions I have used in this study are shown in Appendix 1		




H2.3: Education may have a negative effect on institutional trust 
In general, the effect of socio-demographic variables, including education, is quite 
small, but some studies (Lühiste, 2006, Christensen and Lægreid, 2005, Herreros and Criado, 
2008) find that education has an effect. The positive correlations however are mostly found in 
Western societies. Lühiste (2006) on the other hand, finds a negative effect from education on 
institutional trust in his study. The more education you have the more critically you think and 
you will likely also have more knowledge about the political system, democracy and you own 
rights. Therefore, a higher educated person will easier recognize when the government does not 
perform and will not deserve to be trusted. The loyalty and blind trust might therefore not be as 
apparent amongst those with higher education.   
 
H2.4: Economic prosperity may be positively related to trust as success and well-being can 
lead to a more trusting attitude 
The theory of success and well-being tells us that people who have more success in life 
will trust a lot easier. Living standards, as a measure of financial stand, can work as a measure 
for success. Based on this it is natural to believe that those with higher economic prosperity and 
better living conditions will trust slightly more. Previous findings (Askvik, 2008) have also 
shown an effect from this variable on institutional trust as better living standards is a sign of 
success in society in general which again can be said to be a consequence of high performance 
by the government.   
 
H2.5: Tribe will likely have a positive effect on trust 
In Tanzania there are a large number of ethnic groups, meaning that none will be 
particularly large or dominating. If, in addition to this they are all treated fairly by the 
government this will likely affect institutional trust levels positively. In Botswana the Tswana 
is the dominating tribe, while there are a few other smaller ethnic groups. This asymmetry in 
society could cause conflicts which in turn could affect trust negatively, but if the conflicts are 
between the groups and not with the government it may not affect trust levels.   
 
 
2.4.2 The Societal Approach 
At the macro-level of the cultural theory I have placed those of Delhey and Newton’s 
sub-theories that can be related to national culture; social networks theory, community theory, 
voluntary organization theory and state-centered theory. All these theories can be related to 
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social capital and the main idea is that civic associationism and generalized trust will lead to 
more cooperation between individuals, both within and across ethnic groups. It is believed that 
this in turn will make the government more democratic and efficient (Jamil and Askvik, 2016). 
The societal approach builds on the thought that trust is something we gain from a trusting 
culture that individuals participate in, contribute to, or benefit from (Delhey and Newton, 2003).  
The “top-down”, state-centered theory considers societal factors such as satisfaction 
with democratic institutions like the welfare and legal systems, political and economic 
prosperity as well as access to these goods for the population. In addition, level of political 
freedom, social conflicts and public safety are important factors. The greater the success of the 
country and equality between the population the more trusting the people will be (Delhey and 
Newton, 2003). Both social and institutional trust levels are found to be higher in countries with 
low levels of social division, measured be income equality and ethnic homogeneity (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997). This theory is naturally also connected to institutional theory and can be used to 
explain the effect of some of the variables categorized under institutional and performance-
based theory. 
The voluntary organization theory is closely related to social capital and states that a 
society built up of many and varied voluntary organizations and associations will likely have 
higher levels of social trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003). By participating in voluntary 
organizations in your community you learn the patterns of trust, reciprocity, cooperation, 
empathy for others, and you understand the importance of working together for the common 
interest and common good (Delhey and Newton, 2003). This theory has however, received 
some criticism due to little evidence theoretically and empirically. Marc Hooghe (2003), 
amongst others, claims that “there is no indication whatsoever that interaction with other group 
members would automatically lead to the development of a more socially oriented value 
pattern, to a rise in trust levels, or to abandoning prejudices”.  
One theory that gains greater support is the one of social networks. This claims that it 
is the everyday social interactions with friends, family and colleagues that shapes and generates 
social trust. This also includes smaller groups and networks formed out of mutual interest or 
benefit for its members, for instance car pools, book clubs or local action groups (Delhey and 
Newton, 2003). The social networks theory though, can in certain aspects be related to the 
voluntary organization theory as the social networks of cooperation is largely based on 
voluntarism and mutual benefits. In addition, both these theories are vital in regard to social 
capital, but the social networks theory might have a broader range and is therefore the one that 
has gained greater acceptance.  
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The final theory in this group is community theory which focuses on the characteristics 
of a society, like the size of the city or town, satisfaction with the community and safety, rather 
than the networks between the people in it (Delhey and Newton, 2003). It is often found that 
social trust is higher in smaller towns and suburbs than larger cities. This theory has a “bottom-
up” approach and is concentrated around the community separately from the country or state as 
a whole. This theory will however not be included specifically in this study.   
 
 
2.4.2.1 Social Capital4 
The four theories within the societal approach are the basis for my second category of 
independent variables: social capital. General trust indicators will be of importance as well as 
the respondent’s participation in community and voluntary groups as well as religious groups. 
Also particularized trust will be included with questions regarding trust in relatives, neighbors 
and others they know. Generalized versus particularized trust could indicate whether people’s 
“radius’ of trust” are wide or narrow. In Tanzania, where there is a large number of ethnic 
groups, high particularized trust and low generalized trust would mean that an individual’s 
radius of trust would not be very large. In Botswana on the other hand, the ethnic groups are 
fewer and larger, therefore the radius’ of trust might be bigger and the difference between 
generalized and particularized trust might not be so big and this can effectively mean that there 
is higher level of general trust. Low trust between ethnic groups, although not necessarily 
distrust, can still cause conflicts in society. And of most importance in this context: how does 
this effect institutional trust?  
 
Social capital has been a concept of large debate in social science since it again became 
a part of the social scientist terminology in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Most definitions, 
nevertheless, include trust, cooperative benefits and the value of social networks. James 
Coleman defines the concept quite narrowly by saying that social capital refers to: “people’s 
ability to work together in groups” (Fukuyama, 2002:23). I however prefer Robert Putnam’s 
definition: “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”(Putnam, 1995:2). It has also become widely 
acknowledged that social capital is essential for both a stable liberal democracy and economic 
development (Fukuyama, 2001) and since trust is vital for social capital to occur I find it 
interesting to include this variables within this category in my study. Social capital stems from 
																																																						
4	Parts of this section is taken from my AORG 323 research field paper of spring 2015	
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religion, traditions, shared historical experiences and cultural norms (Fukuyama, 2001). It can 
therefore be natural to believe that in societies with low ethnic diversity, like Botswana, social 
capital will be stronger and trust between people will be greater because people share religion, 
traditions and cultures. In Tanzania however, ethnic diversity is high and therefore we might 
see lower degrees of trust and social capital.  
Achieving mutual goals requires social networks and social organization. These 
networks rely on trust between individuals. In relation to this Robert Putnam (2000) introduce 
us to two concepts, bonding and bridging, within social capital in his book Bowling Alone: The 
Collapse and Revival of American Community. Bonding social capital refers to networks within 
socially homogenous groups. This would be relations with family, friends and neighbors. These 
types of networks are valuable when it comes to working for collective needs, as people in these 
groups are likely to have the same interests and for this reason the connections are believed to 
come rather naturally. It is also valuable as it seeks to bring together oppressed and marginalized 
groups to work for their collective needs and these type of relations can also provide safety to 
its members as it will protect them from external threats (Putnam, 2000). A way of avoiding 
these threats will be to build networks of trust between them. This is where the concept of 
bridging becomes helpful. Bridging social capital means networks between socially 
heterogeneous groups, ties that are slightly more distant, like those with workmates and 
acquaintances (ibid.). These networks can benefit from linking social capital by establishing 
ties with those outside one’s immediate group of contacts. In this way they can exchange ideas, 
information and innovation as well as coming to agreements regarding their diverse interests. 
Bridging is undoubtedly more challenging than bonding since it relies on trust between groups. 
Successful bridging relies on the degree of trust. If the degree of trust is high the “radius of 
trust” will expand, but if trust is not apparent the wide variety of heterogeneous groups is 
likely to be a hinder for democracy as bridging can help create an inclusive institutional 
structure which is democratic in nature. As this is not possible when only bonding takes place, 
bridging is absolutely essential in establishing the institutions we need for a functioning 
democracy (Putnam, 2000).  
The “radius of trust” refers to the circle of people for whom the shared norms and values 
apply (Fukuyama, 2001). The radius of trust can expand to apply to people outside the group if 
the social capital of the group produces positive externalities. In other cases the radius of trust 
may not even include all members of the group, this is often true for larger organizations where 
mutual norms, values and rules may only apply to a specific group within the group, for instance 
the leadership (Fukuyama, 2001). In less developed and traditional societies, the radius of trust 
is usually small as social cooperation, or informal institutions, are based on traditional values, 
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norms and ethnicities. There is usually little trust between groups and the externalities are often 
negative. Taking part in voluntary organization and various community groups can be a way of 
expanding one’s radius of trust and achieve higher levels of both particularized and generalized 
trust in society.    
 
In Delhey and Newton’s (Delhey and Newton, 2003) study however, voluntary 
organization theory does not receive a lot of praise, which is in tone with the debate around 
whether this is positively related to trust and a strong social capital or not. Numbers from 
previous Afrobarometer surveys conducted in several African countries show that 74 percent 
of the respondents say that they take part in at least one voluntary organization (Kryzanek, 
2009:2). Even by world standards these numbers are high. Interpersonal trust however, receives 
relatively low scores, with almost 80 percent claiming that others generally cannot be trusted 
(ibid.). As trust is seen as a necessary factor in voluntary organization this is a rather 
contradicting finding. It is hard to imagine people working together for a common goal without 
trusting each other.  
Ann Pawlik Kryzanek (2009) has studied political participation within a social trust 
framework in the new democracies of South Africa and Botswana. These countries are chosen 
because they are the two most successful sub-Saharan African countries with functioning 
institutions and economic progress. The distinguishing factor is that Botswana is a homogenous 
country with few ethnic groups, whilst South Africa is a lot more diverse. This is also the main 
difference between the two countries in my study, but I have chosen one rather unsuccessful 
country along with the successful one. Kryzanek’s focus is on whether social trust leads to 
political participation and bridging between ethnic groups. She uses data from the 
Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 2003. Though her focus is slightly different than mine I 
find it interesting to look into her findings. African countries have a long tradition for 
cooperation, but results from 18 countries surveyed by Afrobarometer show that in spite of this 
voluntary participation, trust between people is very low (ibid.).  
One of the factors Kryzanek studies is whether there is a relation between bonding and 
bridging and if trust is easier established in a homogenous society versus a heterogeneous 
society. She finds that respondents in Botswana who express bonding social trust also express 
bridging social trust (ibid.). In the more ethnically diverse South Africa, on the other hand, she 
has found levels of both bonding and bridging trust to be lower. Higher levels of bonding social 
trust also seem to be a hindering for political participation in South Africa. Bridging social trust 
has a rather insignificant effect on political participation. In Botswana however, the high levels 
of both bridging and bonding social trust are positively correlated with political participation. 
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Respondents who report higher general trust in others are more likely to be politically active 
and those who are a part of a society with higher levels of bridging social trust are more likely 
to have faith in others (Kryzanek, 2009). These findings support the theories of social trust that 
state that widespread generalized trust is harder to achieve in heterogeneous countries than in 
homogenous countries. Both bonding and bridging social trust levels are higher in homogenous 
countries and political participation is therefore also more common here (ibid.).  
As political participation is necessary for democracy studies of trust will also contribute 
to theories about which societies are more likely to succeed in democratic terms. Robert Putnam 
(1993) states that democratic participation will be more of a struggle in ethnically diverse 
countries and the findings in Kryzanek’s study show that democracy will easier succeed in a 
cohesive society (Kryzanek, 2009). Kryzanek highlights one aspect of studying homogenous 
societies. This is the fact that it may be hard to distinguish between bonding and bridging trust 
as these might go hand in hand. When the majority of the population is of the same ethnic 
group, that one’s neighbor as well as a stranger in a different city is of the same kind, 
respondents may have difficulties separating the trust relation to these people (Putnam et al., 
1993).  
 
Also community theory does quite poorly in Delhey and Newton’s (2003) study. In spite 
of their rejection, community theory does gain support from others. Robert Putnam (2000) 
dismiss the rejection of the community theory by saying that social trust is greater in smaller 
towns. Volunteerism, community projects, help and assistance to strangers and those in need is 
much more common in smaller towns than larger cities. At the same time crime rates are way 
lower in the smaller cities (Putnam, 2000). The characteristics of voluntary organization theory 
seem decent enough, but it is hard to believe that these factors alone will generate trust. It might 
rather be the other way around, that a general level of trust in society will lead to more 
volunteering citizens. Newton and Norris (2000) draws particular emphasis to the voluntary 
association and cooperation aspect of the social trust theories. This thought can be dated back 
to the works of Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill who saw the importance of a 
functioning social society in order for a democracy to work ideally (Newton and Norris, 2000). 
The main point of this theory is that individuals’ life experience, education, participation in 
community and involvement in voluntary organizations will generate social trust and an 
understanding of the importance of cooperation which in turn can lead to strong, effective and 
successful social and political organizations and institutions (Newton and Norris, 2000).  
It is important to note that five out of the six countries in Delhey and Newton’s study 
are well developed European countries (maybe with the exception of Hungary and Slovenia) 
Marianne Landmark, Spring 2016: Trust in Public Institutions 
	
34 
and the only non-European country is South-Korea, which is also a highly developed country. 
Their findings may therefore not necessarily be applicable to developing countries in Africa. 
Not just because of their level of development, but culturally they are also quite different.  
 
The spill-over effect from social trust to political trust has been argued to only be true 
for established democracies in the West where we clearly see that countries with high social 
trust also have high political trust. In new democracies and liberal regimes there does not seem 
to be any correlation between social and political trust, some cases even show a negative 
correlation (Lühiste, 2006). As I am going to study two relatively new democracies this last 
note will be of great relevance to me. Botswana though, has a slightly more functioning 
democracy than Tanzania so I might be able to see some differences in how the two types of 
trust influence each other. It is also stated that a high level of social capital is a prerequisite for 
an effective political system which in turn can generate political capital, but a strong social 
capital will not necessarily lead to strong political capital (Newton, 2001). This theory states 
that a certain level of generalized, social trust in society is needed in order to generate political 
trust, but others again claim that a well-functioning government that acts according to 
expectations will cause a trickle-down effect of trust (ibid.). This is where the question of 
causality is particularly evident. If low social trust and social capital will not generate any 
political trust or political capital, and a low functioning government will lead to low trust or 
even distrust towards the government and also in society in general we find ourselves in a 
vicious circle it is hard to come out of. This low institutional trust can also act as a hindrance 
for social cooperation and the development of social capital (Lühiste, 2006). It is hard to 
imagine that levels of social trust are high, based on the fact that there is an actual reason to 
trust people, at the same time as levels of political trust is low, or the other way around for that 
matter.  
 
Pippa Norris and Kenneth Newton (2000) as well as Kadri Lühiste (2006) have all tested 
the cultural theories in their studies. Norris and Newton have used data from the World Values 
Surveys for 17 trilateral democracies and tested both theories on an individual as well as a 
national level. Lühiste (2006) have tested the theories on an individual level in the Baltic 
countries; Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. He finds that in general trust in political institutions 
is quite low with an average trust rate being 20 percent. On an individual level Norris and 
Newton (2000) have found little evidence supporting the cultural theory and the correlation 
between social and political trust is rather weak. In addition, their findings support those of 
Delhey and Newton (2003) saying that there is little proof that membership in voluntary 
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organizations lead to more trusting individuals (Newton and Norris, 2000). One small exception 
is association with church. Membership in religious organizations might therefore be more 
important for people’s trust in public institutions than membership in other voluntary or 
community organizations. Lühiste (2006) does however also find evidence that social trust is 
positively correlated with institutional trust and an increase in social trust will also increase 
institutional trust. Norris and Newton (2000) only find this correlation on a national level. Here 
social trust seems to have quite an influence on institutional trust. High levels of social trust 
have a positive effect on political trust, but this relationship is not mediated by social capital as 
membership in voluntary organizations for instance is not positively correlated with trust in 
institutions. At the same time low levels of social trust and social capital is not likely to generate 
any political trust (Lühiste, 2006). In Lühiste’s study the explanatory power of the performance-
based model explains 15 percent of the variance in institutional trust and is therefore naturally 
higher than of the cultural model which only explains 11 percent of the variance (ibid.). The 
best explanatory power is achieved when we combine the two models. This way we can explain 
20 percent of the variance in institutional trust (ibid.).  
 
On the basis of his findings; that there is a strong correlation between social and political 
trust, Lühiste (2006:493) suggests that new democracies need to strengthen the social trust by 
“supporting open and inclusive voluntary organizations and enacting policies that tackle 
economic inequality”. This idea contradicts with the findings of social trust theories where we 
saw that the voluntary organization theory gained little support. Although in this specific 
context voluntary organizations might be seen in a broader perspective and fall under the 
concept of social capital and social networks. In order to increase the public’s support in 
government there needs to be more transparency and openness (Lühiste, 2006). As a final point 
Lühiste (2006) notes that this study does not take into consideration how individuals’ evaluation 
of governmental performance is connected to their expectations and this is an important 
question for future research (ibid.).   
 
The social capital variable will consist of three questions. The first question asks about 
the respondent’s membership in religious groups and voluntary or community groups. The 
answers here range from “not a member” (0) or “inactive member” (1) to “active member” (2) 
and “official leader” (3). The question regarding general trust simply asks if people in general 
can be trusted (1) or one must be very careful (0). The last question refers to particularized trust 
and to what degree the respondent trusts his or her neighbors, relatives or other people they 
know. The answers here range from not at all (0) to a lot (3).  




The various studies I have reviewed show slightly different results and several of the 
cultural theories receive both support and dismissal. I have  
 
H3: Social capital and social trust levels may be higher in Botswana than in Tanzania due to 
less ethnic diversity, this in turn will affect political trust slightly positive  
According to the social networks theory the building of social networks is vital for 
achieving trust and building social capital. This will in turn have a positive effect on 
institutional trust. Although the voluntary organization theory has not gained a lot of support it 
can be included in the social networks theory and therefore membership in religious or 
community groups will help in achieving this and will therefore have a positive effect on trust. 
Social networks and a trusting community is believed to be easier established in a more 
homogenous society which is in tone with Fukuyama’s radius of trust theory and Putnam’s 
bridging and bonding. In the heterogeneous country, Tanzania, particularized trust might be 
high, but generalized trust levels may be low as a result of the ethnic diversity. In Botswana on 
the other hand, there are larger and fewer ethnic groups which can result in radius’ of trust to 
be bigger and both particularized and generalized trust to be high. This has also been the case 
in previous studies, where we see that countries with high ethnic diversity have lower general 
trust-levels. According to the cultural theory this can have a positive spillover effect on political 
trust, but previous studies have shown that this is not always the case. Especially in new 
democracies we can see that there is not always a positive correlation between the two. I do 
however believe that the institutional trust will be slightly more positively affected by social 
trust in Botswana than in Tanzania.  
 
 
2.5 Institutional theory     
The main responsibilities of the state and its public institutions are to ensure domestic 
order and provide the basic material well-being for its citizens as well as protecting its territorial 
integrity and citizens from internal and external threats (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). The 
state’s legitimacy and trustworthiness relies on whether or not and to what degree it is able to 
perform these tasks (ibid.). The concepts of political trust and legitimacy are closely related, 
though legitimacy is more covering for the system of government and politics as a whole 
whereas trust mostly refers to the politicians and government of the day (ibid.). The 
performance-based or institutional theory of trust is based on that citizens trust in the state is 
decided by how well the public institutions perform according to their expectations (ibid.). In 
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relation to public administration there is reason to believe that a government’s efficient, 
effective and democratic performance leads to high trust amongst the public, whilst low trust is 
a result of government’s failure to deliver public services (Van De Walle and Six, 2014). 
Citizen’s trust in institutions and government can be seen as a measure of how well they perform 
(Jamil et al., 2013).  
Institutional theories is politically endogenous in nature as it sees political trust as a 
consequence, not a cause, of how the institutions are performing (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The 
foundation for this theory of institutional trust is quite simply that individuals’ trust in public 
institutions relies on how well the institutions perform according to their expectations and what 
has been promised (Lühiste, 2006). It is a very rationally based form of trust, but cultural and 
social influence in early life and upbringing can however shape individual’s trust through 
political socialization and influence from older generations and their trust in institutions. A 
requirement for this though is as mentioned a continuity and stableness in the political regime 
in the country. Nevertheless, in newer democracies where the change from an undemocratic 
government to a democratic one is quite recent we might not find this factor to be as apparent 
(Mishler and Rose, 2001). The political regime and culture people have grown up with is likely 
not the same as today, therefore it is natural to believe that individuals will base their trust on 
the actual performance of the institutions today rather than the system itself as this has proven 
not to be so stable and fair over time.  
A new democracy is likely to undergo challenges in its beginning phase due to 
transitioning’s in the political and economic systems as well as little experience with democratic 
governing (Mishler and Rose, 2001). In this situation performance will likely be low and in 
some areas also failing. This will, according to the performance-based theory cause low levels 
of trust (ibid.). An absence of trust in the public institutions that are supposed to implement new 
democratic principles can also mean low support for the new regime principles (Lühiste, 2006). 
The consequence of low trust can be less effective functioning of the institutions as well as 
dissatisfaction with the regime and its performance, institutions and principles. At worst it can 
challenge regime legitimacy (ibid.). In order for the institutions to gain increased trust they need 
to perform in several key areas in society, like economic growth and improved healthcare and 
education systems as well as making sure this benefits all. In addition they need to refrain from 
activities that are generally perceived as negative, like for instance corruption (Mishler and 
Rose, 2001). This process of improvement only needs to take a few months or years, which will 
cause levels of trust to increase rather quickly as opposed to if trust is culturally bound, where 
change is a slow process stretching over decades and generations (ibid.).  
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The performance-based theory has both a political and an economic aspect. The political 
aspect of the performance-based theory refers to how the government performs in terms of fair 
treatment of citizens, protecting civil liberties and assuring human rights as well as a transparent 
and effective administration (Mishler and Rose, 2001). If individuals evaluate the institutional 
performance in these areas to be good they will show greater trust. The economic aspect of the 
performance-based theory is based on the government’s ability to meet economic expectations 
from the public, both in regard to their personal economy and the national economy (Lühiste, 
2006). Satisfying performance in this area will increase trust in government, but here the 
subjective measures are more important than the objective ones (Lühiste, 2006). This theory 
has gained support in advanced democracies and post-communist countries, but has yet to be 
tested further in new democracies (ibid.).  
Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris (2000) also rely on this theory in their paper on 
“Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture or Performance?”. When institutions 
perform well and according to citizens needs and expectations they will likely gain trust and 
support, while poor performance and ineffectiveness will generate low trust or even distrust. In 
their view this theory dismisses all personal, social and cultural factors for generating trust and 
is solely based on the thought that individuals trust politicians and public institutions on the 
background of their performances (Newton and Norris, 2000). This is because political 
performance, whether good or bad, affects the public randomly, independent of age, education, 
occupation, gender and religion (ibid.).  
Newton and Norris (2000) list three implications for the performance-based theory. 
First, if the samples are of a relevant size and represent the general public, the research 
procedures are reliable, and the survey questions are reasonable the results from the surveys are 
likely to be a good measure of how well the government is performing (ibid.). Second, it 
suggests that if the public show little trust in institutions the politicians can either lower the 
public’s expectations, by for instance promising less, or improve the effectiveness by delivering 
more (ibid.). The third implication is that there is a somewhat indirect relationship between 
political and social trust. This can be explained by the fact that trust is a determinant for social 
capital and a strong social capital can help strengthen political institutions which in turn will 
improve governmental performance and they will gain greater trust from the public (Newton 
and Norris, 2000). The connection between trust on the different levels can also be explained 
by the fact that like we base our trust in the political system on their performance we also base 
our trust in other people on how they have behaved and acted in the past (ibid.). This does then 
mean that there is in many ways a social factor to the performance-based theory after all as 
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social factors like background, education and age can seem to have an influence on your trust. 
This is connected to the cultural theory.  
 
The performance-based theory is a systemic model consisting of both a micro and a 
macro perspective. The macro distinction of the performance-based theory emphasizes the 
collective performance of the institutions, like economic growth, effectiveness of government 
and little corruption (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The micro distinction on the other hand, 
considers the individual’s personal preferences and experiences in relation to performance. 
How they personally have been affected by trust plays a greater role than how the institutions 
are performing in general (Mishler and Rose, 2001). The model does not predict any 
relationship between social trust and trust in public institutions on the individual level, but 
rather at the collective level. 
 The main factor determining trust in institutions on the individual level is governmental 
performance which supports the performance-based theory and dismisses the cultural theory 
(ibid.). In Lühiste’s (2006) study we can also see that the performance-based theory is 
confirmed as the levels of trust correlate with individuals’ perception of corruption, protection 
of human rights and how they experience the general performance (ibid.). The economic aspect 
of performance also seems to matter as individuals who perceive economic conditions to be 
good have higher trust in government (ibid.). This is based on individuals’ expectations and 
experience of the economic performance of the government and can be seen in relation to the 
theory of success and well-being and societal theory. As opposed to cultural theories 
institutional theories gains support in all studies, on both individual and national level. These 
studies are for most part conducted in developed countries which means that I should maybe 
expect somewhat different results in my own study.  
 
 
2.5.1 Transparency  
The first category of independent variables within institutional theories will be 
regarding the transparency and openness in Botswana and Tanzania. An important part of 
making democracy work is that citizens have a certain degree of insight in political processes 
as they are the ones to keep the government in check. If there is openness around the activities 
and processes in government, it will be harder for government officials to misuse their power 
in for example corruption or rent seeking activities. The media functions as an information 
source for the people. The problem though is when it is not free, but rather controlled by the 
government so that only the positive stories come out. One reason that access to media is chosen 
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as an indicator is that people get their information about the government’s performance through 
media and this should contribute to shaping their trust in public institutions (Hetherington, 
1998). One might think that respondents with access to internet, television, newspapers or radio 
have a different opinion about the government than respondents without this access. This can 
be in either a positive or negative direction, depending on the information that comes out.  
According to Hutchison and Johnson (2011) the most recurring finding in the studies 
on political trust is that citizens trust in government is affected positively when the police force, 
legal system and public bureaucracy act in honesty and are corruption-free. People’s perception 
of corruption in public institutions therefore makes a natural contribution to this variable.   
 
The transparency variable will be indicated by how often the respondent’s get news 
form different mediums and how they perceive corruption. The question regarding their media 
access asks how often they get news from either radio, television, newspapers or internet and 
the answers ranges from never (0) to every day (5). The respondents are also asked if they 
believe that members of several public institutions are involved in corruption. The answers 
range from none of them (0) to all of them (3). Here I have created an index based on the various 
institutions in the question: The President and officials in his office, members of parliament, 
government officials, local government councilors, the police, tax officials and judges and 
magistrates. The index is created by adding all the variables and their values together before 
dividing them on the number of institutions, seven.   
 
H4: High levels of perceived corruption may lead to low political trust 
 The performance-based theory gives reason to believe that respondents who perceive 
corruption in public institutions to be high also report low trust towards the government. This 
is natural as corruption is not in line with how individuals would expect public institutions to 
use their resources. Also, individuals with access to radio, television, internet and newspapers 
are likely to have less trust in government if the media will inform about corruption and 
unfaithful public officials. This obviously requires the media to be free and report neutrally and 
objectively about incidents of corruption.    
 
 
2.5.2 Democratic Satisfaction 
 According to Larry Diamond (2004) democracy includes four key elements: a political 
system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections, active 
participation from the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life, protection of human rights 
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for all citizens, and the rule of law, which would apply equally to all citizens. In the survey the 
respondents are asked which characteristics they find most desirable and Diamond’s first point 
is one factor that is favored by the respondents in both countries. Low levels of corruption are 
also desired. In Botswana respondents also state that basic needs and job opportunities are 
important, whilst Tanzanians want freedom of assembly and a free media. What I will focus on 
for this variable is how satisfied the respondents are with the functioning of democracy and if 
these principles are taken care of in their country and if they at all regard it as a democracy. I 
will also add their opinion on the governments problem solving abilities. How does people’s 
satisfaction with the democracy affect trust in public institutions?  
 Askvik (2008) included democratic satisfaction in his study on institutional trust in post-
apartheid South Africa. Using survey data from the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) 
he found that how individuals perceive the political system in their country and how satisfied 
they are with the democracy has a strong positive effect on trust in public institutions on a local, 
provincial and national level (Askvik, 2008). Individuals’ opinion about the political system in 
general is therefore an important variable in determining people’s trust. In the study it explains 
for 46 percent of the variation in institutional trust. The same effect is found in Tom Christensen 
and Per Lægreid’s (2005) research on trust in government in Norway. In this case satisfaction 
with democracy has the strongest effect of a number of political, demographic and experiential 
variables.    
 
 This variable will be operationalized through two questions. The first one simply asks 
how satisfied the respondent is with the democratic functioning in their country. The answers 
here ranges from “Botswana/Tanzania is not a democracy” (0) and “not at all satisfied” (1) to 
“very satisfied” (4). The second question asks how likely the respondent thinks it is that the 
government will solve a given problem within the next five years. The answers range from “not 
likely” (0) to “very likely” (3). If this variable effects trust levels in any way it can be explained 
by people’s strategic form of trust, they trust people or institutions based on the tasks that they 
are set to do. If public institutions fail, trust is likely also to be lower. This form of trust can be 
true also for my next variable.    
 
H5: A positive opinion about democracy may lead to higher political trust 
 Respondents who are positive to the democratic functioning of their country and have 
faith in the government’s problem solving abilities are likely to also express greater trust. This 
is based on the thought that a positive attitude towards the political system should mean that 
you are satisfied with the performance which according to institutional theory may lead to more 
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trust. If you have faith in the government’s problem-solving abilities, it also suggests that you 
are satisfied with their performance which again may result in increased trust.   
 
 
2.5.3 Policy Performance 
The category of independent variables that is most directly related to institutional theory 
is policy performance. Providing the basic needs within healthcare, education, living standards, 
jobs, electricity, water and sanitation and several other areas is the prime job of the government. 
How well the government performs in these areas can be a deciding factor for trust generation 
in the public. This is related to the democracy variable mentioned above, but is more concerned 
around the performance part rather than the system itself. The respondents are to rate the 
government’s handling of a number of matters, both nationally and locally, from managing the 
economy, to battling crime and providing a reliable supply of electricity. In addition, the 
President, the Parliament and the elected local government councilors performance will be 
included.  
The analysis in Askvik’s (2008) study on institutional trust in South-Africa in 2006, 
based on the HSRC survey and the Afrobarometer survey, shows that policy performance has 
a somewhat effect on how much individuals trust the public institutions. The Afrobarometer 
analysis shows that only a few of the policy areas have a significant effect on trust in the 
President and provincial and local governments. The relatively weak explanatory power of the 
model tells us that policy performance variables only explain 24 percent of the variation in trust 
in the President, and 15 and 12 percent of the variations in trust in provincial and local 
governments. The HSRC analysis show a few more significant effects from policy performance 
variables on trust in national, provincial and local governments, but they are rather weak. The 
explanatory power of this model is 15, 12 an 11 percent, respectively (Askvik, 2008).  
In their study “Presidential leadership and the resurgence of trust in Government” Jack 
Citrin and Donald Philip Green (1986) find that especially the President’s performance is 
important in determining people’s trust in government and public institutions. They also note 
that the President’s personal characteristics and charisma plays a role in gaining people’s trust. 
This is explained by the fact that the President is the face of the government and he is the one 
being portrayed in the media and therefore seen by the public as the main actor (Citrin and 
Green, 1986). It is also likely that it is easier for people to relate their trust to a specific person 
rather than to an institution, if the government performs well this success will benefit the 
President in form of more trust because people associates this success with good leadership. If 
the government fails to perform, on the other hand, this will be associated with bad leadership 
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and trust in public institutions will decline. It is natural to believe that signs of low faith in the 
government in these areas will generate low trust, but is that the case for these two countries?  
 
This variable will consist of two performance indexes, one national and one local, and 
approval of the President’s, the Parliament’s and the local governance councilor’s performance. 
The national performance index is merged from how the respondents evaluates how the 
government is handling the economy, improving living standards for the poor, creating jobs, 
keeping prices down, narrowing the gap between rich and poor, reducing crime, improving 
basic health services, addressing educational needs, providing water and sanitation services, 
ensuring food for everyone, fighting corruption in government, resolving violent crimes 
between communities, combating HIV/AIDS, maintaining roads and bridging, providing a 
reliable supply of electricity and empowering women. In Tanzania two additional factors are 
included; reducing transport accidents such as roads and marines, and managing natural 
disasters such as flooding and droughts. The local index is merged from the responses on how 
local governments are maintaining roads, local market places, health standards, keeping the 
community clean and managing the use of land. Just as the corruption index these indexes have 
been created by adding the values for all variables and dividing them on the amount of 
performance-areas, 16/18 and five. The answers to both these questions range from “very 
badly” (1) to “very well” (4). In the analyses they will for most part be combined into either 
badly or well. The answers to the questions concerning approval of the President’s, the 
Parliament’s and the local governance councilor’s performance range from “strongly 
disapprove” (1) to “strongly approve” (4). In the analysis this will mostly be combined to 
approve or disapprove.      
 
H6: Respondents expressing higher faith in policy performance may also show greater degree 
of trust in public institutions  
 The basis of the performance-based theory is that if individuals are satisfied with the 
job the government is doing and feel that they are delivering the required goods and services, 
individuals will have greater trust in them. We therefore have good reason to believe that those 
respondents who feel that the government is delivering in the areas that they find important and 
relevant will also show more trust. I also believe that the respondents in Botswana will show 
higher levels of faith in policy performance as the country’s government has managed to deliver 
in many areas which has led to their higher development status.      
 
 




The datasets I will rely on for my study is provided by Afrobarometer which is a world 
leading survey-research project. It measures African men and women’s attitude towards 
democracy, economy, governance, civil society and other issues (Afrobarometer, 2016). They 
collect and publish high quality, reliable quantitative data available to the public. They have 
conducted a total of 145 surveys in 6 rounds from 1999 to 2015. 36 of the 54 African countries 
have been surveyed, resulting in the fact that 84 percent of the population in Africa is 
represented (ibid.). Their methods of data collection consist of face-to-face interviews from a 
standard questionnaire with a randomly selected sample of 1200 to 2400 respondents in each 
country. A sample size of 1200 respondents allows inferences to the national adult population 
with a margin error of +/- 2,8 percent with a confidence level of 95 percent, whilst a sample 
size of 2400 gives us a margin of error of +/- 2,0 percent at a 95 percent confidence level 
(Afrobarometer, 2016).  
They use a national probability sampling method which seeks to give every adult an 
equal and known chance to be selected for an interview. This method also tries to ensure that 
people living in geographical areas with a higher population have a proportionally greater 
chance of being chosen (ibid.). Afrobarometer’s national partners are responsible for training 
their interviewers so that they are familiar with the survey methods. Groups of four interviewers 
travel to the sample area to conduct the interviews under the control of one field supervisor 
which ensures that the quality of the data that is collected is valid and reliable. Interviews only 
proceed after the consent of the respondent and the information they give is treated with 
absolute confidence. After the data is collected it is verified and checked for any incomplete, 
improperly formatted or inaccurate records by the national partners as well as the core partner 
data managers and the Afrobarometer data manager. The data is published online along with 
summaries of the results. In addition, Afrobarometer hold public dissemination events to 
present the results (ibid.). The topics of the questionnaires span over many areas of society and 
include politics, democracy, governance, economics, poverty, social capital, public services, 
gender equality and tolerance (ibid.). I will use the datasets from round 5, conducted in 2012, 
for Botswana and Tanzania as the data from round 6 (2015) has not yet been published. The 
datasets for Botswana has a total of 1200 respondents, whilst the one of Tanzania has 2400 
respondents. Given the large sample sizes in both countries and the fact that all social groups 
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2.7 Analytical Model 
 In the model below I have displayed the five different categories of independent 
variables in my study and the dependent variable, trust in public institutions. Under each 
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2.8 Summary  
 This rather extensive chapter has reviewed the theoretical implications for studying trust 
in general and institutional trust specifically and the many variables that generates institutional 
trust. There are mainly two theories we can rely on here. The cultural theory states that trust, 
both social and political, is something that we take with us from our up-bringing and 
socialization in addition to it being part of our personality. The institutional theory on the other 
hand states that trust in institutions is something that is based on their performance. If they act 
according to individuals’ preferences they will gain trust, if not people will either show low 
trust or even distrust. The different theories in addition to previous studies of trust lead to two 
categories of independent variables, socio-demographic factors and social capital, within the 
cultural theory and three categories of independent variables, transparency, democratic 
satisfaction and policy performance, within institutional theory. The datasets used in this study 
are collected from Afrobarometer and how I have decided to analyze this data will be presented 
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Chapter Three: Methodological Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 My methodological framework chapter starts with the research approach and design for 
the study before I discuss why I have chosen a quantitative comparative research method. Next, 
I explain why I have chosen Botswana and Tanzania as my cases and why these two countries 
make for a good comparison. I will then turn to how I will go through with the data analyses, 
including the benefits of descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis in 
SPSS. As this study is based on data collected by others, a secondary analysis, it has been 
fundamental to evaluate the quality of the data. I do this by considering Afrobarometer as a 
source and their methods of data collection, before I look at the reliability and validity of both 
the data and my own analyses. Finally, I will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of my study 
as well as ethical aspects I have considered while doing the research.  
 
 
3.2 Research Approach and Design  
 A research approach is a plan for the research, from the first thoughts on the topic to a 
detailed plan on how one should go through with the data collection, analysis and 
interpretations. There are three main aspects of a research approach, these are the research 
problem, the research design and the research methods. The approach to the study is in large 
part shaped by the nature of the research problem and the issues it undertakes (Creswell, 2014). 
My research problem concerning trust in public institutions in Botswana and Tanzania lays the 
ground for a quantitative approach and method. I could also have chosen to rely on a qualitative 
method or combined the two, but a quantitative method using large samples gives me the 
opportunity to see the bigger picture and generalize to the larger population. I will however, 
combine the statistical method with the comparative method. As theories of political trust have 
been the basis of the hypotheses for my study the research has a deductive approach, meaning 
that I will test if these theories are valid for patterns of political trust in Botswana and Tanzania.  
 
 
3.3 Quantitative Comparative Study  
 For my research I chose to rely on quantitative data as this is the favorable method when 
we want to look at larger populations and contribute to statistical generalizations (Grønmo, 
2004). We can also see from previous studies that this has been the preferred method of choice 
by other scientists when studying trust in different societies. The World Values and European 
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Values surveys have been frequently used for this purpose. The data that I have used however 
are publicly available datasets and questionnaires from Afrobarometer. In a statistical research 
the data collected are supposed to reflect that of the population so that it will be possible to 
generalize the findings to the larger whole. In addition, the samples must be big enough to 
generalize from. Where the descriptive statistics only gives me the average answer to certain 
questions and how many respondents have higher education or low living standards, the 
inferential statistics gives me the opportunity to see the different variables in relation to one 
another. The correlation analysis shows me if there is any link between the dependent variable 
and one of the independent variables, while the regression analysis shows me exactly how big 
effect the different groups of independent variables have on the dependent variable. I will 
explain the details of these two types of statistical analysis below. The point of looking at the 
effect of certain independent variables is to see which types or groups of variables explain the 
variations in trust the best. Statistical analysis also gives me the opportunity to test my 
hypotheses for the study as well as theories surrounding the field of trust. In order to make sense 
of the numbers and figures coming out of the analyses, this needs to be related to the real world 
in order to find logical and valid explanations for the results I get, especially if the results are 
contradicting to the hypotheses and theories.  
Collecting the amount of data needed for a large N study like this is quite time 
consuming, therefore it is relatively normal to do a secondary analysis like this where you rely 
on data collected by others. The fact that I have not collected the data myself means that I have 
had no impact on this process or the selection of respondents. This required me to be extra 
critical towards Afrobarometer and their methods of data collection. This is discussed further 
below. One weakness in statistical analysis is that once the data is collected it is not possible to 
go back and ask any further questions in order to clarify certain issues. It also gave me less 
flexibility than if I had chosen a qualitative research approach.  
 
Since I chose to study the levels of political trust in both Tanzania and Botswana I 
combined the statistical study with a comparative study. In many ways all forms of scientific 
studies are based on comparison as we need to see effects and occurrences in relation to others 
in order to make some sense of them. We compare the effect of different independent variables 
and we need to compare the effect in one case with another. There are a few important 
components to, and good reasons for doing a comparative study. The first is that the cases are 
carefully selected based on certain qualities that they have as well as the dependent variable we 
want to study (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). The respondents within my two cases however, have 
been randomly selected. The important factor here is to recognize why it is important to 
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compare these exact cases. Why I have chosen Botswana and Tanzania is further discussed 
below. Another positive component of the comparative method is that it allowed me to see the 
causal relationships found in the statistical analysis in relation to their natural environment and 
the actual situation in either Botswana or Tanzania. This can strengthen the results from the 
correlations and regression models (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). When I see the effect one of 
my independent variables has on trust for either of the two countries I need to compare it to the 
effect of this variable in the other country as well as the effect of other independent variables 
in order to make sense of it. This way it is easier to determine which variables has the strongest 
effect on trust in Tanzania and Botswana. One important precondition for a comparative study 
is that the data collected are equivalent, meaning that the respondents must have been asked the 
same questions and understood the questions in a similar way (Grønmo, 2004). The 
questionnaires in this research are the same for every country and every respondent, though 
there may be variations due to local differences when it comes to language, ethnicities and 
political organization. The limitations or negative sides of a comparative method are that only 
a limited number of cases can be studied at the same time and there can only be a limited number 
of variables. This means that we do not get the complete picture as there are others variables 
and countries we could have included in the research. Generalization should therefore only 
count for Botswana and Tanzania.   
 
 
3.4 Why Tanzania and Botswana? 
In my thesis I wanted to compare one relatively successful country, in terms of socio-
economic development in Africa, to a country that has had more difficulties with its economic 
and political progress to see if there were any clear differences in the patterns of trust that can 
distinguish success from failure. In addition to this, I also wanted one heterogeneous country 
with a high number of ethnic groups and one homogenous country where the ethnic diversity 
is low. Botswana and Tanzania seemed to fit these criteria’s very well. 
 
 
3.4.1 Botswana  
Botswana has long been known for its economic and political success and it is the 
highest ranked Sub-Saharan African country on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2015). 
The country gained independence in 1966 and has since gone from being one of the poorest 
countries on the continent to one of the most successful ones. This has been achieved with a 
peaceful and stable multi-party democracy, the oldest in Africa, a market-driven economic 
Marianne Landmark, Spring 2016: Trust in Public Institutions 
	
50 
growth and smart financial policies as well as low levels of corruption. The development of a 
good institutional structure has also been relevant (Iimi, 2006). Their main industries are 
diamonds, cattle and tourism (Kryzanek, 2009) with the mining industry accounting for 40 
percent of GDP (Iimi, 2006). A big fear associated with rich natural resources is the Dutch 
disease or a resource curse, meaning that a rise in this sector will cause a decline in other sectors 
and the inflow of more foreign currency will diminish the price competitiveness of other goods. 
Several African countries have experienced this, but Botswana has been able to avoid it (Iimi, 
2006). The political institutions in Botswana have gained legitimacy through fair and free 
elections and oppositional representation in parliament. Voter turnout in the country is also 
rather high (Kryzanek, 2009). Another major factor that has contributed to the success is the 
fact that, as opposed to a large number of other African countries, they have been able to avoid 
a coup d’état. In addition, the country has a well-functioning education and healthcare system, 
where ninety percent of the kids are enrolled in primary schools and eighty percent of the rural 
population has access to health care (ibid.). Yet, approximately one out of three people in 
Botswana are HIV positive and they are struggling with socio-economic inequality. Although 
GDP per capita is relatively high there are high levels of poverty and unemployment both in 
the cities and in the rural areas (Globalis, 2014). This shows that the economic growth of the 
country has not benefited the majority of the population. There have also been indications that 
President Ian Khama has become more autocratic in his leadership in addition to economic 
growth slowing down (The Economist, 2014, Worldbank, 2016).  
Botswana is one of the top ranked African countries on the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators with a 72.34 percentile rank (Worldbank, 2016). Meaning that Botswana 
has relatively good governance indicated by voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence and terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and control of corruption. This number coincides with the number presented by the Ibrahim-
index (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015), a 74.2 percentile rank. The Mo Ibrahim foundation uses 
slightly different indicators for measuring governance and these are: safety and rule of law, 
participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. 
About 2.2 million people live in Botswana and almost 80 percent of them are part of the Tswana 
people. This makes it a largely homogeneous country (CIA, 2016).  
 
 
3.4.2 Tanzania  
Tanzania, on the other hand, has not experienced the same success since gaining 
independence in 1961. Their first president Julius Nyerere implemented an independent, 
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socialist-oriented development strategy. Initially this was a success, but it did not manage to 
stand against external shocks and internal restrictions and weaknesses throughout the 1970’s 
(Morrissey, 1995). The problematic economic situation forced Tanzania to join numerous other 
developing countries in implementing the structural adjustment programs introduced by the 
World Bank. This also involved structural adjustment loans, requiring an economic adjustment 
including tax reforms, trade liberalizations, privatization and reducing government intervention 
(ibid.). In order for these programs to be successful there needs to be an administrative and 
institutional capacity in the country as well as political commitment. In the case of Tanzania, 
this has been partly achieved and there was a commitment from the government. All in all, 
structural adjustment programs have been successful and the country has experienced steady 
economic growth and development over the past decades (Muganda, 2004), but as with most 
African countries this growth has not benefitted the many and they are still battling high levels 
of corruption and ineffective bureaucracy. As a result, it is still amongst the poorest and least 
developed countries on the Human Development Index as it struggles financially, politically 
and in developmental terms. Nevertheless, as opposed to the majority of other less developed 
Sub-Saharan African countries it is a relatively peaceful country.  
Agriculture accounts for 80 percent of the labor force and 85 percent of the country’s 
exports (CIA, 2016). The financial sector, however has expanded in the previous years due to 
the establishment of foreign-owned banks (ibid.). On the World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators Tanzania scores quite poorly, receiving only a 40,2 percentile rank (Worldbank, 
2016). On the Ibrahim-index, however, it scores slightly better with a 56,7 percentile rank. 
There has recently been found large gas-resources in Tanzania which gives hope for a fast 
growth in income, more jobs and better social goods (Norad, 2015). The government now faces 
the challenge to meet the expectations from the people and building a proper institutional 
framework to handle this. There is great potential to make this situation the turning point for 
development in Tanzania, but it can also make matters worse. Strong institutions can be seen 
as a factor for generating trust; does the people of Tanzania have faith in the government in 
order to have everyone benefit from the natural resources?  
Another major factor that differentiates Tanzania from Botswana, and one of the main 
reasons these two countries are chosen, is that Tanzania has a highly heterogeneous population. 
The population of approximately 50 million people is a mix of about 130 different ethnic groups 
with Sukuma being the largest, representing around 16 percent of the population. There are also 
a large number of ethnic languages in addition to the official languages English and Swahili 
(CIA, 2016). The religious divide in the country is quite equally spread amongst Christians, 
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Muslims and traditional religions with approximately one third representing each religion 
(Globalis, 2014).     
 
It is often believed that the larger the ethnic diversity the lower the trust is, because 
people tend not to expand their trust-radius to outside what is familiar to them. Is this also the 
case in Tanzania? And will Batswana’s therefore be more trusting? Does economic progress 
and political success foster trusting citizens and will trust-levels therefore be higher in 
Botswana than Tanzania? Is the low development a reason for low trust or is low trust the reason 
that institutions are not functioning? Do low levels of trust lead to low levels of social capital? 
How does trust vary in a homogenous society versus a heterogonous society? The Scandinavian 
countries together with Japan are examples of homogenous countries with high levels of social 
and political trust. Is it so that homogenous countries in terms of ethnicity foster more trust than 
heterogeneous countries?  
 
 
Table 3.1: Statistics over Botswana and Tanzania  
 Botswana Tanzania 
Surface Area (km2) 581, 730 947, 300 
Population 2, 219, 937 51, 822, 621 
GDP  $ 30.8 (PPP) $ 82.2 (PPP) 
GDP per capita $ 15, 247 (PPP) $ 1, 718 (PPP) 
Extreme Poverty 13.4 % 43.5 % 
National Poverty Line 19.3 % 28.2 % 
HDI index/rank 0.698/106 0.521/151 
Good Governance 72.34 % 40.2 % 
Adult Literacy 86.7 % 67.8 % 
Child Mortality 36.3 36.4 
Fertility Rate 2.4 4.9 
Life Expectancy 64.5 65 
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3.4.3 Respondent’s Profile 
 Based on the frequencies from the Afrobarometer surveys I have developed the 
following profile of the respondents. Living standards as a measure of economic prosperity 
does not match what is stated above and the general knowledge that Botswana is more 
developed than Tanzania. The reason for this however could be that it is a subjective measure. 
The biggest tribe in Tanzania is Sukuma and around 16 percent of the population is known to 
be of this tribe. Their representation in this survey is therefore good. In Botswana almost 80 
percent of the population is of the Tswana tribe. In this survey however they only represent 47 
percent.  The education level of the respondents is according to the general standards in the two 
countries as Botswana has a slightly better education system than Tanzania.      
 
  
Table: 3.2: Respondent’s Profile 





600 (50 %) 
600 (50 %) 
 
1203 (50.1 %) 
1197 (49.9 %) 
Age  
Min. – Max. 
Average 
 
18 – 92 
38 
 




Neither Good or Bad 
Good 
 
989 (82.4 %) 
208 (17.3 %) 
- 
 
1 569 (65.4 %) 
642 (26.8 %) 
184 (7.7 %) 
Tribe Tswana 46.8 % Sukuma 13.8 % 
Education  






148 (12.4 %) 
264 (22.1%) 
566 (47.1 %) 
75 (6.2 %) 
147 (12.3 %) 
 
210 (8.8 %) 
1 698 (70.8 %) 
405 (16.9 %) 
54 (2.3 %) 
32 (1.3 %) 
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3.5 Data Analysis 
 After the data is collected, which in my case was a job done by Afrobarometer and I 
therefore only needed to get hold of the datasets, it was time to analyze it. The goal, in both 
qualitative and quantitative studies, is to uncover general patterns and relations or possible 
differences between the cases. We inspect the data in order to discover useful information and 
finding possible conclusions (Yin, 2014). The main focus and also the great challenge will be 
to find an answer to the research problem. As mentioned I used a deductive approach to my 
analysis and therefore rely on a theoretical proposition – strategy in order to reach my 
conclusions, this is typically used in case-studies. By using this strategy, I followed the 
theoretical propositions that my study is built on. The theoretical framework was the basis for 
my research problem, the literature reviewed and the hypotheses of my study and I have 
analyzed and discussed my findings in relation to the background for my study. The theoretical 
framework helped me reach conclusions and test the theories I have reviewed. Is the 
performance-based theory valid in Botswana and Tanzania? Does social trust have a positive 
effect on political trust? What role do socio-demographic variables play?   
In order to analyze statistical data, we need to rely on a statistical program. In my case 
I have used SPSS. This allowed me to do everything from the very simple analyses like a 
univariate analysis to a multiple regression analysis. To get an overview of the values in the 
different variables I started by running a univariate analysis of all my variables, both dependent 
and independent. These descriptive statistics gave me answers about the average response for 
each question, the standard deviation and the significance level. I also looked at the frequencies 
of each value for some of my variables. This tells me how often each value occurs in my sample 
and in a large sample like this it should be a representable pattern for the general population. 
The interesting thing by looking at the descriptive statistics is that the typical value and average 
for each variable will either be according to your expectations or deviate from them and this is 
likely to answers some questions about the situation in these countries, but it will possibly also 
generate more questions about why this is the case. This way the analyzing process is already 
beginning. A natural next step was a correlation analysis. This told me whether there is a 
connection between the dependent variable, trust in public institutions, and one of the 
independent variables. I also got answers to whether these correlations are significant or not. 
For this step I could also have chosen to use cross-tabulations to look at the connection between 
each of the values in the dependent variable and each of the values for the independent 
variables, one at a time, but I found it to extensive and not quite as interesting as the correlation 
analyses. The final and most important step of my analysis was an OLS regression analyses. 
This showed me the direction and strength of the correlation and the effect is also adjusted for 
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the effect of the other independent variables in the group. The significance value and t-value in 
the regression models tells me if the effect is generalizable to the general population. These 
final analyses helped me answer my research problem and find out if my hypotheses are correct 
or not.   
 
 
3.5.1 Correlation analysis 
 A correlation analysis focuses on the strength of the relation between the dependent 
variable and one of the independent variables (Midtbø, 2007). If there is a positive correlation 
it means that a lot of one factor leads to a lot of another factor, if there is a negative correlation 
a lot of one thing leads to less of another thing (Midtbø, 2007). Whether these correlations are 
random or valid and if they can be generalized to outside this specific research depends on the 
statistical significance (ibid.). Testing the significance means also testing if the hypotheses are 
correct or not. We have two different types of hypotheses-testing; a two-tailed (symmetrical) 
test and a one-tailed (asymmetrical) test. As there is no clear indication in my theories or 
previous studies on the field whether there is a positive or negative correlation between trust in 
public institutions and my independent variables I find it most sensible to rely on a two-tailed 
test. This might though be a rather safe assumption. The next important step in a correlation 
analysis is deciding on a test statistic. In a correlation analysis we mostly rely on significance 
values, often referred to as the p-value, whilst in the regression analysis we have several other 
measures for deciding if the effect is significant or not. This decides to what degree we are 
willing to reject the null hypothesis; the higher the significance level is the harder it will be to 
reject the null hypothesis. The correlation analysis can cause us to make one of two mistakes in 
generalizing to the larger population. An error of first kind, a rejection error, is to falsely reject 
a correct null hypothesis and an error of second kind, an acceptance error, is to not reject the 
null hypothesis when it is in fact wrong (ibid.). The first type of mistake is generally seen as 
worse than the other as this will cause us to state that there is a correlation when it in fact is not. 
To avoid this, the significance level will be set quite low, usually to 1, 5 or 10 percent (ibid.). 
The significance level I have chosen to use is 5 percent, meaning that I am willing to accept up 
to a five percent chance of claiming that there is a correlation when this can be caused by 
random effects. When running the correlation analysis in SPSS it will sometimes decide this 
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3.5.2 Regression analysis  
When we want to study the direction of a correlation and a more exact effect of each 
variable we need to turn to a regression analysis. This distinguishes between the variable that 
is being explained, the dependent variable, and the ones explaining, the independent variables 
(Midtbø, 2007). The regression analysis is what gave the most precise and complete picture as 
it gave me the opportunity to connect all my independent variables or the different groups of 
independent variables to my dependent one. This has naturally been the main focus of my study. 
I found the explanatory power of the models by looking at the adjusted R square, as all the 
models have more than one independent variable. The number tells how much of the variations 
in the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables and is adjusted for how 
many independent variables are included in the model. This number is based on Pearson R, 
which is a measure of the correlation between metric variables, which again is based on the 
covariance. The number will be between 0 and 1 (0-100%) and the closer it is to 1 the more 
does the independent variables explain.  
Testing of the hypotheses in a regression analysis is a lot like in a correlation analysis, 
but instead of looking at the correlation itself we want to see if the independent variable affects 
the dependent one (Midtbø, 2007). The constant tells the level of the dependent variable when 
there is no effect from the independent variables. The effect from these variables is shown by 
the slope coefficients. The higher the coefficient, the bigger is the effect. This effect will be 
either positive or negative. When we have more than one independent variable in a model the 
slope coefficients will also be affected by the correlation between the independent variables 
and the other independent variables effect on the dependent variable. When adding more 
independent variables to a model the original coefficients will not change value if there is no 
correlation between the original independent variables and the newly added one and if the new 
independent variable does not have an effect on Y. Both these criteria’s have to be achieved for 
there to be no effect (ibid.).  
In order to prove or reject the null hypotheses I need to know whether the estimated 
slope coefficient can be regarded as significant or random. There are several ways to find the 
significance of a regression model. One way is to look at the standard error. The general rule is 
that the estimate must be double the standard error to be significantly different than 0. It is more 
common however to look at the t-value. If the coefficient is high and the standard error small 
the t-value will be high. The higher the t-value is the more likely it is that the effect is real and 
the null hypothesis is wrong (ibid.). In order to reject the null hypothesis, the t-value needs to 
be higher than the critical value. With a significance level of 5 percent my t-value in a two-
tailed test will be ±1.96. This means that if the t-value is higher than 1.96 the null hypothesis 
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will be rejected and there is only a 5 percent chance that this is a false rejection. Nevertheless, 
I choose to pay attention to the p-value as well, as the last form of test statistic. This tells me 
how likely it will be to get a result in my sample if the null hypothesis is correct. The rules for 
the significance level and value in the correlation analysis apply in a regression analysis too. 
The lower the p-value is the less reason we have to accept the null hypothesis. If the p-value is 
lower than my chosen significance level the null hypothesis will be rejected. My significance 
level of 0.05 means that I am willing to accept up to a 5 percent chance that the effect is caused 
randomly. The t-value and p-value are in many ways related and if the p-value is lower than the 
significance level the t-value has to be over the critical value.  
 
 One point that is important to note when it comes to a regression analysis is that it 
requires the variables to be metric. This means that the values in the datasets need to be 
meaningful in themselves, either values that are ranged in a particular order or values that 
simply are numbers, like age. The values that are on a nominal or ordinal level, where the values 
are given just to separate the answers, need to be recoded into dummy-variables.    
 
 
3.6 Quality of the Research 
 Whether the data can illuminate the research question or not depends on the quality of 
the data, which again depends on a number of factors. The quality of the material cannot be 
generalized as it depends on whether it is relevant or not in order to answer the research problem 
(Grønmo, 2004). It is therefore possible that the data has both high and low quality, depending 
on what it is used for. There are several ways of reviewing the quality of the data, making sure 
that the data collection process has been reasonable and the research as a whole is justified in 
terms of purpose and completion. I have relied on two overall criteria’s in order to review the 
quality of my data and my study. These are validity and reliability. In general, the validity tells 
how valid the data is and how well my research design contributes to answering my research 
problem. If the collection of data gave me relevant information according to the intentions with 
the research the validity is high (ibid.). Validity can be broken into construct validity, internal 
validity and external validity. Reliability indicates if the research methods, data and results are 
trustworthy. If the research is repeated with the same results there is high reliability (Yin, 2014). 
If the collected data has high validity the reliability must also be high, but even though it is 
reliable it is not necessary valid. Reliability is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for 
validity (Grønmo, 2004).  
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I consider Afrobarometer to be a serious organization which collects and distributes 
both valid and reliable data, but since the data I have used is collected by others and based on 
questionnaires developed by others there is reason to be extra critical. The original motivation 
for collecting this information might also differ from mine which is an extra factor to be aware 
of. My evaluation of Afrobarometer as a valid and reliable source is based on their 17 year-long 
history in providing statistics on societal, political and cultural issues on the African continent 
and their strong scientific team. Some of the leading scientists within African political research, 
Dr. Michael Bratton and Dr. Robert Mattes, are among the co-founders (Afrobarometer, 2016). 
Afrobarometer is really the only organization that collects and distributes this type of large-
scale data about the public opinion on important topics within society in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In their book, Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform, Bratton and Mattes along with 
Dr. E. Gyimah-Boadi discuss the validity and reliability of Afrobarometer’s methods and why 
the type of research that they do has not been conducted so much in the past. Their main 
argument is that a research technology and questionnaires developed in industrial societies may 
lead to largely misleading results when conducted in typical rural areas in Africa (Bratton et 
al., 2004). One way of solving this is by using focus groups to discuss the core concepts of the 
questionnaires, with participants from several African countries. Another point is to make the 
questions as concrete as possible in order to eliminate any “non-attitude” responses just because 
the questions are too vague and the respondent has not reflected too much on the matter. Most 
respondents will have an opinion on the different topics in the survey and the goal is to capture 
these opinions and not let them end up in the “other”-category (ibid.).  
One important concern they mention surrounding the validity and reliability of the 
research is whether or not the respondents answer true to their opinion or if they are influenced 
by the leaders of their country. It is therefore vital that the fieldworker gives thorough 
information about the purpose of the survey as well as emphasizing that Afrobarometer is a 
politically independent and non-governmental organization. Opinion surveys like this are not a 
common feature in African societies and it is therefore natural that respondent have some 
hesitations when it comes to participating. As most media channels are controlled by the 
government the opinion that the public have of political matters is largely shaped to be what 
the government wants it to be. To avoid this Afrobarometer surveys are only conducted in 
politically liberalized countries where citizens enjoy at least some degree of free speech and 
where the mass media is pluralized (ibid.). As far as possible, the fieldwork was not conducted 
during elections. After the surveys are completed they undergo numerous internal tests. These 
tests have revealed little threat to the possibility of false answers or fake ignorance ending up 
in the “don’t know” category. The refusal to take part in the survey is also relatively low, around 
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5 percent, with many respondents being very positive to take part as this hopefully means that 
their voice will be heard. The number of “don’t know” responses is also fairly low. The last, 
but maybe the most important point is to measure political fear and cross-reference these 
answers with the respondents’ answers to a number of other questions. Some correlation has 
been found between those who say one must be very careful expressing political opinion and 
those expressing loyalty to the winning party and performance of the government. However, 
these respondents do not show signs of any self-censorship in regard to any other questions 
about public opinion, for instance trust in public institutions (Bratton et al., 2004). The thorough 
and systematic work done by Afrobarometer in conducting the surveys gives me faith that these 
are reliable and valid data and that they are relevant and appropriate for my research as a number 
of questions contribute to understand the correlation between my dependent variable and 
independent variables.    
 
 
3.6.1 Construct Validity 
 According to Yin (2014) construct validity is concerned with creating the right 
operational measures for the concepts that are being studied. My dependent variable, trust in 
public institutions, has been operationalized through the question of how the respondents range 
their trust in several public institutions. The dependent variable is therefore quite simple to 
cover. The independent variables however are a bit more complicated. The first category, socio-
demographic factors, includes basic questions concerning age, gender, education and tribe as 
well as living conditions which is to refer economic prosperity. In order to measure social 
capital, I have chosen to focus on in what degree respondents take part in any organization and 
to what degree they trust the people around them, either friends, family, neighbors or strangers. 
General trust in society and associationism are good measures for social capital and is why I 
am relying on these questions for this variable. My third category of independent variables, 
transparency, is covered by one question about the respondent’s use of media sources whilst 
the other asks to what degree they believe that several public institutions are involved in 
corruption. In order for these indicators to be valid for my research they need to be seen in 
relation to one another. Is there any difference in how corruption I perceived from the ones with 
great access to media to the ones with little access? And how does this affect their trust? My 
fourth category of independent variables, democratic satisfaction is operationalized by the 
direct questions asking respondents to rate their satisfactions with the democracy and faith in 
problem solving. The last category, policy performance, consists of questions regarding the 
respondents’ evaluation of the national and local government’s policy performance as well as 
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approval of the President’s, the parliament’s and local government council’s performance. The 
questions in relation to my variables have also been used and tested in previous research by 
other scientists (Jamil and Askvik, 2015, Delhey and Newton, 2003, Lühiste, 2006) and should 
therefore be valid operational measures in relation to my research problem.    
 In order to improve the construct validity of my study I could have used multiple sources 
of data and for instance combined my dataset with fieldwork or in depth interviews. This way 
I could have seen if the results coincide.  
   
 
3.6.2 Internal Validity 
 Internal validity refers to “establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious 
relationships” (Yin, 2014:46). In causal studies we need to be particularly aware of the internal 
validity and avoid concluding that X causes Y when it is actually Z that causes Y (Yin, 2014). 
Since I have relied on SPSS to run my analyses I have gotten a decent amount of help. In the 
correlation analysis I saw if there was at all a correlation between trust in public institutions 
and any of my independent variables, but it did not tell me anything about which variable effects 
which. If the correlation is valid depends on the statistical significance. This is vital to pay 
attention to so that I do not draw any false conclusions. It is better to conclude that there is no 
correlation when there in fact is, than to state that there is a correlation when there is not. In 
order to distinguish between which variables that are explaining and which variable is being 
explained I ran a regression analysis. This showed me the strength of the relation between the 
variables. To test if the relation between the variables are valid in a regression analysis I need 
to look at the significance value and the t-value.  
 
 
3.6.3 External Validity 
 External validity tells me whether the results from the study can be generalized to other 
situations at other times (Yin, 2014). The goal of a quantitative study is to do exactly that: 
generalize to the larger population. In order for this to be possible the samples need to represent 
the population and they need to be of significant size. The samples in my study are 1200 for 
Botswana and 2400 for Tanzania. This qualifies for large N studies and are therefore well suited 
to generalize from. As mentioned, Afrobarometer’s methods for selecting their respondents are 
based on random sampling giving every adult an equal chance to be chosen to participate. 
Geographical areas and tribes are represented respectively to their size in the population. The 
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sample for Tanzania has a slightly lower error margin than the one of Botswana, but both 
samples have a confidence level of 95 percent. Quantitative studies also give us great 




 Reliability tells us about the conformity between different collections of data about the 
same phenomenon based on the same research design; how reliable is the data (Grønmo, 2004). 
If a researcher were to repeat my research he or she should come to the same findings and 
conclusions as I did. Reliability is mostly concerned with the data and as I have not collected 
this myself I need to be well aware of the methods used be Afrobarometer. As mentioned, 
Afrobarometer goes to great lengths in order to make sure that their data is reliable and this is 
proved by their thorough process in developing the questionnaires, their data collection methods 
and training of their fieldworkers. In order for the survey itself to be reliable we need to know 
that the respondents would answer the questions the same way tomorrow as they do today 
(Midtbø, 2007). Their answers cannot be random and uncertain and this can be avoided with 
clear questions and alternatives. The respondents need to understand fully what they are being 
asked and be sure of their answers. To assure this the questionnaires are developed through a 
process of careful testing with focus groups evaluating the core concepts and topics of the 
survey like democracy, corruption and government. The questions are also made as precise as 
possible to avoid a large number of “don’t know” answers. One factor that is relevant for my 
study is the respondents political fear. Do they answer what they think the government wants 
them to answer? Do they express higher levels of trust in public institutions out of loyalty? 
According to testing done by the organization itself there is no correlation between expression 
of political fear and trust in public institutions (Bratton et al., 2004). I therefore regard the data 
presented by Afrobarometer as reliable.     
 My research design and how I have conducted my analyses in SPSS have been 
systematically explained throughout this paper. I have clarified which questions in the survey 
that have been used in creating my variables as well as how these have been used in the 
correlation and regression analyses. Creation of index variables and dummy coding’s have also 
been explained. The data-collection and SPSS analyses should, based on this, be fairly 
straightforward for others to repeat with the same results and I therefore regard my analyses to 
be reliable.   
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3.7 Strengths and Weaknesses to my Study  
 There are both strengths and weaknesses to my study and the method I have chosen. 
One of the weaknesses is that I have not collected the data myself, but rather downloaded the 
datasets from Afrobarometer. The reason for this is that I would have had no chance to collect 
this amount of data in my appointed time-frame and therefore could not have done a large N 
study. This secondary analysis method requires an extra critical attitude towards 
Afrobarometer, their methods and the data, and the thorough examination of these, outlined 
above, shows that this is a serious organization collecting and presenting data using valid and 
reliable methods. They also go to great lengths in order to safety-proof both input and output in 
the surveys. In regard to the outcome of the research I therefore do not think that this method 
is of disadvantage. In terms of taking part in the entire research process, on the other hand, it 
might show signs of choosing a slightly simpler path in order to reach my goal. However, this 
study would not have been possible without secondary analysis. In addition, I regard the 
analysis part as the most important part and the data collection as more of a starting point. 
Another negative side to doing a quantitative study is that it only gives you an overall and in 
some cases slightly shallow perspective of the situation as opposed to a qualitative study where 
you dig a little deeper in order to get more in-depth information from people. In addition, I have 
never been to either of the countries which of course is a weakness that may be most visible in 
the analyses section. The fact that I have no first-hand experience with these societies and have 
to rely on documents in order to make sense of the findings in SPSS could cause me to make 
misinterpretations. A qualitative study nevertheless is harder to generalize from as the sample 
sizes are often relatively small and when comparing a great societal issue like trust in two 
countries it is absolutely preferred to rely on quantitative data and methods. Looking at other, 
similar studies of trust, both institutional and social, we also see that the absolute majority is 
based solely on quantitative data.  
The quantitative comparative method gives me the opportunity to look at large scale 
data and hopefully be able to make generalizations to the population. This way I can also test 
theories and hypotheses and compare my findings with previous research. As mentioned, 
statistical analysis also lets me see the correlations between the different variables as well as 
the effect the independent variable has on the dependent variable. This way we can see which 
exact factors are important for generating trust. Comparing two countries also gives me the 
opportunity to test theories between nations and cultures to find what determines trust in 
different areas.  I have chosen a somewhat wide variety of independent variables which gives 
me a better image of whether social or institutional factors are deciding of individuals’ trust in 
public institutions. This gives the analyses a broader range and allows me to see things from 
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different perspectives and test competing theories. The fact that other, highly acclaimed 
scientists have relied on the quantitative method in their research also proves that this is 
absolutely a valid and reliable method for conducting this type of study.       
 
 
3.8 Ethical Considerations 
 In any research that is conducted it is of high priority to make sure that all ethical 
principles are considered. Afrobarometer is a serious organization conducting serious research 
and producing valid results and datasets. Their interviewers are well trained and informed about 
general ethical principles when conducting research. All respondents are over the age of 18 and 
have under informed consent agreed to participate. They are therefore well informed about the 
purpose of the study and how the information they give will be handled further. Interviewers 
must also sign agreements stating that they will not under any circumstances discuss the identity 
of the respondents or the contents of the interview to anyone outside the project. No respondent 
should risk taking any harm from participating in the survey. When the data is collected the 
respondents are coded and from there on they are mere numbers in a scheme and there is no 
possibility of identifying them (Afrobarometer, 2016). There is little I can do in terms of 
wrongdoing in regard to the respondents, but I do have a responsibility to handle the data in a 
respectful way and in line with the purpose of the data collection. In relation to the documentary 
sources that I have used I have made sure to cite the authors and respect their work by not 
passing of any of their research as my own. In addition, I have ensured that my conclusions and 
further recommendations are not misrepresentative and incorrect based on my findings.  
 
 
3.9 Summary  
 The methodological framework of a research should give a detailed presentation and 
discussion of how one has planned and followed through with the data collection and analyses 
as well as an evaluation of the quality of the data. I found the quantitative comparative method 
to be best suited in order to answer my research question as well as it giving me the opportunity 
to generalize my findings. The analyses have been completed in SPSS and the findings from 
the descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analyses will be presented in the next 
chapter. The secondary analysis approach is justified with the time frame I am working with 
and Afrobarometer’s thorough methods of data-collection as well as their valid and reliable 
data. The chapter was completed with a reflection around the strengths and weaknesses of my 
study and the ethical considerations.  
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Chapter Four: Empirical Findings 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 This chapter presents the results of my analyses in SPSS. I start by presenting the 
findings from the descriptive statistics, both the frequencies table and the descriptive statistics 
table for trust in public institutions and then the same for all the independent variables. I then 
turn to the correlation analysis. I will present all the correlations in one table before I discuss 
the findings for each group of independent variables. Last are my regression models. These too 
are presented in one table consisting of six models, one for each group of independent variables 
in addition to the last one where all independent variables are included. The complete tables for 
the descriptive statistics as well as the correlation and regression analysis can be found in 
appendix two, three and four. I will discuss the findings in the regression models for each group 
of independent variables separately before I round off with a brief discussion of all the 
independent variables’ effect on institutional trust. A further analysis and discussion of my 
findings follows in the next chapter.    
 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics   
4.2.1 Dependent variable: Trust in public institutions 
When I look at the frequencies and descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, trust 
in public institutions, the first thing I notice is that the number of valid answers is remarkably 
lower for Botswana than Tanzania. In Botswana only 69 percent of the response is valid, whilst 
the number for Tanzania is 88 percent. The numbers from Tanzania might therefore be more 
valid for generalization as it is a much larger sample. Of more relevance we should turn to the 
actual numbers for trust. The trust index is, as mentioned above, computed from the values for 
trust in the various public institutions. The values presented here is therefore the total number 
of answers for each value as well as the combined average for trust in public institutions. In 
order to simplify a little, I have divided the trust index in two with the lower half representing 
low trust and the upper half representing high trust. Low trust consists of the values from “not 
at all” (0) to in between “just a little” and “somewhat” (1.49), while high trust then naturally 
reaches from in between “just a little” (1.5) to “a lot” (3).    
For Botswana 39 percent of the respondents express low trust while 30 percent express 
high trust. Since such a large percentage of the answers in Botswana are invalid we need to also 
look at the valid percentages which is 57 for low trust and 43 percent for high trust. The fact 
that the majority of the population expresses low trust is surprising and that there seems to be 
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lower trust in Botswana than in Tanzania is even more surprising. For Tanzania we see that 65 
percent show high trust while 24 percent express low trust. In this case the valid percent’s do 
not deviate as far from this with 73 percent in the high trust category and 27 percent in the low 
trust category.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Trust in Public Institutions in Botswana and Tanzania (percent distribution) 
 
 FREQUENCIES PERCENT VALID PERCENT 
Botswana Tanzania Botswana Tanzania Botswana Tanzania 
Low Trust 468 576 39 24 57 27 
High Trust 360 1 545 30 65 43 73 
Missing 372 279 31 12   
N 1200 2400 1200 2400 828 2121 
 
How much trust do you have in the following, or haven’t you heard enough to say? 
a) The President; b) Parliament; c) the National Electoral Commission; d) the Tanzanian/Botswana revenue 
authority; e) your Local Government Council; f) the Ruling Party; g) Opposition Political Parties; h) the Police; 
i) the Army; j) Courts of Law; K-TAN) the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB): Not at all 
(0); Just a little (1); Somewhat (2); a lot (3)  
 
 
For both countries the larger percentage clusters around the middle of the index. The 
average response for Botswana is 1.5, which is right in the middle of the scale. This means that 
most respondents in Botswana answer that they trust the public institutions just a little or 
somewhat. In Tanzania the average institutional trust is slightly higher with 1.9. Respondents 
in Tanzania therefore seem to have somewhat trust in the public institutions.  
 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for trust in Public Institutions in Botswana and Tanzania 
 MEAN/S.D. 
 Botswana Tanzania 
Trust Index 1.5/0.7 1.9/0.6 
Valid N 828 2121 
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It is quite interesting that trust in public institutions is significantly higher in Tanzania 
than in Botswana and that the majority of the respondent’s in Botswana express low trust while 
a large majority of respondents in Tanzania are trusting of public institutions. The average 
however, is only slightly higher in Tanzania than in Botswana. These findings contradict with 
my first hypothesis, why is it so that institutional trust is significantly higher in Tanzania than 
in Botswana? I will attempt to answer this question in my discussion of these findings in my 
analysis chapter.   
 
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables  
The descriptive statistics and frequencies for the independent variables might be 
somewhat surprising. According to the respondents living conditions are better in Tanzania than 
in Botswana which is contradicting to the general development level and poverty rates. 
Education levels and access to media are however more as expected. Faith in problem solving 
is higher in Tanzania, which is strange as their level of development may show signs of little 
action from the government. On the other hand, Batswana’s are more satisfied with the policy 
performance. However, the most surprising is that both generalized and particularized trust 
levels are so low in Botswana, while only generalized trust is low in Tanzania.  
 
 
4.2.2.1 Socio-demographic variables 
 Living conditions 
The average for living conditions in Botswana is 1.6, meaning that most people state 
that they have somewhere between very bad and fairly bad living conditions. As we see, the 
highest answer in Botswana is 3 (neither good or bad) which means that none of the respondents 
in Botswana has answered that their living conditions are fairly or very good. The frequencies 
(in appendix 2) tells me that 82 percent of the respondents consider their living conditions to 
be bad, while 17 percent think they are neither good or bad. In Tanzania the average living 
standard is 2.1, slightly better than fairly bad. The frequencies show that 65 percent of the 
respondents answer that their living conditions are bad, while only 8 percent say that their living 
conditions are good. It should be noted once again that this is a subjective measure by the 
respondents, but it is however unexpected that such a large majority of the respondents in 
Botswana say that their living conditions are bad as this country is considered the most 
successful country in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 




Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
 MEAN/S.D. 
 Botswana Tanzania 
Socio-Demographic Variables   
Age 38.5/17.1 38.3/14.1 
Living Conditions 1.6/0.8 2.1/1 
Tribe 147.2/6.1 748.5/4.9 
Education 4.1/2.2 3/1.3 
Gender 0.5/0.5 0.5/0.5 
Social Capital   
Member In Religious Group 0.8/1 1.2/1 
Member in Com./Vol. Group 0.3/0.8 1/1.1 
General Trust 0.1/0.3 0.1/0.3 
Trust Relatives 1.7/1.1 2.6/0.6 
Trust Neighbors 1.2/1 2.2/0.8 
Trust Others You Know 1/0.9 1.7/0.9 
Transparency   
Listen to Radio 2.7/1.5 2.9/1.5 
Watch TV 2.4/1.7 1.3/1.6 
Read Newspaper 1.9/1.5 0.9/1.3 
Use Internet 0.7/1.4 0.3/0.8 
Corruption Index 1.1/0.5 1.3/0.5 
Democratic Satisfaction   
Satisfaction w/Democracy 2.9/0.9 2.9/0.8 
Faith In Problem Solving 1.6/1 2.5/0.7 
Policy Performance   
Performance Index 2.7/0.4 2.2/0.5 
Local Performance Index 2.5/0.6 2.2/0.7 
President’s Performance 3.1/0.9 2.9/0.9 
MP’s Performance 2.4/0.9 2.7/0.9 








In terms of education the average in Tanzania is 3, completed primary school with 58 
percent of the respondents answering that they have only completed primary school. In 
Botswana the average is 4, some secondary school with 30 percent of the respondents saying 
that they have completed secondary school and 16 percent have some secondary education. 
These frequencies are also displayed in appendix 2.  
 
Age 
In Botswana the respondents are between 18 and 92 years old with the average age being 
just above 38 years. This is the same average as in Tanzania, but here the oldest respondent 99 
years old.  
 
Tribe 
The average tribe does not tell much, but the frequencies (appendix 2) shows that the 
dominating tribe in Tanzania is Sukuma with almost 14 percent. It is believed that this group 
makes up around 16 percent of the population, so this result is quite representative (World 
Culture Encyclopedia, 2016). Ha is the second largest with 5 percent and Chaga is the third 
largest with 4.5 percent. In Botswana the largest ethnic group is the Tswana people, this group 
however is made up of several smaller groups. In the survey these groups are mentioned 
separately and not Tswana as a whole. 47 percent of the respondents say that they are members 
of one of the Tswana groups. Amongst these are Bangwato with 12 percent and Bakgatla with 
9 percent which respectively are the second and third largest groups in the survey. The second 
largest ethnic group in Botswana is Kalanga. In this survey however it is the largest as 16 
percent of the respondents state they belong to this group. Since 79 percent of the population is 
said to belong to the Tswana and 11 percent to Kalanga (CIA, 2016) this survey might not 
represent the ethnicities in the country correctly.   
 
 
4.2.2.2 Social Capital  
Based on memberships in community groups or religious groups social capital seems to 
be higher in Tanzania than in Botswana. In terms of membership in religious groups the average 
(ranging from 0 to 3) in Tanzania is 1.2, slightly over inactive member, while for Botswana it 
is 0.8, close to inactive member, but leaning more towards not a member. For community or 
voluntary groups, the numbers are even lower, the average membership in Botswana is 0.3, 
meaning most people are not members, while in Tanzania the average is 1, inactive member. 
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The frequency table in appendix 2 shows that 45 percent in Tanzania say that they are an active 
member in a community or voluntary group and 35 percent are active in a religious group. 
Respectively 42 and 51 percent are not members. In Botswana however only 29 percent are 
active in a community or voluntary group while 59 percent are not members. Only 12 percent 
say that they are a member of a religious group and 82 percent say they are not members. In 
general, this means that associationism is quite a bit higher in Tanzania than in Botswana. Why 
is this the case and how does it affect institutional trust?  
Looking at the general trust indicator we see that the average in both countries is 0.1, 
meaning that the majority of the respondent’s state that one must be very careful when dealing 
with others. General trust is therefore very low in both Tanzania and Botswana. In Tanzania 
particularized trust is somewhat higher than in Botswana. In terms of trust in relatives the 
average 2.6 for Tanzania shows that most respondents have somewhat or a lot of trust in them, 
while in Botswana the average is only 1.7, meaning that respondents here are slightly more 
careful when dealing with relatives. Trust in neighbors is naturally a little bit lower, the average 
is 2.2 for Tanzania and 1.2 for Botswana, meaning that people in Tanzania have somewhat trust 
in their neighbors while in Botswana people only trust their neighbors a little. Trust in other 
people you know is even lower with the average in Tanzania being 1.7 and 1 in Botswana. 
Respondents in Tanzania have close to somewhat trust in others, while in Botswana they have 
just a little trust in others. Particularized trust levels in Tanzania show that most people 
generally trust people somewhat, but naturally they have more trust in the people they know 
well. In Botswana people seem to be more careful as most answers cluster around just a little 
trust, but here too people display most trust in those they know the best. The social capital 
variables show that both associationism and particularized trust is higher in Tanzania than 
Botswana while generalized trust is the same. If these variables can be seen as good measures 
for social capital, social capital is slightly stronger in Tanzania. Theories of social capital state 
that social trust and associationism can be harder to achieve in an ethnically diverse country, 
therefore this result is rather surprising. As we saw above institutional trust is also higher in 
Tanzania, can this be explained by the fact that social capital is stronger here than in Botswana 
and are the cultural theories of trust therefore valid? 
 
 
4.2.2.3 Transparency  
 The transparency variable is divided in two; how often respondents get news from 
different mediums and perceived corruption. The media variables tell us that most people get 
news from the radio a few times a week as the average is 2.7 for Botswana and 2.9 for Tanzania 
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(on a scale from 0, never, to 4, every day). Watching television is more common in Botswana 
where the average person gets news from a television between a few times a month and a few 
times a week. In Tanzania on the other hand, where the average is only 1.4, people get news 
from a television less than a few times a month. Reading newspapers is even rarer as the average 
is 1.9, a few times a month, in Botswana and 0.9, less than once a month, in Tanzania. Use of 
internet has the lowest average, 0.7 for Botswana and 0.3 for Tanzania. This means that very 
few people use internet at all and most people never use it or use it less than once a month. 
Based on this we can see that people in general pay more attention to news in Botswana than 
in Tanzania, but it can also be explained by less access to the different media channels in 
Tanzania. If the media is reporting negative cases related to public institutions this is believed 
to have a negative effect on institutional trust, but if they are reporting positive circumstances 
institutional trust is likely to increase.   
The corruption index has an average of 1.3 for Tanzania and 1.1 for Botswana. This 
means that most respondents believe that some or most public institutions are involved in 
corruption. Transparency International’s corruption index gives Botswana a score of 63 on a 
scale from 0 to 100 where 100 means very clean (Transparency International, 2015), corruption 
is therefore quite low in Botswana. Tanzania on the other hand only gets a score of 30 meaning 
that corruption is generally quite high here. The fact that the average perception is so similar is 
therefore surprising. As corruption is viewed as a negative factor in institutions this could have 
a negative effect on trust according to the performance-based theory.   
 
 
4.2.2.4 Democratic Satisfaction 
   Satisfaction with the democratic functioning receives an average score of 2.9 for both 
countries, which means that people generally are fairly satisfied. When it comes to how much 
faith the respondents have in the government’s problem solving abilities we see that the average 
for Botswana is 1.6 and 2.5 for Tanzania. This means that people in Botswana do not have too 
much faith that the government will solve certain issues within the next five years. In Tanzania 
however most people seem to believe that it is likely that problems will be solved within 
reasonable time. This generally high satisfaction with the democracy in the two countries will 
according to the institutional theory of trust result in higher trust in the public institutions. But 
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4.2.2.5 Policy Performance  
 The performance index for Botswana has an average of 2.7 meaning that most 
respondents rate the government’s handling of several policy matters as either fairly well or 
fairly bad. The highest frequencies however are closer to 3, either right over or right below, 
which means that people generally think the policy performance is fairly good. In terms of local 
performance, the average is slightly lower, 2.5, but here as well most respondent’s answers 
cluster around “fairly well”. For Tanzania the numbers are a little lower, 2.2, for both the 
performance index and local performance index. This means that more respondents are leaning 
towards “fairly bad”. In both countries respondents seem to approve of the President’s 
performance with the Tanzanians having a slightly lower average, 2.9 towards 3.1 in Botswana. 
The members of Parliament receive a somewhat lower average in both countries, 2.7 in 
Tanzania and 2.4 in Botswana. The elected local Government Councilors receive slightly more 
approval, 2.5 in Botswana and 2.8 in Tanzania. We see then that people are generally more 
satisfied with the policy performance in Botswana than in Tanzania, which is somewhat strange 
as Tanzanians were generally more satisfied with the democracy. In addition, Tanzanian’s also 
display more trust in public institutions. The link between performance and trust may therefore 
not be so strong in the case of Tanzania. It might also be surprising that the averages are so 
similar when levels of development are quite different in the two countries.  
  
 
4.3 Correlation Analysis 
 In the correlation analysis I will get an indication of whether there is any link between 
the dependent variable, institutional trust, and the independent variables. Only the significant 
variables are included and, as expected, we see that quite a few are correlated with institutional 
trust. As mentioned, the causality does not become clear here, we can therefore not be sure that 
the independent variables have any effect on trust. It could just as well be the other way around.    
 The first thing to notice when looking at the correlation analysis is that almost all 
variables related to institutional theory are correlated with institutional trust, while rather few, 
at least for Botswana, of the ones related to cultural theories have a correlation with trust. The 
variables related to institutional theory generally also have stronger correlations than those 
connected to cultural theories. Some variables are, as expected, negatively correlated with 
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Table 4.4: Correlation analysis, dependent variable: Institutional Trust 
 BOTSWANA TANZANIA 
Socio-Demographic Variables   
Age .142** .115** 
Living Conditions - .114** 
Tribe - .112** 
Education -.158** -.149** 
Gender - - 
Social Capital   
Member in Religious Group - -.067** 
Member in Community/ 
Voluntary Group 
- - 
General Trust - - 
Trust Neighbors .259** .114** 
Trust Relatives .201** .176** 
Trust Others You Know .210** .165** 
Transparency   
Listen to Radio - -.106** 
Watch Television  - -.143** 
Read Newspaper  -.124** -.112** 
Use Internet  -.102** -.069** 
Corruption Index -.303** -.394** 
Democratic Satisfaction   
Satisfaction With Democracy .377** .302** 
Faith In Problem Solving .268** .059** 
Policy Performance   
Performance Index .416** .421** 
Local Performance Index .277** .248** 
Approval Of President .422** .456** 
Approval Of Members Of 
Parliament 
.319** .304** 
Approval Of Local Government 
Council 
.257** .311** 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
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4.3.1 Trust and socio-demographic variables 
 Age 
The correlations between the trust index and the socio-demographic variables show that 
age has a slight positive correlation with trust for both Botswana (0.142**) and Tanzania 
(0.115**). This could mean that the older you get the more trust you will have in public 
institutions. Both these correlations are valid as the significance value is 0.00 and the 
significance level is 0.05. The positive correlations between age and institutional trust tells us 
that more experience could affect trust positively. This may indicate support for the thought 
that later-life experiences are more important that early-life experiences in Mishler and Rose’s 
(2001) lifetime learning model.  
  
Living Conditions 
In Tanzania living conditions are positively and significantly correlated with trust 
(0.114**). Which can mean that people with better living conditions are likely to trust more. 
The correlation for Botswana is not significant. The positive correlation between living 




There is also a small, significant correlation, between tribe and trust in Tanzania 
(0.112**). In Botswana this correlation is insignificant. In the correlation analysis, as opposed 
to the regression analysis, tribe is treated as one, collective variable with all tribes. We will 
therefore see the effect of ethnicity and not the affiliation with a specific tribe. The correlation 
between tribe and institutional trust in Tanzania can be a sign that there is a positive relation 
between the various ethnic groups and the public institutions and that individuals are treated 
fairly by the government.  
 
Education 
Education is negatively and significantly correlated with trust in both countries (-0.158** 
in Botswana and -0.149**), which could mean that the more education you have the less you 
trust. As opposed to the positive correlation between age and institutional trust it seems as if 
the experience one gets from education has a negative effect on institutional trust which may 
seem rather contradicting. It is therefore natural to believe that what one learns in school has a 
negative effect on institutional trust, while what you learn and experience outside school, as 
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you get older will have a positive effect. As age and education naturally are correlated this 
might become clearer in the regression analysis. 
 
Gender 
Gender is insignificantly correlated with institutional trust in both countries. These 
findings give mixed support to some of the cultural theories. It does however support the 
institutional theory stating that the institutional performance affects people randomly.    
 
 
4.3.2 Trust and Social Capital 
 The correlations between trust and the social capital variables shows that for Tanzania 
there is a negative, but significant, correlation between membership in religious groups and 
institutional trust (-0.67**). For Botswana there is no correlation between these variables. 
Membership in voluntary or community groups is insignificantly correlated with institutional 
trust in both countries. General trust also has an insignificant correlation with trust in public 
institutions in both countries. The particularized trust variables on the other hand have 
significant correlations in both Botswana and Tanzania. Trust in relatives (0.201** and 0.176**), 
neighbors (0.259** and 0.114**) and other people you know (0.210** and 0.165**) are however 
stronger correlated in Botswana than in Tanzania. This correlation analysis displays mostly 
weak correlation and with several of them also being insignificant it can tell us that social capital 
variables does not have a great impact on trust in public institutions and the spill-over effect is 
not as big as one maybe had hoped. These findings fail to give any significant support to the 
voluntary organization theory. Particularized trust does nevertheless have somewhat of a 
correlation with institutional trust, although not too strong. With the social capital variables 
however, we need to be extra cautious about the causality. In this case it could just as well be 
institutional trust and reasons for high institutional trust that leads to associationism and 
particularized trust as the other way around. The direction of the correlations between 
institutional trust and particularized trust and associationism will become clearer in the 
regression models below.        
 
 
4.3.3 Trust and Transparency    
  All the correlations between trust in public institutions and media access and perception 
of corruption in both Tanzania and Botswana are negative. In Botswana however listening to 
radio and watching television have insignificant correlations with institutional trust. The 
Marianne Landmark, Spring 2016: Trust in Public Institutions 
	
75 
corruption index is strongly correlated with trust (-0.303** for Botswana and -0.394** for 
Tanzania) which means that if a respondent expresses high levels of trust he or she is likely to 
also express low levels of perceived corruption and if a respondent believes that corruption 
rates are high they will likely express less trust in public institutions. This is as expected and in 
line with institutional theory of trust, saying that individuals will base their trust on how the 
institutions perform and as corruption is unaccepted behavior it will affect trust negatively. The 
correlation between media access and institutional trust are not as strong. The fact they are all 
negative is nevertheless quite interesting. This could mean that the mediums are reporting 
negative stories about incidents in relation to any of the public institutions. Stories that will 
cause the public to have less trust in public institutions, for instance about corruption in 
government. From this correlation analysis it seems as if perceived corruption has quite a lot to 
say in terms of peoples trust in public institutions, while how much they access media does not 
play the same role.     
 
 
4.3.4 Trust and Democratic Satisfaction 
 In both countries there are positive and significant correlations between institutional 
trust and both “satisfaction with the democracy” and “faith in the government’s problem solving 
abilities”. The correlations are however strongest between trust and satisfaction with democracy 
(0.377** for Botswana and 0.302** for Tanzania). For Botswana the correlation between trust 
and faith in problem solving is also quite strong (0.268**), while this correlation is rather weak 
(0.059**) for Tanzania. This means that how well the democracy is functioning, in the eyes of 
the respondents, plays a significant role in how much they trust public institutions, while faith 
in problem solving does not seem to matter as much. Again, and not unexpected, institutional 
theory gains support, but here too the question of causality is important to remember. A well-
functioning democracy could just as well be a result of high institutional trust as high 
institutional trust is a result of well-functioning democratic institutions. Further answers to the 
strength and direction of these effects will be given in the regression analysis.    
 
 
4.3.5 Trust and Policy Performance  
 All variables in the policy performance category correlate quite strongly with trust in 
public institutions for both countries and they are all significant. The strongest correlation, in 
both Tanzania and Botswana, is between trust in public institutions and approval of the 
President’s performance (0.456** and 0.422** respectively) as well as the national performance 
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index (0.421** and 0.416**). In Tanzania the local performance index correlates the least with 
trust in public institutions (0.248**), although this too is rather strong. In Botswana approval of 
the local government council correlates the least (0.257**). Overall this could mean that if 
respondents regard the governments performance in a number of key areas as good and they 
approve of the President’s, members of Parliament and the local government councilor’s 
performance they will also trust more. The findings are according to the performance-based 
theory and therefore expected. The strong correlation between approval of the President’s 
performance and institutional trust may however be somewhat surprising, although this is also 
the finding in Citrin and Green’s (1986) study. This could prove that the President’s 
performance is reflected in peoples trust in public institutions in general.     
 
 The findings in the correlation analysis are in large part as expected, both in terms of 
strength and direction, and most independent variables have an effect on institutional trust. The 
performance and institutionally related variables in the last three categories have the strongest 
effect which supports institutional and performance-based theory. National policy performance 
as well as approval of the President’s performance have the strongest correlation with 
institutional trust. In addition, the corruption index is strongly, negatively correlated with trust 
in public institutions. Cultural and early-life experience does not seem to matter as much, yet 
many of the variables are correlated with institutional trust.     
 
 
4.4 Regression analysis  
 The regression analysis will hopefully give some answers to the direction and causalities 
in the correlations found above. It will also tell which category of independent variables 
explains the most of the variations in institutional trust. Many of the correlations above are 
confirmed, some with stronger and others with weaker effects. Those variables that were 
negatively correlated, still have a negative effect on institutional trust. Cultural theories of trust 
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4.4.1 Socio-demographic variables (model 1) 
 I start by looking at the explanatory power for model 1 for the socio-demographic 
variables. In a model with a multiple number of independent variables I need to look at the 
adjusted R square. This number is adjusted for the number of independent variables and will 
therefore be more accurate than just R square. In Botswana the socio-demographic model 
explains 4.5 percent of the variations in trust, while in Tanzania this category of independent 
variables explains 9 percent of the variation.  
 The coefficients are however the most interesting and the slope coefficients tell how 
much change, either positive or negative, there will be in the dependent variable if the 
independent variable changes with one unit. When we operate with a multiple number of 
independent variables, like here, we will not only see what effect each of the independent 
variables has on the dependent variable, but also the correlation between the independent 
variables and the other independent variables effect on the dependent variable. None of the 
slope coefficients in this regression model are particularly high, meaning that the socio-
demographic variables do not have very big effects on trust in public institutions.  
Age has a small positive effect on trust (0.100** in Botswana and 0.123** in Tanzania) 
which means that for both countries people seem to be more trusting the older they get. Living 
conditions has a slightly bigger effect on trust in both countries (0.131** in Botswana and 
0.145** in Tanzania). Even though this is not very substantial it still gives some support to the 
theory of success and well-being. As mentioned, I have only included the three most dominating 
tribes in the regression analysis and we see that in Botswana being part of the Kalanga people 
will likely result in less trust in public institutions (-0.070**). Since this in reality is the second 
largest ethnic group in Botswana and significantly smaller than the Tswana group the negative 
effect could be explained by discrimination or inferiority. In Tanzania however the tribe 
variables have a more significant effect. Members of the largest ethnic group, Sukuma, seem to 
be rather trusting of the public institutions (0.176**), while being part of the Ha group has a 
slightly lower effect (0.059**), but still positive. The third largest ethnic group, Chaga, do not 
seem to be very trusting as this effect is negative (-0.095**). Education on the other hand has a 
slight negative effect on institutional trust (-0.140** in Botswana and -0.110** in Tanzania). 
This means that the higher education you have the less you trust. Gender does not have any 
significant effect on institutional trust.   
The significant variables in this model can be generalized to the larger population, 
meaning that the effects seen here are likely to be true also outside this sample. As the 
significance level is 0.05 there is however a 5 percent chance that the effects are not real. 
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Similar to the correlation analysis we see that the socio-demographic variables have a 
minimal effect on institutional trust. This is as expected and means that several of the cultural 
theories, like the theory of success and well-being, only receive limited support. Previous 
findings state that ethnic background may have an effect on institutional trust, according to how 
the respective group has been treated by the government in the past and we do see signs of that 
here. The Kalanga people in Botswana and the Chaga people in Tanzania seem to be less 
trusting of the public institutions which may indicate poor treatment from the government in 
the past or the present. I will get back to this in the analysis.     
 
 
4.4.2 Social Capital (model 2) 
 The explanatory power of the social capital model is not very big in either of the two 
countries. 4.8 percent of the variations in trust can be explained by social capital in Botswana, 
while only 3.4 percent of the variations in institutional trust can be explained by this category 
of independent variables in Tanzania.  
 The regression table tells us that none of the coefficients for social capital are 
particularly high. Associationism only has an effect in Tanzania where membership in religious 
groups has the strongest effect (-0.121**) of all the social capital variables on trust in public 
institutions. This effect however is negative, meaning that the more active you are in a religious 
group the less trust you will have in public institutions. Membership in community or voluntary 
groups on the other hand has a small positive effect on institutional trust (0.112**). The theory 
of voluntary organization therefore gains some support, but does not seem to be valid for 
religious groups. Why is this the case?   
In Botswana trust in relatives (0.169**) and trust in other people you know (0.086**) are 
the only variables with any significant effect on institutional trust, but they do not have a very 
big effect. In Tanzania these variables have slightly smaller effects (0.055** and 0.100** 
respectively), but still positive. General trust and trust in neighbors have insignificant effects in 
both countries. 
These findings give some support to some of the cultural theories, like the voluntary 
organization theory, as membership in voluntary and community groups has a small effect. 
However, membership in religious groups has a negative effect on institutional trust. We also 
see some spill-over effect from particularized trust to institutional trust, since trust in relatives 
and trusting other people you know will lead to more trust in public institutions. However, none 
of the effects in this model are particularly strong and the explanatory power is not very high, 
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consequently we cannot give too much support to the spill-over effect from social capital and 
social trust to institutional trust. 
 
 
4.4.3 Transparency (model 3)  
 The explanatory power of the regression model for the category of transparency 
variables shows that for Botswana media access and perceived corruption explain 10.5 percent 
of the variations in institutional trust and in Tanzania they explain 16.4 percent. The somewhat 
high numbers for adjusted R square gives this model a relatively high explanatory power.   
 In Botswana listening to radio has a slight positive effect on trust in public institutions 
(0.089**), while reading newspapers has a slight negative effect on trust (0.094**). Using the 
internet and watching television have insignificant effects. Listening to radio will therefore lead 
to slightly more trust while reading newspapers will lead to slightly less trust. In Tanzania 
listening to radio (-0.054**) and watching television (-0.066**) have small, but significant 
negative effects, while using the internet and reading newspapers have insignificant effects. 
Listening to the radio and watching television will therefore lead to slightly lower trust in public 
institutions in Tanzania. The mediums with a negative impact on institutional trust can be 
believed to report on negative behavior or poor performance from institutions.    
The variable that does have quite an effect on institutional trust is the corruption index. 
In Botswana trust in public institutions will decrease (-0.209**) if respondents perceive 
corruption in the institutions. In Tanzania the effect (-0.378**) is a little stronger and perceived 
corruption will lead to lower trust in public institutions. This confirms the negative relation 
between these two variables that was found in the correlation analysis, and also institutional 
theories claiming that unaccepted and unlawful behavior in government will lead to less trust 
in public institutions. We see that the effect from the corruption index is bigger in the regression 
model than in the correlation analysis, while the effect from the media variables are smaller. 
This indicates a correlation between these variables and that media usage will cause perception 
of corruption to influence institutional trust more.    
  
 
4.4.4 Democratic Satisfaction (model 4) 
 The explanatory power of these variables for Botswana is quite good as this model 
explains 10.1 percent of the variations in trust in public institutions. In Tanzania however, only 
4 percent of the variation in institutional trust can be explained by people’s satisfaction with 
democracy.  
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 The coefficients table shows us that in both countries both satisfaction with democracy 
and faith in problem solving has a somewhat strong positive effect on trust in public institutions. 
Satisfaction with democracy in Botswana has the strongest effect (0.231**), while this variable 
is slightly weaker in Tanzania (0.193**). Faith in the government’s problem solving abilities 
has a somewhat smaller, but still significant effect in Botswana (0.179**), in Tanzania the effect 
from this variable is rather small (0.050**). As neither of these coefficients are vastly different 
from the coefficients in the correlation analysis it is not likely that these to variables correlate 
too much with each other. The effects are rather significant and proves that institutional 
performance is important in order to generating trust. Again we find evidence that supports the 
institutional theory.     
 
 
4.4.5 Policy Performance (model 5) 
 The model summary for the regression analysis with trust and policy performance 
shows that the explanatory power is quite high and it seems that policy performance is important 
in deciding peoples trust in public institutions. In Tanzania 26.3 percent of the variations in 
institutional trust can be explained by what the respondents think of the governments 
performance in several areas. In Botswana, the policy performance variables can explain 30.5 
percent of the variations in institutional trust.  
In both countries the performance index and approval of the President’s performance 
are the only significant variables and they seem to have quite an effect on institutional trust. In 
Botswana, the coefficient for the performance index (0.397**) shows that trust in public 
institutions will increase rather much if people are satisfied with the performance of the 
government. In Tanzania, the effect (0.298**) is slightly lower, but still strong. Approval of the 
President has a slightly less effect on institutional trust in both countries, though higher in 
Botswana (0.280**) than in Tanzania (0.249**). The remaining variables have insignificant 
effects on institutional trust. 
 It is surprising that only two of the policy performance variables have any significant 
effect on trust in public institutions when all these variables had a significant correlation with 
institutional trust in the correlation analysis. It is however not so surprising that national policy 
performance and approval of the President’s performance are the ones to have significant 
effects. The fact that these two factors alone explain so much of the variations in institutional 
trust absolutely prove that how individuals perceive the performance of the government in 
several key areas is important in determining trust. People will in large part base their trust on 
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past experience and performance. These findings absolutely coincide with the institutional and 
performance-based theory in addition to previous findings.    
  
 
4.4.6 All Independent Variables (model 6)  
 In order to find out which independent variable explains the most we need to combine 
all the independent variables in one regression model. The adjusted R square shows us that the 
explanatory power in both cases is quite good. In Botswana, all the independent variables 
together explain 39 percent of the variations in institutional trust, while they in Tanzania explain 
38 percent of the variation.  
  The model shows us that only a few of the independent variables have coefficients that 
show a significant effect. For Tanzania the Sukuma tribe, trust in others that you know, 
perceived corruption, satisfaction with democracy, policy performance and approval of the 
President’s performance are the only significant variables. Being part of the Sukuma tribe 
continues to have a positive effect on institutional trust (0.092**), yet not as big as when seen 
only in relation to the socio-demographic variables. This means that its correlation with the 
other variables decreases its effects. Trust in other people you know has a slightly bigger effect 
(0.123**) in this model than in the model for only social capital variables. Some types of 
particularized trust can therefore be said to have a positive spill-over effect on institutional trust. 
The corruption index has a smaller effect (-0.218**) on institutional trust than before, but still 
significant. Satisfaction with democracy also has less effect (0.154**) than in the previous 
model. The performance index has the greatest effect (0.222**) yet this is slightly lower than in 
relation to only policy performance variables. Also the effect of the approval of the President’s 
performance remains quite high (0.203**). As policy performance and perceived corruption are 
the variables with the greatest effect it can be said that positive and negative performance are 
the most determining factors in terms of institutional trust which gives support to the 
institutional and performance-based theory.    
 For Botswana even fewer coefficients for the independent variables are significant. The 
performance index has a slightly higher effect (0.419**) now than in the previous model and the 
coefficient tells us that this effect is rather substantial. Approval of the President’s performance 
is also important for the generation of trust (0.258**), this is only marginally lower than in the 
previous model. None of the other coefficients have any significant effect on institutional trust. 
The most surprising factor in this model however is that perceived corruption does not have 
any effect. In Tanzania this variable is almost as important as policy performance, why then is 
this not significant in Botswana?  
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 Not surprisingly, this model has the most explanatory power. However, there is more 
of a spread in the origin of institutional trust in Tanzania compared to Botswana where only 
performance variables influences trust in public institutions. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that 
we find stronger evidence for the performance-based and institutional theory of trust than 
cultural theories. Socio-demographic variables were not expected to have a big effect, but I had 
thought that social capital would have a bigger effect as well as levels of social capital all 
together to be stronger in Botswana than in Tanzania. Social networks theory might be said to 
gain somewhat support due to a small effect from particularized trust. If we see ethnicities as 
part of personality theory this also gains some support. Although the effect from performance 
variables is great, not all of them have an effect. Faith in problem solving, for instance, does 
not matter in the bigger picture. It might be strange that past performance of the government is 
so important while faith in their future performance is insignificant.       
 
 
4.5 Summary  
I have in this chapter presented my findings from the descriptive statistics, correlation 
analysis and regression analysis completed in SPSS. The findings have in some cases been 
rather surprising and contradicting to my hypotheses. I found that most of the socio-
demographic factors and the social capital variables were insignificantly correlated with trust. 
In the regression models there were more significant correlations, but rather weak ones. Being 
part of the largest tribe in Tanzania, Sukuma, seems to be positive for generating trust while the 
Chaga people are likely to express lower trust in public institutions. Most surprising however 
was that social capital had such little effect on institutional trust and that membership in 
religious groups in Tanzania and trusting relatives being negatively correlated with institutional 
trust. Institutional theories of trust seem to gain more support as the vast majority of the 
independent variables in the three remaining categories have rather strong correlations with 
institutional trust. As expected media access and perceived corruption is negatively correlated. 
These findings were confirmed in the regression models, although media access was not as 
strongly correlated. Perceived corruption has a strong negative effect on institutional trust, 
while satisfaction with democracy and policy performance have strong positive effects on 
institutional trust. When looking at the last regression model I find that in Botswana national 
policy performance and approval of the President’s performance are the only variables with 
significant effects and quite strong effects too. In Tanzania, a few more variables, in addition 
to national policy performance and approval of the President, explain the variation in 
institutional trust. Perceived corruption has a negative effect while being part of the Sukuma 
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people, trusting other people you know and satisfaction with democracy have small positive 
effects.  
All in all, we can say that the institutional and performance-based theory gains more 
support than the cultural theories. When seen in relation to the lifetime learning model these 
findings agree with previous findings stating that later-life experiences are of greater 
importance in order to generate institutional trust than early-life experiences. I will in the 
following chapter analyze these findings further and attempt to understand and explain why 
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Chapter Five: Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 Analyzing my findings may be seen as the core of my thesis. This is where I try to 
answer my research question and draw the bigger lines in order to generalize. I will also 
conclude with whether institutional or cultural theories can be seen as valid in explaining trust 
in public institutions in Botswana and Tanzania. I have organized this chapter a lot like the 
previous one with separate discussions for each category of independent variables or in this 
case each hypothesis. I will start with the first hypothesis regarding the dependent variable, 
institutional trust before I move on to discussing the effect of the different categories of 
independent variables. In this, I will include both the descriptive statistics, the correlation 
analysis and the regression model for that specific category of independent variables as well as 
how these variables behave in the last regression model including all independent variables.     
 
 
5.2 Institutional Trust  
My first hypothesis was that levels of trust in public institutions would be higher in 
Botswana than in Tanzania due to their higher development level and stronger achievements 
from the government in a number of key areas. In addition, I predicted that the low ethnic 
diversity in Botswana would cause social trust and social capital to be high which again would 
have some positive effect on trust in public institutions. This was based on the performance-
based (Mishler and Rose, 2001) and societal theories (Delhey and Newton, 2003) that stated 
that the success of a country and good performance by the government would lead to more trust 
from the public. The theories pointed in opposite directions than the findings in this case and I 
chose to rely on the theories when forming my hypothesis. What I found seemed to correspond 
more with previous findings than with the theories. Average trust in public institutions in 
Tanzania is somewhat higher than in Botswana and the majority of the respondents in Tanzania 
have faith in public institutions. In Botswana on the other hand, the majority has low trust in 
public institutions. Why is this the case and can it be explained by any of the independent 
variables? The average for the performance index shows us that respondents in Botswana 
believe the government here performs better than the respondents in Tanzania believe of their 
government. This also has a rather strong effect on institutional trust. It is strange however that 
how individuals evaluate their government’s performance plays such a significant role while 
their faith in the government’s ability to solve certain issues in the future is insignificant.  
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In addition to being the only coefficients that were valid for Botswana, the general 
policy performance and the President’s performance have rather strong effects on trust in public 
institutions. As the performance-based theory predicts (Mishler and Rose, 2001) there is a 
strong correlation between trust and how well people believe the government performs. Why 
then are levels of trust not higher in Botswana when the respondents believe that the 
government performs fairly well? The President and the government’s performance alone 
explain for almost 40 percent of the variations in trust in Botswana and none of the other 
variables explain anything. Therefore, several other factors in society must explain for the 
remaining 60 percent when controlled for these independent variables. What are these factors?  
 
Understandably, the corruption index has a strong negative effect on trust in public 
institutions as this contradicts with people’s expectations of how the government should 
perform. Perceived corruption in Botswana is fairly low, which coincides with their actual low 
corruption levels, and as this is the case trust levels will not suffer as much. In the regression 
analysis for all the variables however we saw that the effect of the corruption index was 
insignificant in the bigger picture. Levels of education however are somewhat higher in 
Botswana than in Tanzania and this too has a negative effect on trust, some of the explanation 
could lie here, but it is insignificant in the final regression model. Satisfaction with democracy 
and faith in the government’s problem solving abilities does also have fairly strong effects on 
trust in public institutions and the average levels for these variables are quite high. Over 70 
percent are satisfied with the functioning of the democracy in Botswana while the faith in 
problem solving is a bit more reserved. The insignificant effect from these variables on trust in 
public institutions, however, tells us that even though people are generally satisfied with 
democracy it does not matter for how they trust. Respondents in Tanzania are even more 
satisfied with democracy and this does have a positive effect on trust. Levels of generalized 
trust in both countries are very low, while levels of particularized trust are also fairly low in 
Botswana. In Tanzania on the other hand particularized trust is quite high. In comparison to the 
institutional trust levels this is rather surprising. How come people generally trust the public 
institutions, but they do not trust each other or in some cases even people that they know? In 
many ways institutional trust is more related to particularized trust than generalized trust as you 
have some sort of knowledge about the specific institution. It is in large part also related to 
strategic trust as this refers to trusting someone to do the job they are trained to do. In many 
ways it is therefore natural that institutional trust will be more similar to particularized trust 
than generalized trust.        
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 The fact that political trust in Botswana is low might not be as big a surprise as the fact 
that trust in public institutions in Tanzania is so high. What is the reason for this high trust when 
the country is doing rather poorly development-wise? It could be a sign of loyalty towards the 
government and the President. People could be victims of President Jakaya Kikwete’s5 
charismatic appearance and focus less on his actual achievements. An uncritical attitude 
towards the public institutions can also cause high trust. These findings corresponds with those 
of Mattes et al. (2002) and the paradoxes in the public opinion they present. Also my findings 
can therefore be said to be determined both by cultural, early-life factors and institutional, later-
life factors. The political landscape of Tanzania has been influenced greatly by Julius Nyerere’s 
one-party system which came to an end first in 1992. Although Tanzanians have enjoyed a 
multi-party system for a while now this is not a full-worthy liberal democracy. It could therefore 
be that individuals are somewhat naïve and believing that what they have is as good as it gets. 
We also see that higher education leads to lower trust, which means that the more knowledge 
one gets and the more trained one is in critical thinking will cause one to trust less. Since only 
a small minority has exceeded a primary school level the low education levels could be a reason 
for the high trust, which is also the hypothesis for my education variable.  
More of the independent variables in the final regression have significant effects on trust 
causing the picture to be slightly more nuanced for Tanzania than Botswana, but they explain 
less of the variations in trust. The relatively low trust in Botswana could be caused by higher 
expectations from the people due to the countries previous success. It could also be that the 
democratic success in Botswana is not as great as it seems or that it is slowly coming to an end. 
Trust in the President is amongst the most trusted institutions.  
 
 
5.3 Socio-demographic variables   
 My first category of independent variables had the general hypothesis that the socio-
demographic variables would have a limited effect on trust in public institutions. As the 
performance of the government affects people randomly, trust in public institutions will also be 
randomly distributed amongst the population, regardless of age, gender, education, living 
standards and tribe (Newton and Norris, 2000). According to the personality theory (Delhey 
and Newton, 2003) trust can also be based on individual personality characteristics that will be 
evenly spread amongst all ages and tribes, genders, different living standards and levels of 
education. The socio-demographic factors have however been proved to have different effects 
																																																						
5 Kikwete resigned in November 2015, but since he was the President when the survey was conducted 
his performance will be used in the analysis.	
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on institutional trust in the past, I therefore developed individual hypotheses for each of the 
variables. I predicted that age would not have much effect on institutional trust. The results 
show that there was a small correlation in the correlation analysis and also a small, positive 
effect in the first regression model and absent in the final model. In a complex world there will 
always be a number of factors influencing each other and this again will affect the influence on 
a third factor. Looking at several variables will therefore give us a more complete picture. Age 
is naturally connected to several other variables and will therefore correlate with these in the 
different regression models. The more variables that are added to the model the less effect age 
seems to have. The idea that governmental performance affects people randomly independent 
of for instance age (Newton and Norris, 2000) receives support in the final model. In general, 
age has had mixed effects in previous studies, but Herreros and Criado (2008) as well as Paxton 
(2007) also find that age has a positive effect on institutional trust.  
 
 The second hypothesis within the category of socio-demographic variables anticipated 
that gender would have no effect on institutional trust. This turned out to be correct as we see 
that in none of the models does gender have any correlation with or effect on institutional trust. 
The insignificance of gender in this context again confirms the idea that institutional 
performance affects people randomly.  
 
  Education was believed to have a slight negative effect and we see that this is the case 
as it is negatively correlated in both countries and we see in the first regression model that 
education does have a slight negative effect on trust. It does however not have any effect in the 
final model including all the variables. The effect in the first model states that the higher 
education people have the less they trust. This can be explained by the fact that people get more 
experience with the political system as well as the different institutions and they learn more 
about it, which can cause them to become more critical as they know about the flaws and 
weaknesses of it. These are factors though that should also have been explained by age. The 
fact that education has a negative effect while age has a positive effect could mean that those 
with an education have developed a more critical mindset and they know more about what they 
should expect from the government and from a democracy in addition to what rights they have. 
These findings correspond with what Lühiste (2006) finds in his research on institutional trust 
in the Baltic states.  
 
The theory of success and well-being was the basis for the hypothesis regarding 
economic prosperity’s effect on trust. It was believed that those with better living conditions 
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had greater trust in institutions. Making sure that the economic growth in the country benefits 
all is one area where the government in Botswana has received some criticism and this is also 
the opinion of the people as 53 percent say that the government is doing a bad job at narrowing 
gaps between rich and poor. In Tanzania, 86 percent feel the same way. Living standards, which 
here represent economic prosperity, can be considered as a sign of how the government is doing 
in this area. We remember from the descriptive statistics that respondents reported worse living 
conditions in Botswana than in Tanzania. Again it must be noted that this is a subjective 
measure and people would normally evaluate their living conditions in comparison to what 
others have in addition to their own expectations. In Botswana, where the development is 
generally more successful than in Tanzania it could be the case that respondents rate their living 
conditions as worse even though they are actually better. Therefore, objectively living 
conditions are not necessarily worse in Botswana than in Tanzania. In Botswana 74 percent of 
the respondents answers that the government is doing a good job at improving living standards 
for the poor. In Tanzania however 81 percent says that the government is doing a bad job in 
this field. These numbers are not quite in line with how they rate their living standards. Living 
conditions has a stronger correlation with trust in Tanzania than in Botswana, and this is the 
case in the regression analysis as well. In both countries living standards has a small positive 
effect on trust. The theory of success and well-being states that people who have less will also 
trust less as they have relatively more to lose (Delhey and Newton, 2003). The fact that living 
standards has a positive effect on trust means that this theory gains some support. That people 
trust more the better their living conditions are can also be a result of their approval of the 
performance by the government. Since the majority of the respondents in Botswana are satisfied 
with the government’s job at improving living standards for the poor the positive correlation 
between living standards and trust in public institutions can be a result of approval of 
performance. Therefore, this effect can also give grounds to the performance-based theory. In 
Tanzania however we must credit this effect to the theory of success and well-being.    
 
My final hypothesis in the socio-demographic category suggested that tribe would have 
a positive effect on institutional trust. This was because the tribes included in the regression 
analysis were the three largest ones in each country. Smaller tribes might be discriminated and 
neglected by the government and could therefore have less trust in institutions, while the more 
dominating tribes avoid this. We saw that in Tanzania this was to some degree the case as the 
two largest groups, Sukuma and Ha, had a positive effect on institutional trust, while the third 
largest group, Chagga, was negatively correlated. The size difference between the second and 
third largest group however is not very big (4.9 percent and 4.5 percent). In spite of the great 
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ethnic diversity in the country it seems that most groups are linked by a common language, 
Swahili, and a shared national identity. In addition to this one major uniting factor is credited 
to the Tanzanian socialism created under Julius Nyerere’s (World Culture Encyclopedia, 2016). 
This socialism was largely based on the idea of familyhood and mutual cooperation which in 
turn had a positive effect on ethnic groups and cooperation between them. The financial benefits 
from this politics were rather unsuccessful however. It does not seem like any groups are 
discriminated or neglected by the government. Why then does the Chagga tribe have a negative 
effect on institutional trust? When seen in relation to all the independent variables, however, 
Chagga and Ha are insignificantly related to trust, while Sukuma still has a positive effect.  
In Botswana the Kalanga tribe had a negative effect on institutional trust, while the 
others were insignificant. In the model and in the survey Kalanga is the largest ethnic group, 
but in reality this is the second largest group with only around 11 percent of the population. In 
the past the Kalanga tribe as well as a few smaller tribes have been treated as lesser or minors 
by the Tswana people. This has caused a rivalry between the different ethnic groups and the 
Kalanga people have since the 1990’s been fighting for recognition as an ethnic tribe as well as 
their minority rights (World Culture Encyclopedia, 2016). The domination of the Tswana 
people has also caused their customs, culture and language to predominate society, naturally 
causing other groups to feel neglected and discriminated. The government on the other hand 
claims to have a non-ethnic profile and the ethnic minorities are represented in official 
administration and bureaucracy (ibid.). Yet, it is easy to understand that being part of the 
minority will have negative effects on institutional trust. The situation has in many ways 
improved the last few decades, but the fact that trust amongst the minority is still low can be 
explained by cultural theories and path-dependency. Trust seems to be culturally bound in this 
case and will therefore be substantially more difficult to change, both in regard to how 
institutions should generate increased trust and how and why individuals will choose to trust 
institutions.    
The many ethnic groups in Tanzania will result in none of them being too dominant. 
Therefore, the relation between them will be peaceful and cooperative, while in Botswana there 
is one very dominating group and some rather small ones which lead to an asymmetrical relation 
between the groups causing tensions. Though the oppression is not by the government it seems 
to have a negative impact on the trust relation between the Kalanga people and public 
institutions. This confirms previous findings and theories stating that discriminated groups will 
be less trusting (Gleave et al., 2012, Lühiste, 2006). On the other side, being part of the 
dominating tribe does not necessarily have a positive effect as we see that the Tswana tribe has 
an insignificant effect on institutional trust.   




 Most of the socio-demographic variables have low or insignificant effects on 
institutional trust. Together with the low explanatory power of the model this confirms the 
general hypothesis that socio-demographic factors would have a limited effect on trust in public 
institutions. This again confirms the part of the performance-based theory that states that how 
the government performs affects the population randomly. This is proven further when we see 
the socio-demographic variables in relation to the other independent variables where only the 
Sukuma tribe in Tanzania has any significant effect on trust in public institutions. The effects 
of the tribe variables in the first model confirm parts of the cultural theory stating that trust is 
something that is derived from personality, up-bringing and socialization.    
 
 
5.4 Social Capital   
 A strong social capital with a high degree of general trust is believed to have a positive 
spill-over effect on political trust. But as this has proven to not always be the case in newer 
democracies my hypothesis was slightly reserved in terms of this effect although I did predict 
a small effect. There were however good reasons to believe that social trust would be higher in 
Botswana than in Tanzania. We see that the effect of the social capital variables is not quite as 
expected. For both countries levels of generalized trust is very low and it does not seem to be 
any difference between the homogenous and the heterogeneous society. According to social 
networks theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) generalized trust would be high in the 
homogenous country, Botswana, and low in the heterogeneous country, Tanzania, as it is 
believed that one easier trusts someone of their own kind. The fact that the levels are as good 
as equal is therefore much unexpected.  
The levels of particularized trust are higher in Tanzania than in Botswana, which is quite 
surprising and also contradicting to the social networks theory. As noted in the hypothesis I had 
expected it to be the other way around. The societal theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) also 
supports this thought as it is based on the belief that societal factors such as welfare systems, 
legal systems, political and economic prosperity and equal access to these goods for the 
population will lead to more trust. In many ways it is a lot like the theory of success and well-
being for the country as a whole. As Botswana is definitively the more successful country of 
the two both social and political trusts should be higher here, but also this theory fails in this 
case. What are the reasons for this low social trust in Botswana? We remember that also the 
political trust was quite low in Botswana and lower than in Tanzania. Is there a correlation here 
or is it just a coincidence?  
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There is a correlation between the particularized trust variables and institutional trust, 
with the coefficients being a little higher in Botswana than in Tanzania, but the effect in the 
regression is rather small with only “trust in neighbors” and “trust in others you know” being 
significant. Levels of particularized trust are rather low, but they do have a positive effect on 
political trust, so if levels of particularized trust would be higher levels of political trust would 
be higher too. Surprisingly, general trust is weakly correlated in both countries and in the 
regression model we find that the effect is insignificant in both countries. As emphasized by 
Rothstein and Stolle (2008) the spill-over effect from general trust to institutional trust may 
vary between the political institutions and the legal and administrative institutions. One 
explanation for the insignificant effect from generalized trust to institutional trust could 
therefore be that all these institutions are merged in my study. The issues between the few ethnic 
groups in Botswana, discussed above could also be a contributing factor in the low social trust, 
both particularized and generalized, though as the vast majority of the population is of the same 
tribe both these forms of trust will in most cases not expand to outside the ethnic group.     
 
The fact that membership in religious groups has a negative effect on political trust in 
Tanzania also contradicts with the hypothesis. What is the reason for this when membership in 
community or voluntary groups has an equally positive effect on trust in public institutions? 
Should religious groups be considered separate from other types of voluntary groups? Do the 
opinions and solutions from the government contradict with what is being professed in 
churches, mosques and within traditional religions? In Botswana the majority of the 
respondents are not members in any form of religious or community groups and this does not 
play any significant role in their political trust. These findings both reject and support the 
voluntary organization theory, as membership in community or voluntary groups has a positive 
effect, but membership in religious groups has a negative effect in Tanzania. The majority of 
the respondents however, are not members in any of these kind of groups.  
People will likely join or form community and voluntary groups in order to achieve 
something collectively. They will be working together for a mutual benefit in their own 
community such as neighborhood watch or local action groups. To take part in a religious 
group, on the other hand, is only for personal benefit. Some of the reason for these group’s 
divertive effect on political trust could be explained by this. The social networks theory overlaps 
slightly with the voluntary organization theory and states that interaction with friends, family 
and colleagues will generate social trust. Low membership in both religious and voluntary and 
community groups could therefore also be a reason for the low social trust levels. As mentioned 
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before, there is a question of causality here. Whether membership leads to social trust or social 
trust leads to more members in community groups is unknown.      
   
 When seen in relation to the other independent variables we see that for Tanzania trust 
in others that you know still has a positive effect on trust in public institutions and this is 
stronger when seen together with all the independent variables instead of simply with social 
capital variables. For Botswana none of the social capital variables have any significant effect 
on institutional trust in the bigger picture. Why are social capital variables in general more 
correlated with institutional trust in Tanzania than in Botswana? In light of these findings we 
can say that the voluntary organization theory and social networks theory gains minimal 
support. For most part these findings support other recent findings that claim that the spill-over 
effect from social to political trust will likely be harder to achieve in newer democracies, like 
those of Tanzania and Botswana, than in well established, western democracies. Social trust 
however does not seem to be very high in either countries, so it is not so much a problem that 
the social trust has a positive effect on political trust, but rather that neither types of trust is very 
high.    
The more nuanced picture the regression for Tanzania paints gives a slight credit to the 
social theories of trust by acknowledging that some of the social capital variables have an effect 
on trust. The variables that are significant have rather weak effects however. I find it most 
surprising that general trust has insignificant correlations and effects in all the analyses. Why 
is it so that people do not seem to trust people in general, but have a relatively high trust in the 
public institutions? As we have seen the cultural theories have gained little support, therefore 
institutional trust must in large part be based on performance. If individuals base their trust in 
institutions on the basis of performance it is more likely that they will also base their trust in 
others on the basis of previous experience. If their trust has been betrayed in the past they will 
likely be more careful before trusting people in the future. In relation to particularized trust this 
trust or distrust is assigned to each individual, but in terms of generalized trust it will be based 
on previous experience with strangers. If one stranger has betrayed your trust in the past you 
will likely be less trusting when interacting with the next stranger.  
 
 
5.5 Transparency  
 The hypothesis regarding transparency was that high levels of perceived corruption 
would have a negative effect on trust and so would media access given a free media that is able 
to report on unlawfulness within public institutions. According to institutional theory 
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individuals are believed to show signs of less trust or distrust if institutions and the actors within 
the institutions do not act in line with shared norms, values and rules. In large part this 
hypothesis turned out to be correct as I found strong negative correlations between perceived 
corruption and media habits and trust in public institutions. These correlations are further 
established in the regression analysis where the effects are still strong, though a little weaker 
for the media variables and a little stronger for the corruption index.  
 
The descriptive statistics shows us that most respondents believe that there is some 
degree of corruption within public institutions which is a pretty good assumption. Levels of 
corruption in Botswana have historically been amongst the lowest on the African continent. 
According to Transparency International’s corruption index their scores have been right above 
60 (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 is very clean) the last few years and dropping to 63 in 
2015 (Transparency International, 2015). For a country who claims to have zero tolerance for 
corruption however this is not too impressive, but quite good in African terms. Tanzania on the 
other hand has only scored a little over 30 the last few years and dropping to 30 in 2015 
(Transparency International, 2015). This means that for both countries corruption has actually 
worsened slightly over the last few years. Respondents then do right in believing that there is a 
degree of corruption in their countries although those of Tanzania should be more critical than 
they are. The fact that the perceived corruption will lower their trust is as expected and in line 
with the performance-based theory. If for instance members of Parliament, the President or the 
Police are involved in corruption, rent-seeking activities and bribing others to get their way they 
are not performing according to the public’s expectations which will obviously influence their 
trust. When seen in relation to all the other independent variables the corruption index continues 
to have a negative effect in Tanzania, though not as strong, but in Botswana however it is 
insignificant. The fact that it does not seem to matter much in the bigger picture in Botswana is 
very surprising. The performance variables in general seem to influence trust quite a bit and 
since perceived corruption has a strong negative effect on institutional trust in the first model it 
is natural to believe that this would still be the case in the final model. In addition, it is often 
thought that negative incidents weigh heavier than positive incidents, meaning that individuals 
will focus on the negative things, like corruption, but also low performance and misuse of 
resources rather than the positive things. Therefore, I would have expected perceived corruption 
to also be evident in Botswana when seen together with the other variables. The case of 
Tanzania nevertheless is as expected according to my hypothesis and institutional theory in 
both models.          
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Freedom House’s Freedom of Press Index shows that in Tanzania the freedom of the 
press has become slightly better over the last couple decades. In 1993 they received a total score 
of 60 on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is free and 100 is not free. Since then their score has 
been slightly over and under 50 and in 2015 it was 54. This means that the press is only partly 
free to report what they want. The fact that people will trust less the more they watch television 
or listen to radio in Tanzania can be caused by the media reporting on unlawfulness in the public 
institutions even though they are not completely free. The reason for the insignificant effect 
from internet and newspaper access could be that very few people get news from these mediums 
in their daily life. Reports from Freedom House show that there are some laws meant to prevent 
critical journalism like for instance the Statistics Act and even though it is not common that 
journalists are being convicted for unlawfulness the fear of prosecution causes a high degree of 
self-censorship. In addition to this the government tend not to support the critical mediums by 
for instance refusing to advertise through them and as private firms want to stay on good terms 
with the government they will often follow in the same paths. This results in an unfortunate 
financial situation for the critical mediums due to lose of income (Freedomhouse, 2015).          
The total scores for Botswana are slightly better, but has worsened since the beginning 
of the 90’s. In 1993 their score was 19, which is very good in African terms. After then however 
they have been stuck around 40 and in 2015 their score was 44 (Freedomhouse, 2015). This 
also equals out to be partly free, though better than Tanzania. In Botswana freedom of speech 
and expression is secured through clauses in the constitution, which for most part is respected 
by the government also when this is practiced by the media. On the other side there are a number 
of rules and laws meant to ensure national security, public order and public morality which can 
be used to limit freedom of the press (Freedomhouse, 2015). This can force the media to avoid 
reporting on the negative news. One of the major problems in Botswana, however is not that 
information does not get out to the people, but rather that the journalists do not have access to 
the information in the first place. This is a sign of low transparency and openness from the 
government. There are also reports saying that the government at times will censor and restrict 
stories they do not agree with. Self-censorship is also in some degree evident in Botswana due 
to fear of punishments. The state-owned newspaper the Daily News is free and the only 
newspaper accessible in rural areas (ibid.), and as most people read newspapers weakly or at 
least several times a month it is natural to believe that they read this one. As it is state-owned 
one might think that censorship and restrictions on what to publish would be more common 
here, but since reading the newspaper has a negative influence on institutional trust this might 
not be the case.  
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It seems then that in both Botswana and Tanzania media will report somewhat freely 
and as people for most part end up trusting less the more news they get from different media 
channels it must mean that negative information on public institutions is being reported. This 
could be in terms of corruption, but it can also be on the government not performing as they 
should and as expected by the public. The low effect from the media variables can be explained 
by the fact that certain restrictions and fear of punishments can cause the media to not being 
able to report on all the negative actions of the public institutions which again can be an 
explanation for why the effect on trust is not stronger. The generally negative effect can also be 
a sign that whatever positive stories that are being reported do not make up for the negative 
ones. In relation to all the other independent variables in the final regression model media habits 
no longer have any effect meaning that these variables are not so relevant in the bigger picture.     
  
Overall it can be stated that only in Tanzania does negative performance have a negative 
effect on trust in public institutions while this is the case in Botswana only when seen isolated 
from other categories of variables. The performance-based theory therefore gains some support, 
but it might be that negative performance does not have as big effect on trust as positive 
performance does.  
 
 
5.6 Democratic Satisfaction  
 The performance-based theory was the basis for a hypothesis stating that satisfaction 
with the democratic functioning of the country would lead to higher trust and as we saw in the 
previous chapter this turned out to be a correct assumption. The descriptive statistics for 
Tanzania showed us that the vast majority of the respondents were satisfied with the democracy 
and they find it likely that the government will solve several societal issues within the next five 
years. In Botswana, respondents are also mostly satisfied, although there is a slightly smaller 
majority than in Tanzania and just over 50 percent believe that the government will solve certain 
issues within the next five years. It is surprising that people in Tanzania are more satisfied as 
this country has performed worse in terms of development in the past. This trend is noticeable 
also when looking at levels of institutional trust and there should therefore naturally be a 
correlation between the two. Instead we find a rather weak link between institutional trust and 
faith in problem solving.  
Faith in problem solving can be regarded as strategic trust, that individuals trust the 
various institutions to solve certain issues within some main societal areas like for instance 
improving health care or education systems. Institutional trust on the other hand can, as 
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mentioned, be seen as particularized trust in the sense that we in many ways know the 
institutions or officials within the institutions. These types of trust both refer to the context-
specific versions of trust regarding how and whom we trust. It would therefore be expected that 
they had a stronger correlation. Why are they not stronger correlated?  
The main task of the government is to provide for its citizens and ensure their rights, 
how and if they at all perform in these areas should affect how people trust in a larger degree. 
Tanzanians are generally very pleased with the government’s problem solving skills something 
that according to the performance-based theory should lead to greater trust in institutions. The 
finding that this is not the case dismisses the institutional theory in this specific point. In 
Botswana however the effect of this variable is stronger as well as satisfaction with democracy 
having even stronger effects on institutional trust in both countries.  
Satisfaction with democracy can be seen as a general satisfaction with and faith in the 
political system as opposed to trust in the specific institutions. The result that satisfaction with 
democracy as the generalized form of institutional trust has a strong effect on the more 
particularized form of trust in public institutions is therefore not so surprising. Overall 
satisfaction with democracy does nevertheless seem to be less important for trust in public 
institutions in Tanzania than in Botswana. This is also explained by the weaker explanatory 
power by the model for Tanzania. However, satisfaction with democracy does have a positive 
effect on institutional trust also in the final model, meaning that it does play a contributing role 
in explaining trust. All in all, the performance-based theory gains support due to the strong 
effect that these two variables have on trust in public institutions, with the small exception of 
faith in problem solving in Tanzania. If people are satisfied with the political system, they will 
also trust the public institutions in that system. In his study on institutional trust in South Africa 
Askvik (2008) finds that satisfaction with democracy is very important in the determination of 
peoples trust in institutions. It is therefore somewhat surprising that the explanatory power of 
these variables in my study is significantly lower than in his study.   
 In relation to the other independent variables the effect from satisfaction with 
democracy becomes a little weaker in Tanzania while faith in problem solving is insignificant. 
In Botswana both variables are insignificant.     
  
 
5.7 Policy Performance 
 The hypothesis for the policy performance variable was naturally based on the 
performance-based theory and the hypothesis is in large part correct. The performance of 
national government and approval of the President’s performance have strong correlations with 
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trust in both countries and the effect for these variables in the regression analysis is even 
stronger. The insignificance of the remaining variables in the regression model shows that when 
all the policy performance variables are seen together the effect that the government’s and the 
President’s performance has on trust “washes out” the effect of the other variables. The strong 
effect from policy performance variables can be seen in several other studies as well, like for 
instance those of Askvik (2008), Lühiste (2006) and Hutchison and Johnson (2011) referred to 
in the theoretical framework above. The descriptive statistics shows that people are generally 
fairly satisfied with the performance of the President, the members of Parliament and the local 
government council. In Botswana they are also quite satisfied with the general policy 
performance while people in Tanzania are not as pleased in this area. As the samples in these 
surveys are rather large it can be believed that these numbers paint a reasonably good picture 
of how well the government actually performs, although this is a subjective measure from the 
respondents according to their expectations.  
 
The fact that the government in Botswana receives higher praises from their people can 
be explained by their success in several important policy areas, like health care and education 
systems (Worldbank, 2016), through the years. It is nevertheless strange that the numbers were 
turned around in the previous section where Tanzanians had great faith in the problem solving 
skills of the government, while Batswanas did not have that much faith. The main difference 
here is that one variable is based on evaluations of past performance, while the other is faith in 
future performance. There seems to be a slight change in both countries at the moment, with 
the economic growth in Botswana slowing down while Tanzania is experiencing higher 
economic growth than ever (Worldbank, 2016). This could be an explaining factor. The overall 
success in terms of development can also cause the people of Botswana to expect more of the 
government than the people of Tanzania. Therefore, the government also has more to lose if 
they do not succeed, which in turn will affect trust negatively.  
In the regression model with the effect of all the independent variables on trust in public 
institutions we see that in Botswana the government’s and the President’s performance are the 
only variables that have significant effects and they have quite strong effects too. In Tanzania 
these are the variables with the strongest effect, but a few other variables also contribute in 
explaining institutional trust.    
 
We see that the local government’s performance has an insignificant effect on 
institutional trust in both countries, while national policy performance is the most important 
factor in determining people’s trust in public institutions, at least in comparison to my 
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independent variables. This confirms the foundation of the performance-based theory further 
as it seems that how the government performs is the most determining factor for peoples trust. 
But why is the performance of the national government so much more important than the 
performance of the local government? As mentioned, there are two aspects to the performance-
based theory, the political and the economic (Mishler and Rose, 2001, Lühiste, 2006). Both 
aspects are represented in the national performance index with for instance empowering 
women, fighting corruption and reducing crimes representing political aspects and reducing the 
gap between rich and poor and creating jobs are part of the economic aspects. In the local 
performance index mainly political aspects are represented. The matters mentioned in the 
national performance index can be seen as more relevant in terms of development and 
improvements in the country, both nationally and locally. One explanation could thus be that 
individuals feel that national government is more important than local government and that they 
are to a stronger degree responsible for the really important issues in society. In addition, the 
majority of the public institutions in the trust index are national level institutions, it might 
therefore not be so strange that local performance is not correlated with trust in national 
institutions.         
  
 Why does the President’s performance have such a positive effect on trust while 
members of parliament’s performance are insignificant? The respondents in Botswana state that 
they approve of President Ian Khama’s work, but they only have a little trust in him. The 
respondents in Tanzania are a bit more consistent in their answers with somewhat trust and a 
slight approval of President Jakaya Kikwete. Their performance however is important in terms 
of how people trust public institutions in general. Is there something about their leadership and 
charisma that causes this effect or have they achieved on levels which justifies approval? Is it 
also that the Presidents get credit for achievements from institutions in general because they 
give people a name and a face for people to rely on? Citrin and Green (1986) have found this 
to be true in their studies. Personal characteristics and charisma are especially important in this 
matter and these are factors that have been visible amongst leaders in several African countries 
since independence. This was the case also for President Kikwete. He was a very popular 
president in his ten-year period much due to his charismatic character, but also because of his 
achievements in improvement of infrastructure and foreign policy. He also improved economic 
conditions for individuals and women in particular and contributed to economic growth. 
However, Kikwete and his government were also involved in numerous corruption scandals as 
well as failing to protect journalists criticizing political leaders and reporting on failure from 
the government (Daily Monitor, 2015). The high trust in and approval of President Kikwete is 
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thus well reasoned and it seems to be the case also here that he might stand as a representative 
of the public institutions in general.  
Botswana has long been known for its democratic, peaceful and stable society. It has a 
well-functioning multiparty system that has existed long, but over the past few years this has 
started to crack. A negative development that is being ascribed to President Khama’s more and 
more autocratic leadership. In his re-election in 2014 his party, Botswana Democratic Party, 
received significantly less support than before and there are clear signs of stress in the political 
system (Mail & Guardian Africa, 2015). Yet approval of President Khama’s performance is 
high, though trust is slightly lower. As this variable has a strong, positive effect on institutional 
trust we can believe that also in Botswana people view their President as the leader for, and 
face of the public institutions.  
These presidential characteristics correspond with the mentioning above that it seems 
as the two countries are undergoing some changes. While Tanzania seems to be heading in the 
right direction in many key areas, both politically and economically, Botswana is going through 
somewhat of a rough patch. In the case of Botswana, it will hopefully turn out to be exactly 
that, a rough patch, and thus not be a permanent shift. The newly elected president in Tanzania, 
John Magufuli, on the other hand must continue the good work to assure continued high trust 
from the public. 
 
As we saw above trust levels are higher in Tanzania than in Botswana. The strange 
factor is that approval of governmental performance and presidential performance is relatively 
high in Botswana and this has a strong positive effect on trust in public institutions, but trust 
levels are rather low. The adjusted R square of the final model shows that policy performance 
explains almost 40 percent of the variations in trust in public institutions. This is a very 
satisfactory result, but it also means that there are other factors in society that I have not 
considered in my study that have negative effects on trust. Again, this shows how complex it is 
to explain the origins of trust. Nevertheless, the performance-based theory of trust gains a lot 
of support in this category as do previous findings that the President’s performance and 
charisma play a significant role. 
 
 
5.8 Summary  
 What are the origins of institutional trust? And how can we explain that different 
variables have different effects in Botswana and Tanzania? These are questions I have tried to 
answer in this analysis chapter. The first hypothesis regarding the general institutional trust 
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levels in the two countries turned out not to be valid as respondents in Tanzania expressed 
greater trust in public institutions than the respondents in Botswana did. The reasons for this 
could be lower expectations from the public, naivety or that they simply do not know better 
after years of poor government under Nyerere and a one-party democracy. The different 
hypotheses within the socio-demographic category showed mixed belief in the effect of these 
variables. Age and gender turned out to be insignificant, as expected, while education had a 
small negative effect, also as predicted. Living standards as a measure for economic prosperity 
turned out to have a small positive effect which was also in line with the hypothesis and the 
theory of success and well-being. Tribe was probably the most interesting variable in this 
category and the strong effects, both negative and positive, were reasoned in the specific groups 
relation to the government. The Kalanga tribe in Botswana have long been discriminated and 
oppressed by the Tswana tribe which is likely to explain their low institutional trust. The 
generally low support for the socio-demographic variables as well as low explanatory power of 
the model proves that cultural theories help little in explaining why people choose to trust public 
institutions.  
 The social capital variables do not give much support to the cultural theories either. In 
the first model however, there is a small effect from most of the variables in Tanzania, but only 
a few significant ones in Botswana. The spill-over effect from social trust and social capital can 
therefore only be said to be slightly true in these countries.  
 The transparency variables were expected to have a negative effect on trust based on 
that corruption is seen as a negative factor in society and will therefore lead to lower trust 
amongst the people. Levels of perceived corruption are not too high in either country, but this 
does have a rather strong negative effect on institutional trust. The media variables had for most 
part negative influence on institutional trust as well, but not as strong. The partly free media in 
both countries gives reason to believe that some negative stories are being reported which is 
likely to lead to the decrease in trust.  
 Satisfaction with democracy and faith in problem solving were, based on the core of 
institutional theory, believed to have positive effects on institutional trust which turned out to 
be a relatively correct assumption. The strong effect from satisfaction with democracy can be 
explained by the thought that if people are generally satisfied with the system they will likely 
also trust the functioning of the institutions within this system. Faith in problem solving should 
by this logic have been stronger related with institutional trust as this refers to why individuals 
trust and whom they trust. Institutional theory does nevertheless gain support given that the 
variables all do have a positive effect on institutional trust. The significant effect from the 
satisfaction with democracy variable in the final regression model also proves this.    
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 The policy performance variables were not unexpectedly the variables with the strongest 
correlations in both models. However, national policy performance and the President’s 
performance were the only significant variables, these were also significant in the final 
regression model. This is naturally explained by the performance-based theory as people will 
trust more the better they evaluate the government’s performance to be. The importance of the 
President can be ascribed to his role as the head of government and many will probably see him 
as a leader for the various institutions, although this is not necessarily the case in practice.         
  
 All in all, national policy performance and approval of the President’s performance 
seems to be the most important variables in determining people’s trust in public institutions 
which in turn gives support to performance-based and institutional theory as well as previous 
findings (Askvik, 2008, Lühiste, 2006, Mishler and Rose, 2001). Cultural theories on the other 
hand does not get a lot of support, though there are some small spill-over effects from social 
trust to institutional trust. Associationism and particularized trust have minimal effects and so 
does tribe and education. Also these results correlate with the theories and hypotheses.   
 
 In the following chapter I will try to gather the main points of this analysis in order to 
reach a conclusion for this study. A summary of the thesis will be necessary before I can list 
the paradoxes and implications of my study and finally answer my research problem. As 
institutional trust in an African context is without a doubt a field that deserves to be studied 
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Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks 
 
I started this thesis by asking the questions What is trust? What defines trust? Why do 
we decide to trust and how do we measure it? Do we need trust? Maybe of more importance in 
this context how does trust occur? I have for most part treated trust as expectations as opposed 
to ways of conduct. I relied on Newton’s (2001) definition of trust stating it as “a belief that 
others, at worst, will not knowingly or willingly do you harm, and at best, will act in your 
interest”. This will also include a vulnerability factor, meaning that individuals place 
themselves in a somewhat critical position by relying on others to handle certain matters on 
their behalf. The decision to trust someone can be based on mutual interests and the want and 
need to cooperate in order to reach a common goal or simply making others responsible for the 
outcome alone. In complex and unknown situations individuals need to trust and rely on others 
in order to cope. It was established early on in this thesis that we need trust. We need to be able 
to trust the people around us as well as the institutions we interact with on a daily, weekly or 
monthly basis. Trust is vital for social cooperation, the generation of social capital, a stable 
democracy and functioning institutions. It is believed that people who share expectations, 
values and beliefs are more likely to trust each other. If the common codes of conduct are 
practiced by the institutions, they will likely gain increased trust from the public. In addition, 
this could lead to more trust amongst individuals.  
 
The importance of trust is highly recognized and widely studied and discussed, but in 
the large pile of research on the field there are surprisingly few studies concerning African 
countries. As the presence of trust is regarded as vital for establishing modern, well-functioning 
democracies it is strange that it is not studied further in these newly established democracies in 
Africa. Based on this I chose to study institutional trust in Botswana and Tanzania. The reason 
for choosing these two countries was that the former is seen as a rare African success in terms 
of development. It has had a stable multi-party democracy since independence in 1966 with a 
steady economic growth. However, it has struggled a bit when it comes to making sure that the 
growth will benefit the many. In addition, it has recently been claimed that President Ian Khama 
is rather autocratic in his leadership. Nevertheless, Botswana is the highest ranked sub-Saharan 
African country on the Human Development Index. The latter has been known to struggle 
slightly more in terms of development and good governance. Since independence in 1961 Julius 
Nyerere ruled the country for decades as a socialist, one-party state. The implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Programs was partly successful and has helped the country to economic 
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growth, but this has not benefited the majority of the population and development is still 
suffering. In addition, corruption levels are high and the country scores rather poorly on good 
governance indexes. An additional difference between the countries is the ethnic compositions. 
Botswana is a homogenous country with one dominating ethnic group, the Tswana tribe, and a 
few smaller ones. Tanzania on the other hand is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in 
the world with around 130 different ethnic groups.  
 
My research problem asked which factors determined institutional trust in the two 
countries and if there were any differences, either in trust levels alone or determining variables 
of trust in public institutions. In order to be able to answer this I started off with a theoretical 
discussion of the concept of institutional trust as my dependent variable. This led me to a further 
discussion of the various factors and elements that can cause a trusting relationship between 
individuals and public institutions. Two main theories were presented here as the ones I would 
rely on when explaining my findings in the analysis. Cultural theories consist of six sub-
theories; personality theory, the theory of success and well-being, community theory, voluntary 
organization theory, societal theory and social networks theory. These theories have gained 
mixed support in the past, but were included as a contrast to the institutional theory in an attempt 
to explain those variables that were not directly connected to the institutions. Institutional or 
performance-based theory logically states that trust in institutions is based on their performance 
and if this is in accordance with the public’s expectations. Based on this I developed two 
categories of independent variables within the cultural theories; socio-demographic factors and 
social capital, and three categories of independent variables within institutional theory; 
transparency, democratic satisfaction and policy performance.  
The absolute majority of studies on trust are done using statistical data and I therefore 
chose to rely on quantitative method as well. Statistics gave me the possibility to generalize my 
findings to the larger population and it tells me about the situation concerning institutional trust 
in Botswana and Tanzania as a whole as opposed to looking at a very isolated case like when 
using qualitative methods. Comparing two countries gave the study more depth as I got to test 
the theories in different national contexts. The time-consuming process of collecting statistical 
data required me to rely on a secondary analysis using data from Afrobarometer’s 2012 survey. 
I thoroughly evaluated their methods as well as the data collected and regarded it as both valid 
and reliable. The validity and reliability of my study was also evaluated and found to be fairly 
good. In addition to these strengths to using the quantitative comparative method there are 
absolutely some weaknesses. The main one being that I have never been to either of the two 
countries which can cause me to make misinterpretations about different situations. Combining 
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the quantitative method with qualitative elements like for instance fieldwork would absolutely 
have strengthened the thesis. Observations and in depth interviews would have added some 
flesh to the bone and a more accurate interpretation of reality. I do however think that I have 
been able to capture a good image of the situation due to the thorough data collection methods 
done by Afrobarometer catching the diversities in society and a reflected understanding of key 
areas in the two countries.  
In the process of analyzing my data I relied on descriptive statistics as well as correlation 
and regression analysis done in SPSS. The findings gave me some surprises judging by my 
hypotheses. First and foremost, levels of institutional trust were higher in Tanzania than in 
Botswana. I had expected it to be the other way around. The explanation for this could be loyalty 
towards the government or simply that they are not aware of what good governance entails after 
years of bad governance. The situation in Tanzania has however improved somewhat over the 
last few years and this is likely to increase trust. At the same time the development curve in 
Botswana is flattening out which could cause institutional trust to decrease. One could also 
think that President Khama’s autocratic style would decrease trust, but trust in the President is 
fairly high in Botswana. Wong and Hsiao (2011) has studied the effect from several institutional 
and cultural variables on institutional trust in six Asian countries; China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. In a few of the countries some of the cultural 
variables have an effect. Traditionalism and authoritarianism, for instance, have weak, but 
positive correlations with institutional trust. Although these two variables are not included in 
my study they could be thought to lead to high trust in public institutions in general and the 
President in particular. Authoritarianism is believed to lead to loyalty towards the government 
and political fear will cause one to express higher trust than intended (Jamil and Askvik, 2016). 
As the trust index consists of administration and public officials in addition to the 
elected politicians I must also consider their trustworthiness. Jamil et al. (2013) find, in their 
study on institutional trust in Nepal and Bangladesh, that prompt and efficient as well as 
friendly and helpful public officials generate more trust in both countries (Jamil et al., 2013). 
In addition, predictable and reliable civil servants are positively correlated with institutional 
trust in Nepal (ibid.). It could therefore be that the administration and bureaucracy in Tanzania 
is more efficient since trust is generally higher here. The descriptive statistics for trust in the 
public institutions separately (in appendix 2) show that there is no clear distinction between 
trust in the representational institutions and the legal and administrative institutions.  
   
Based on previous findings I did not have too high hopes for the socio-demographic 
variables. I expected an insignificant effect from gender and age which turned out to be correct, 
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which is also in line with previous findings and theoretical expectations that institutional 
performance will affect people randomly. In Wong and Hsiao’s (2011) study age and gender 
also have insignificant effects on trust in public institutions. Personality, up-bringing and 
societal and community features will also affect people regardless of age and gender. The slight 
negative effects of education were also expected, though this effect was not very strong. As the 
absolute majority in both countries has completed primary school it is likely that it is secondary 
school and higher education that causes the effect. Learning about the political system and 
political and social rights as well as developing a more critical mindset could be the cause effect. 
Also this was the case in Wong and Hsiao’s (2011) study, where education is found to have a 
slight negative effect on institutional trust in China, while insignificant in the other countries 
(Wong and Hsiao, 2011). China is known for its authoritarian regime and as people seem to 
trust less the more education they have could be a sign of a more critical attitude towards the 
government. The same explanation can be valid in the two countries in my study.   
 Living standards was expected to have a positive effect as the theory of success and 
well-being states that those who have more have relatively less to loose and will therefore be 
more willing to trust others, including public institutions. This theory gained some support as 
the effect was weakly positive. The descriptive statistics for this variable was surprising as 
living standards seemed to be better in Tanzania than in Botswana. This is strange considering 
Botswana’s higher development status. Some of the explanation however can lie in the fact that 
this is a subjective measure.   
Tribe was believed to be positively related to institutional trust. The effects from the 
three largest tribes in the two countries were both negative and positive. Due to discrimination 
and oppression in the past the Kalanga tribe in Botswana seems to trust less. The two largest 
tribes in Tanzania, Sukuma and Ha, are very trusting of the public institutions, while the Chaga 
tribe is less trusting. The overall effects of the socio-demographic variables were as expected 
minimal. The explanation for the limited effect could be the irrelevance of social and 
demographic elements in regard to how institutions perform, both negatively and positively.  
 
I did expect there to be a spill-over effect from the social capital variables to institutional 
trust and this was to some degree true, though very limited. The theory of voluntary 
organization gained some support due to the findings in Tanzania. It was however baffling that 
membership in voluntary or community groups had a positive effect on institutional trust while 
membership in religious groups had a negative effect. General trust levels in both countries 
seem to be very low and this has no impact on institutional trust. Theories and previous findings 
state that if people generally trust other people and take an active part in their community this 
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will build social networks and a more trusting culture will develop. In Tanzania this seems to 
be the case as most variables have some effect, though membership in religious groups are 
negatively correlated. In Botswana on the other hand only two of the particularized trust 
variables have a positive effect on institutional trust. Social capital does, for most part, have a 
positive impact on institutional trust, but it cannot be said to be a determining factor.  
 
The remaining groups of independent variables were all connected to institutional 
theory, and the thought that trust in institutions would be based on their performance. Generally 
speaking, these variables had a significantly bigger effect on institutional trust than the previous 
variables. Involvement with corruption is viewed as negative behavior and it contradicts with 
values and norms in society, it was therefore as expected that perceived corruption had a 
negative effect on institutional trust. In Jamil et al.’s (2013) study in Bangladesh and Nepal they 
too find that corruption has a negative effect on institutional trust in Bangladesh, but not in 
Nepal.  
In what degree people get news from different mediums is not of great significance, but 
in Botswana listening to radio has a positive effect while reading newspapers has a negative 
effect. It is therefore likely to believe that different stories or different perspectives of the stories 
are being reported in these two mediums. In Tanzania both listening to radio and watching 
television has a negative effect, meaning that they are likely reporting stories that put the public 
institutions in a bad light. Individuals will mainly receive information about what is going on 
in government through the media and this will naturally influence their trust, but we see that it 
does not have a great effect.  
We also find an expected correlation between how satisfied respondents are with 
democracy and how much they trust public institutions. This can be explained by the thought 
that if people are satisfied with the political system and agree with the values and norms 
expressed through that system they will trust more. As the core of the performance-based theory 
claims, the actual performance of the institutions will be determining for how much trust they 
receive form the public. This is also the case in Tanzania and Botswana. Approval of the 
President’s performance is also very important. In both countries it seems as the performance 
in various key areas is quite good, however better in Botswana than in Tanzania. Respondents 
also approve of their President. This has also been the case in previous findings. The President 
is the face of the government and its institutions, the work done by the institutions may therefore 
reflect on his leadership and this again will either increase or decrease trust. Wong and Hsiao’s 
(2011) also find that both economic and political performance has a strong positive effect on 
institutional trust. Similar to the findings in a number of other studies (Mishler and Rose, 2001, 
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Askvik, 2008, Lühiste, 2006), it can be said that the institutional theory gains vastly more 
support than the cultural theory.  
 
 This summary leads me to the answer of my research problem. Although the socio-
demographic and social capital variables do have some effect on institutional trust in both 
countries, it is without doubt that those variables directly related to the institutions and their 
performance that explain for the most variations in trust in public institutions. The institutional 
theory of how and why trust occurs therefore gains the most support and we can say that this 
theory is valid in these two African countries. Mishler and Rose’s (2001) lifetime learning 
model distinguishes between early-life socialization and later-life experiences and cultural and 
social variables and institutional and performance-based variables are seen in relation to one 
another. They claim though that the combination of these variables in the determination of 
individuals’ trust will likely not happen in newer democracies and it seems as this is the case in 
Botswana and Tanzania. However, there are signs that the people in Tanzania still inhabit some 
of the legacies from Nyerere’s presidential era. In an unstable political situation with varied 
performance trust will likely also change rapidly if determined by performance, if, on the other 
hand, the cultural and social variables play the bigger role trust will not be affected by the 
unstableness in government. In this case it will be unlikely or rather impossible that these 
variables all influence institutional trust. In well-established and stable democracies early-life 
socialization, pre-political experiences and social trust will often coincide with adult 
experiences of both the social and political world. This is likely to cause both cultural, social 
and institutional variables to influence peoples trust patterns, but in newer democracies 
individuals will rely on one type of variables, or early-life or later-life experiences. In Botswana 
and Tanzania, it seems as though people, as expected, will rely on the latter. The main difference 
between the two countries is that slightly more of the variables can be given credit for 
institutional trust in Tanzania than in Botswana. Apart from this, both countries display the 
same trends in terms of institutional trust. As national policy performance is the absolute most 
important factor in gaining trust from the public this is the key area to focus on in terms of 
continued trust and increased trust in the future.  
A few paradoxes can be found in this thesis. The first one is that respondents are more 
satisfied with the policy performance in Botswana and this has a positive effect on institutional 
trust, but trust levels are lower here than in Tanzania. A second paradox is that more people 
approve of the President in Botswana than in Tanzania, but less people trust him. Third, faith 
in future problem solving is much stronger in Tanzania, but satisfaction with previous 
performance is weak. Why would people trust the government to solve issues when they do not 
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approve of the work they have done in the past? In addition, I also find it strange that people in 
Botswana show greater trust in public institutions than in relatives, neighbors and other people 
they know.       
 
Grimen (2009) required that a good theory of trust would help answer the question how 
and why trust occurs, develops and crumbles. The combination of institutional and cultural 
theories does a satisfying job at this. In terms of how and why trust occurs, positive and 
fulfilling performance by the government is of most importance. Trust in institutions in both 
countries is quite high, people are also satisfied with the performance of the institutions and 
they approve of their President. When trust is performance-based, increasing and developing 
trust will as mentioned require better institutional performance which in theory is simple as 
opposed to culturally based trust. The challenging element with performance-based trust 
however is that institutional trust can crumble just as easy as it can occur and develop. 
Continued high performance and avoidance of negative conduct is therefore important for 
continued trust from the public. The fact that trust already is high and satisfaction with policy 
performance, the President and the democracy as a whole is good are positive signs in regard 
to development and government. As noted several times, trust is vital for a well-functioning 
democracy with stable institutions and the findings in this thesis paints a positive picture of the 
situation for both countries. Even though there is still a long way to go in terms of a stable 
government and development the fact that the public is generally positive to the work done by 
the public institutions is a very good start and this will also make it easier to solve issues and 
achieve goals in the future.   
        
I hope that I with this thesis have contributed somewhat to an increased focus on the 
African countries within trust research as well as determining some of the factors that lead to 
trust in public institutions. I have tested the two main theories of trust in two African countries 
and the results I got were not much different than those found in studies in Western and Asian 
countries. Based on this study I can say that it seems as if performance and institutional factors 
are the main variables determining institutional trust also in African countries. However, this is 
a relatively small study and if there are at all any major differences between how trust occurs 
in developed and newly established democracies would be interesting to study further. A larger 
comparative study of several African as well as European countries could therefore be of great 
interest. Even though the explanatory power of my model is satisfying there are other factors 
in society that I have not included that could possibly contribute to explaining the variations in 
institutional trust. Relying on different independent variables is yet another path one could take 
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when studying institutional trust. There is absolutely a potential for improvement in regard to 
the method I have used and in terms of further studies on institutional trust in an African context 
it would absolutely be beneficial to combine the quantitative method with qualitative methods. 
As mentioned this is a weakness to my own study. A greater depth in the analysis could have 
been given by including fieldwork and having some real-life experiences to draw from. Another 
interesting perspective for a study on institutional trust would be a time study in order to 
compare levels of trust over a certain period of time and see if the determinant variables of trust 
has changed through different development phases and under different governments and 
Presidents as this is seemingly an important variable. I sincerely wish that institutional trust and 
its determining factors will be studied further in a wider African context.  
































BRATTON, M., MATTES, R. & GYIMAH-BOADI, E. 2004. Public Opinion, Democracy, 
and Market Reform in Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
CRESWELL, J. W. 2014. Research design : qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches, Los Angeles, Calif, SAGE. 
GRIMEN, H. 2009. Hva er tillit, Oslo, Universitetsforl. 
GRØNMO, S. 2004. Samfunnsvitenskapelige metoder, Bergen, Fagbokforl. 
JAMIL, I. & ASKVIK, S. 2015. Citizens’ Trust in Public and Political Institutions in 
Bangladesh and Nepal. Governance in South, Southeast, and East Asia. Springer. 
JAMIL, I., ASKVIK, S. & DHAKAL, T. N. 2013. Citizen's trust in public officials: 
Bangladesh and Nepal compared. In Search of Better Governance in South Asia and 
Beyond. Dordrecht: Springer. 
MARCH, J. G. & OLSEN, J. P. 1989. Rediscovering institutions : the organizational basis of 
politics, New York, Free Press. 
MIDTBØ, T. 2007. Regresjonsanalyse for samfunnsvitere: med eksempler i SPSS, 
Universitetsforlaget. 
MOSES, J. & KNUTSEN, T. 2012. Ways of knowing: competing methodologies in social and 
political research, Palgrave Macmillan. 
NORTH, D. C. 1981. Structure and change in economic history, Norton. 
PUTNAM, R. D. 2000. Bowling alone : the collapse and revival of American community, 
New York, Simon & Schuster. 
PUTNAM, R. D., LEONARDI, R. & NANETTI, R. Y. 1993. Making democracy work : civic 
traditions in modern Italy, Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press. 
YIN, R. K. 2014. Case study research : design and methods, Los Angeles, Calif, SAGE. 
 
Journal Articles 
ASKVIK, S. 2007. Political regime and popular trust in the civil service: South Africa and 
Norway compared. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 9, 69-85. 
ASKVIK, S. 2008. Trust in the post-apartheid government of South Africa: The roles of 
identity and policy performance. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 46, 516-
539. 
Marianne Landmark, Spring 2016: Trust in Public Institutions 
	
112 
ASKVIK, S. 2010. The dynamics of political trust in South Africa, 1995–2006. Politikon, 37, 
25-44. 
CHRISTENSEN, T. & LÆGREID, P. 2005. Trust in government: The relative importance of 
service satisfaction, political factors, and demography. Public Performance & 
Management Review, 28, 487-511. 
CITRIN, J. & GREEN, D. P. 1986. Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in 
Government. British Journal of Political Science, 16, 431-453. 
DELHEY, J. & NEWTON, K. 2003. Who trusts?: The origins of social trust in seven 
societies. European Societies, 5, 93-137. 
DIAMOND, L. J. & MORLINO, L. 2004. An overview. Journal of democracy, 15, 20-31. 
FREITAG, M. & BÜHLMANN, M. 2009. Crafting Trust: The Role of Political Institutions in 
a Comparative Perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 42, 1537-1566. 
FREITAG, M. & TRAUNMÜLLER, R. 2009. Spheres of trust: An empirical analysis of the 
foundations of particularised and generalised trust. European Journal of Political 
Research, 48, 782-803. 
FUKUYAMA, F. 2001. Social capital, civil society and development. Third World Quarterly, 
22, 7-20. 
FUKUYAMA, F. 2002. Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda. SAIS Review, 
22, 23-37. 
GLEAVE, E., ROBBINS, B. & KOLKO, B. 2012. Trust in Uzbekistan. International 
Political Science Review, 33, 209-229. 
HALL, P. A. & TAYLOR, R. C. R. 1996. Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms*. Political Studies, 44, 936-957. 
HERREROS, F. & CRIADO, H. 2008. The state and the development of social trust. 
International Political Science Review, 29, 53-71. 
HETHERINGTON, M. J. 1998. The Political Relevance of Political Trust. The American 
Political Science Review, 92, 791-808. 
HOOGHE, M. 2003. Value congruence and convergence within voluntary associations: 
ethnocentrism in Belgian organizations. Political Behavior, 25, 151-175. 
HUTCHISON, M. L. & JOHNSON, K. 2011. Capacity to trust? Institutional capacity, 
conflict, and political trust in Africa, 2000–2005. Journal of Peace Research, 48, 737-
752. 
IIMI, A. 2006. Did Botswana escape from the resource curse? 
JACOBSEN, D. I. 1999. Trust in Political-Administrative Relations: The Case of Local 
Authorities in Norway and Tanzania. World Development, 27, 839-853. 
Marianne Landmark, Spring 2016: Trust in Public Institutions 
	
113 
JAMIL, I. & ASKVIK, S. 2016. Introduction to Special Issue. International Journal of Public 
Administration. Routledge, Taylor and Francis group. 
KNACK, S. & KEEFER, P. 1997. Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-
country investigation. The Quarterly journal of economics, 1251-1288. 
KRYZANEK, A. Bridging New Democracies: The Dynamics of trust and Political 
Participation in African Countries.  67th MPSA Annual Conference, Chicago, 2009. 
LEE, C.-S. 2013. Welfare states and social trust. Comparative Political Studies, 46, 603-630. 
LEWICKI, R. J., MCALLISTER, D. J. & BIES, R. J. 1998. Trust and distrust: New 
relationships and realities. Academy of management Review, 23, 438-458. 
LÜHISTE, K. 2006. Explaining trust in political institutions: Some illustrations from the 
Baltic states. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39, 475-496. 
MA, D. & YANG, F. 2014. Authoritarian orientations and political trust in East Asian 
societies. East Asia, 31, 323-341. 
MATTES, R., BRATTON, M., CHALIGHA, A. & DAVIDS, Y. D. 2002. Uncritical citizens 
or patient trustees? Tanzanians' views of political and economic reform. 
Afrobarometer Working Paper, Afrobarometer Paper No. 18. 
MAYER, R. C., DAVIS, J. H. & SCHOORMAN, F. D. 1995. An integrative model of 
organizational trust. Academy of management review, 20, 709-734. 
MISHLER, W. & ROSE, R. 2001. What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional 
and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative political studies, 34, 
30-62. 
MORRISSEY, O. 1995. Political commitment, institutional capacity and tax policy reform in 
Tanzania. World Development, 23, 637-649. 
MUGANDA, A. Tanzania’s Economic Reforms (and Lessons Learned).  Case study for the 
World Bank Shanghai Conference on Scaling Up Poverty Reduction, Shanghai, 
China, May, 2004. 25-27. 
NEWTON, K. 2001. Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy. International 
Political Science Review, 22, 201-214. 
NEWTON, K. & NORRIS, P. 2000. Confidence in public institutions. Disaffected 
democracies. What's troubling the trilateral countries. 
PAXTON, P. 2007. Association memberships and generalized trust: A multilevel model 
across 31 countries. Social Forces, 86, 47-76. 
PUTNAM, R. D. 1995. Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. Journal of 
Democracy, 6, 65-78. 
Marianne Landmark, Spring 2016: Trust in Public Institutions 
	
114 
ROTBERG, R. I. 1999. Social Capital and Political Culture in Africa, America, Australasia, 
and Europe. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 29, 339-356. 
ROTHSTEIN, B. & STOLLE, D. 2008. The state and social capital: An institutional theory of 
generalized trust. Comparative politics, 441-459. 
SIMMEL, S. 1992. Simmel, Georg, Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der 
Vergesellschaftung, Gesamtausgabe, 11. 
USLANER, E. M. 1999. Democracy and social capital. Democracy and trust, 121-150. 
USLANER, E. M. 2000. Producing and Consuming Trust. Political Science Quarterly, 115, 
569-590. 
VAN DE WALLE, S. & SIX, F. 2014. Trust and Distrust as Distinct Concepts: Why 
Studying Distrust in Institutions is Important. Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis: Research and Practice, 16, 158-174. 
WONG, T. K.-Y. & HSIAO, H.-H. M. 2011. The bases of political trust in six Asian 
societies: Institutional and cultural explanations compared. International Political 
Science Review, 0192512110378657. 
YAMAGISHI, T. & YAMAGISHI, M. 1994. Trust and commitment in the United States and 
Japan. Motivation and emotion, 18, 129-166. 
 
Web Page 








CIA. 2016. Available:  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html 





Marianne Landmark, Spring 2016: Trust in Public Institutions 
	
115 













MAIL & GUARDIAN AFRICA. 2015. Available:  
http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-12-15-botswanas-democracy-under-stress [Accessed]. 
 
MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS INDICATORS. 2015. Available: 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=580 [Accessed]. 
 




NORAD. 2015. Available:  
https://www.norad.no/landsider/afrika/tanzania/ [Accessed]. 
 




TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL. 2015. Available: 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 [Accessed]. 
 
UNDP. 2015. Available:  
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI 











WORLDBANK. 2016. Available: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=TZA&series=&period= 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=BWA&series=&period= 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx - reports 


























Marianne Landmark, Spring 2016: Trust in Public Institutions 
	
117 
Appendix 1: Survey Questions  
 
Institutional Trust 
59. How much trust do you have in each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say? 




Somewhat A lot Don’t 
Know 
a. The President  0 1 2 3 9 
b. The Parliament  0 1 2 3 9 
c. The Independent Electoral 
Commission 
0 1 2 3 9 
d. The Botswana/Tanzania Revenue 
Services 
0 1 2 3 9 
e. Your Local Government Councilor 0 1 2 3 9 
f. The Ruling Party 0 1 2 3 9 
g. Opposition Political Parties  0 1 2 3 9 
h. The Police 0 1 2 3 9 
i. The Army 0 1 2 3 9 
j. Courts of Law 0 1 2 3 9 
K – TAN The Prevention and 
Combatting of Corruption Bureau 
(PCCB) 




1. How old are you? 
[Interviewer: enter three-digit number. Don’t know=999] [If respondent is 
aged less than 18, stop interview and use cards to randomly draw another 
respondent from the same household] 
   
 
Let’s discuss economic conditions. 














b. Your own living conditions? 5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Let’s go back to talking about you 
84. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe? [Do not read options. Code 
from response] Tanzania 
Mnyakyusa  740 Mmeru 751 
Mchaga 741 Mkurya 752 
Mhaya 742 Migogo  753 
Mngoni 743 Mluguru 754 
Mikwere 744 Mfipa 755 
Mpare 745 Mmanyema 756 
Mhehe 746 Mnyiramba 757 
Mmakonde 747 Mnyaturu 758 
Mnyamwezi 748 Tanzanian only or “doesn’t think 
of self in those terms” 
9990 
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Msukuma  749 Refused to answer 9998 
Mmasai  750 Don’t know 9999 





   
 
Let’s go back to talking about you 
84. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe? [Do not read options. Code 
from response] Botswana  
Mokgatla 140 Mokhurutshe 154 
Mokwena 141 Mmirwa 155 
Mongwato 142 Mongologa 156 
Mongwaketse 143 Modamara 157 
Motlokwa 144 Mombukushu 158 
Moherero 145 Molete 159 
Morolong 146 Motswapong 160 
Mosarwa 147 Motlharo 161 
Mokalaka/Mokalanga 148 Motlhaping 162 
Mosubeya 149 Mokgothu  163 
Motawana 150 Motswana only or “doesn’t think 
of self in those terms” 
9990 
Mokgalagadi 151 Refused to answer 9998 
Moyeyi/Moyei 152 Don’t know 9999 





   
 
97. What is the highest level of education you have completed? [Code from answer. Do 
not read options]  
No formal schooling 0 
Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling) 1 
Some primary schooling 2 
Primary school completed 3 
Some secondary school/high school 4 
Secondary school/high school completed 5 
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. diploma or degree 
from polytechnic or college 
6 
Some university 7 
University completed 8 
Post-graduate 9 
Don’t know (do not read) 99 
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Social Capital  
Let’s turn to you role in your community  
25. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each 
one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an 











a. A religious group that meets 
outside of regular worship services 
3 2 1 0 9 
b. some other voluntary or 
community group 
3 2 1 0 9 
 
Let’s turn to your views on your fellow citizens  
87. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
must be very careful in dealing with people?  
Most people can be trusted 1 
Must be very careful 0 
Don’t know 9 
 
88. How much do you trust the following types of people? 
 Not at all Just a little Somewhat A lot Don’t know 
a. Your relatives 0 1 2 3 9 
b. your neighbors 0 1 2 3 9 




13. How often do you get news from the following sources?  
 Every 
day 
A few times 
a week 
A few times 
a month 
Less than 
once a month 
Never Don’t 
know 
a. Radio 4 3 2 1 0 9 
b. Television 4 3 2 1 0 9 
c. Newspapers 4 3 2 1 0 9 
d. Internet 4 3 2 1 0 9 
 
 
60. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or 
haven’t you heard enough about them to say?  








a. the President and Officials in 
his Office 
0 1 2 3 9 
b. Members of Parliament 0 1 2 3 9 
c. Government Officials 0 1 2 3 9 
d. Local government councilors 0 1 2 3 9 
e. Police 0 1 2 3 9 
f. Tax officials, like Botswana 
Unified Revenue Services or 
Local government tax collectors 
0 1 2 3 9 
g. Judges and Magistrates 0 1 2 3 9 




Satisfaction with Democracy  
43. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way the democracy works in Botswana? 
Are you: [Read out options. Only one option to be chosen. Read the question in the 
language of the interview, but always read “democracy” in English. Translate “democracy” 
into local language only if respondent does not understand English term.] 
Very satisfied 4 
Fairly satisfied 3 
Not very satisfied  2 
Not at all satisfied 1 
Botswana/Tanzania is not a democracy 0 
Don’t know 9 
 
64. Taking the problem that you mentioned first, how likely do you think it is that the 
government will solve this problem within the next five years? 
Very likely 3 
Somewhat likely 2 
Not very likely 1 
Not at all likely 0 
Not applicable 7 




65. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 











a. Managing the economy 1 2 3 4 9 
b. Improving living standards for the poor  1 2 3 4 9 
c. Creating jobs 1 2 3 4 9 
d. Keeping prices down 1 2 3 4 9 
e. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor 1 2 3 4 9 
f. Reducing crime 1 2 3 4 9 
g. Improving basic health services 1 2 3 4 9 
h. Addressing educational needs 1 2 3 4 9 
i. Providing water and sanitation services 1 2 3 4 9 
j. Ensuring everyone has enough to eat 1 2 3 4 9 
k. Fighting corruption in government  1 2 3 4 9 
l. Resolving violent conflict between 
communities 
1 2 3 4 9 
m. Combatting HIV/AIDS 1 2 3 4 9 
n. Maintaining roads and bridges 1 2 3 4 9 
o. Providing a reliable supply of electricity 1 2 3 4 9 
p. Empowering women 1 2 3 4 9 
Q – TAN Reducing transport accidents 
such as road and marine 
1 2 3 4 9 
R – TAN Managing natural disasters such 
as flooding, draughts etc.  
1 2 3 4 9 
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66. What about local government? I do not mean the national government. I mean 
your municipal or local government council. How well or badly would you say your 
local government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough 











a. Maintaining local roads 1 2 3 4 9 
b. Maintaining local market places 1 2 3 4 9 
c. Maintaining health standards, for 
example in restaurants and food stalls 
1 2 3 4 9 
d. Keeping our community clean, for 
example, by refuse removed 
1 2 3 4 9 
e. Managing the use of land 1 2 3 4 9 
 
71. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have 
performed their jobs their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard 
enough about them to say?  
 Strongly 
Disapprove 




a. The President 1 2 3 4 9 
b. Your Member of Parliament 1 2 3 4 9 
c. Your elected local 
government councilor 
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 N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
 Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 
Trust 
President 
1160 2387 .00 .00 3.00 3.00 1.822 2.075 1.1292 .9821 
Trust 
Parliament 




1088 2279 .00 .00 3.00 3.00 1.626 1.806 1.1009 1.0012 
Trust revenue 
authority 
930 2218 .00 .00 3.00 3.00 1.501 1.599 1.0834 .9342 
Trust local 
gov. council 
1159 2381 .00 .00 3.00 3.00 1.25 1.846 1.0225 .9160 
Trust the 
ruling party 




1156 2382 .00 -1.00 3.00 3.00 .884 1.588 .9575 .9762 
Trust the 
police 
1188 2392 .00 .00 3.00 3.00 1.542 1.691 1.1132 1.0142 
Trust the army 1152 2384 .00 .00 3.00 3.00 1.877 2.31 1.1118 .857 
Trust courts of 
law 
1091 2382 .00 .00 3.00 3.00 1.835 2.008 1.1146 .8811 
Trust the 
PCCB* 







        
 
 









Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 
0.00-0.49 30 34 2.5 1.4 3.6 1.6 3.6 1.6 
0.50-0.99 148 122 12.3 5.1 17.9 5.7 21.5 7.4 
1.00-1.49 290 420 24.2 17.5 35.1 19.8 56.5 27.2 
1.50-1.99 139 509 11.6 21.2 16.8 24.0 73.4 51.2 
2.00-2.49 110 727 9.1 30.3 13.2 34.3 86.6 85.5 
2.50-3.00 111 309 9.3 12.9 13.4 14.5 100.0 100.0 
Total  828 2121 69.0 88.4 100.0 100.0   
Missing 372 279 31.0 11.6     
Total 1200 2400 100.0 100.0     






 Frequencies Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 
Tribe 1 191 332 15.9 13.8 15.9 13.8 61.6 36.9 
Tribe 2 147 118 12.2 4.9 12.2 4.9 29.4 59.6 
Tribe 3 113 108 9.4 4.5 9.4 4.5 9.4 6.8 
Tribe 1 = Botswana = Kalanga; Tanzania = Sukuma 
Tribe 2 = Botswana = Bangwato; Tanzania = Ha 





Frequencies: Education  
 Frequencies Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 
No formal schooling 138 189 11.5 7.9 11.5 7.9 11.5 7.9 
Informal schooling 
only 
10 21 .9 .9 .9 .9 12.4 8.8 
Some primary school 136 316 11.4 13.2 11.4 13.2 23.7 21.9 
Primary school 
completed 
128 1382 10.7 57.6 10.7 57.6 34.4 79.5 
Some secondary school 202 210 16.8 8.8 16.8 8.8 51.3 88.3 
Secondary school 
complete 
364 195 30.3 8.1 30.3 8.1 81.6 96.4 
Post- secondary 
qualifications  
75 54 6.2 2.3 6.2 2.3 87.8 98.7 
Some university 45 13 3.8 .6 3.8 .6 91.6 99.2 
University completed 96 15 8.0 .6 8.0 .6 99.5 99.9 
Post-graduate 6 4 .5 .1 .5 .1 100.0 100.0 
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis 
 
Socio-demographic variables 




Tribe Education Gender 













































N 828 2117 827 2117 747 1148 828 2121 828 2121 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 




































.010 -.067** .061 .018 .040 .031 .259** .114** .201** .176** .210** .165** 
Sig. (2-
tailed 
.767 .002 .078 .398 .248 .149 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 828 2121 828 2112 828 2119 828 2121 827 2121 827 2121 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 


























Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.060 -.106** -.044 -.143** -.124** -.112** -.102** -.069** -.303** -.394** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.083 .000 .211 .000 .000 .000 .003 .002 .000 .000 
N 828 2121 828 2121 828 2118 825 2081 569 1929 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
Trust Index 
Satisfaction with Democracy Faith in Problem Solving 











Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .007 
N 824 2099 782 2097 























Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.416** .421** .277** .248** .422** .456** .319** .304** .257** .311** 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 677 2121 706 2045 805 2108 783 2107 787 2108 
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Appendix 4: Regression Analysis 
 
 









Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 














Sig. B Std. Error Beta  
Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 
Constant 1.322 1.599 .127 .060   10.375 26.582 .000 .000 























Tribe 1 -.134 .305 .068 .036 -.070 .176 -1.986 8.377 .047 .000 
Tribe 2 -.033 .160 .075 .057 -.016 .059 -.446 2.800 .656 .005 
Tribe 3 -.110 .-271 .087 -060 -.044 -.095 -1.257 -4.529 .209 .000 
Education -.047 -.050 .014 .010 -.140 -.110 -3.319 -5.079 .001 .000 
Gender .102 -.035 .049 .026 .072 -.029 2.101 -1.363 .036 .173 
Tribe 1 = Botswana = Kalanga; Tanzania = Sukuma 
Tribe 2 = Botswana = Bangwato; Tanzania = Ha 
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Sig. B Std. Error Beta  
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Sig. B Std. Error Beta  
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Sig. B Std. Error Beta  
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Sig. B Std. Error Beta  
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Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 



















Sig. B Std. Error Beta  
Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. Bots. Tanz. 











































Tribe 1 -.371 .176 .243 .066 -.143 .092 -1.53 2.656 .131 .008 
Tribe 2 .114 .012 .263 .129 .045 .003 .433 .093 .666 .926 
Tribe 3 -.095 -.064 .276 .109 -.034 -.020 -.342 -.589 .733 .556 
Education -.029 -.024 .059 .018 -.060 -.049 -.483 -1.35 .631 .178 
Gender .326 -.007 .177 .045 .201 -.005 1.84 -.154 .070 .878 
Radio access -.052 -.023 .059 .017 -.095 -.049 -.884 -1.35 .380 .178 
TV access .003 -.024 .050 .017 .006 -.061 .059 -1.43 .953 .153 


































































































































































































































































































General trust .146 .064 .334 .067 .043 .032 .437 .955 .664 .340 
Trust 
relatives 
 
.149 
 
-.019 
 
.180 
 
.088 
 
.093 
 
-.008 
 
.828 
 
-.212 
 
.410 
 
.833 
Trust 
neighbors 
 
.133 
 
-.113 
 
.183 
 
.066 
 
.080 
 
-.070 
 
.726 
 
-1.702 
 
.470 
 
.089 
Trust others 
you know 
 
.093 
 
.162 
 
.206 
 
.052 
 
.050 
 
.123 
 
.451 
 
3.103 
 
.653 
 
.002 
 
 
